Yes, it is, would be the answer by a vast majority of Pakistanis, which is hardly surprising given the widespread anti-American sentiments prevalent in society. When quizzed on why the US would destabilise Pakistan, ‘Because they want to manufacture an excuse to defang Pakistan of its nuclear arsenal through a series of military strikes’, would come the pat reply. They honestly believe these are not mere statements but undeniable facts and any Pakistani challenging their assertion is considered either ‘bird-brained’ or on the payroll of the foreign agencies. Despite the hostile ambiance I will run the gauntlet and put the destabilising theory through what I consider litmus tests to verify its authenticity. Of the four overt and covert nuclear weapon states (India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel) besides the big five, the Pakistani and North Korean nuclear arsenals have faced the fiercest opposition from the US and its western allies. Of the two, North Korea might have been subjected to greater sanctions, threats and punitive actions than Pakistan, but the latter because of its over-dependence and vulnerability to the western financial and military support has suffered more. A critical examination of Pakistan’s road to the attainment of nuclear weapons and the US’s efforts in blocking it should reveal some interesting conclusions, which would provide useful pointers to the question posed in the title of the article. The US and Israel were and still remain the bitterest opponents of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal right from 1974 when the nation had finally decided to leave no stone unturned to indigenously manufacture nuclear weapons. Acquisition of PU-239 as nuclear fuel for the bombs was the first hurdle. Nuclear power reactors produce limited PU-239 as residue that could be siphoned off periodically to amass enough to fuel atomic bombs. Pakistan’s sole nuclear power reactor KANUPP at Karachi was under very strict supervision of the IAEA, which made pilfering PU-239 without detection almost impossible. Pakistan’s efforts to acquire a French Nuclear Reprocessing Plant in 1976 was effectively sabotaged by the US as it feared and suspected that Pakistan would be able to filch enough PU-239 from the Plant despite IAEA monitoring. As the PU-239 option closed, in walked Dr A Q Khan and he convinced Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto that he had the wherewithal to enrich Uranium to weapons grade level. Uranium in natural state comprises 99.3 percent U-238 and 0.7 percent U-235. Only the latter is fissionable. Enriching natural Uranium, where the U-235 portion is raised to beyond 90 percent converts it into nuclear weapons grade fuel and Dr Khan planned to achieve it through the centrifuge enrichment method that he had mastered abroad. He was given full freedom to do so and the work started in earnest in Khan Research Laboratory (KRL) that he set up for the purpose. While the entire KRL staff was local, some of the equipment needed to set up the centrifuges had to be imported, nay smuggled from abroad, as the US had imposed strict and heavy sanctions on any material that could be used for production of nuclear weapons. From 1976 to 1979 the Uranium enrichment process continued at a rapid pace. The CIA could not have missed this new development but in all probability considered the centrifuge technology far too advanced for Pakistan to master, Dr Khan’s claims notwithstanding. Nevertheless, the US Congress passed the Symington Amendment in 1976 that banned US economic and military assistance to countries that do not comply with IAEA regulations and inspections. The Carter administration meanwhile dangled the military carrot in the shape of supplying over a 100 A-7 Corsair strike fighters if Pakistan abandoned its nuclear weapons programme. General Ziaul Haq, who had deposed Bhutto and taken over as the country’s supremo in 1977, did not take the bait and continued the Uranium enrichment process. Pakistan, as a result, came under heavy sanctions under the Symington Amendment. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 turned the relationship matrix between the US and Pakistan on its head and they once again became close allies. To circumvent the Symington Amendment, the Pressler Amendment that permitted resumption of financial and economic aid to Pakistan if the US president simply certified that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device was passed. Besides financial and military aid packages, Zia was able to extract another vital unwritten concession from the Reagan administration that the US turn a blind eye towards Pakistan’s nuclear programme. By 1985 KRL and the Atomic Energy Commission of Pakistan working in tandem had crossed the nuclear threshold and Pakistan had developed a handful of nuclear weapons. Like Israel and India, it adopted ‘the bomb in the basement policy’. Meanwhile, President Reagan and his successor right up to 1989 continued to certify to the US Congress that Pakistan did not have nuclear weapons. By 1988, Soviet forces in Afghanistan were in disarray and the US, with substantial help of Pakistan, had achieved its strategic aim of defeating its archenemy. In 1991 the Soviet Union disintegrated. Pakistan had served its purpose and George Bush in 1990 refused to certify Pakistan’s non-nuclear status; the Pressler Amendment was immediately invoked and Pakistan once again came under heavy sanctions. According to foreign intelligence sources, Pakistan in 1990 had about a dozen nuclear weapons and a delivery system with limited range. That was a golden opportunity for the US to have mounted a concerted raid to finish off Pakistan’s small nuclear arsenal but they did not. Why? The only explanation is that the military could not guarantee with absolute certainty its ability to destroy all Pakistani nukes and even if a couple of them survived, the danger of Pakistan starting a nuclear war was too real and frightening. Nuclear weapons are not easy to locate as they are invariably very well protected and dispersed. Unless their 100 percent destruction can be guaranteed, the risk of a nuclear conflagration makes the entire operation extremely risky. The US and its allies since then have learned to live with a nuclear Pakistan but have put the country on notice on two counts: not to transfer nuclear weapons or nuclear technology to any other state and to ensure its nuclear arsenal, especially the enriched Uranium, are secure and do not fall into the wrong hands. If a mere dozen nukes had stymied the US’s ambitions to de-nuke Pakistan over two decades ago, imagine the dilemma and migraine a hundred of them pose now that most foreign agencies credit Pakistan with that number. The only scenario where a military action to defang Pakistan of its nuclear weapons might make sense is if Pakistan either openly indulges in nuclear weapons and technology transfers or it is destabilised to the extent that extremist elements and terror outfits come to power and gain control of the strategic assets. Deliberately destabilising Pakistan, therefore, makes little sense. Besides, if one was to accept for the sake of argument that a destabilised Pakistan somehow serves the US interest, would it not be able to achieve its aim simply by forcing the IMF, the World Bank and other global financial institutions to stop any bailout packages to its already beleaguered economy? A simple trade embargo by the US would put Pakistan’s exports in a tailspin. It can even use its enormous influence to declare Pakistan a terrorist state. With far simpler options available to destabilise Pakistan, why would the US want to patronise a group that is known to be closely associated with its nemesis, the Afghan Taliban? In conclusion the theory of the US attempting to destabilise Pakistan by supporting the TTP’s terror acts fails to pass muster. That said, history is littered with examples where nations have resorted to actions that with hindsight we know bordered on lunacy because the cabal in power considered it in the national interest; the US invasion of Iraq is the most recent one. Wisdom dictates that the use of the term impossible should be avoided in almost all cases and with this caution in mind, I will end by placing this particular destabilising theory in the very improbable category. The writer is a defence analyst and Director of Centre of Airpower Studies and can be reached at jamal4701@yahoo.co.uk