Well over 90 percent of the university-going students in Lahore and Islamabad cannot differentiate between the Afghan Taliban and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). And 67 percent believe that the TTP is the enemy of the United States, and working in the interest of Pakistan. While 76 percent see the Baloch grievances as unjustified, and blame the Baloch people for supporting their corrupt Sardars (tribal chiefs), only 12 percent blame the Pakistan military for the current crisis in the country.
These are the unfortunate highlights of the study “Perception of militancy amongst urban youth” that I conducted in December 2012 at three top universities in Lahore and Islamabad. The study brings out the deep-rooted contradictions in Pakistan and suggest how miserably Pakistan’s security establishment has failed to develop an effective counterterrorism strategy. The ‘educated’ Pakistan as the study shows is pro-Taliban in geo-political terms, but would not want Taliban-style Sharia to disrupt their ‘liberal’ lifestyle. At the same time, educated Pakistan views the United States as an enemy, but would pay millions to live the American dream.
Over 11 years into the war on terror, having lost thousands of lives, and nearly destroyed our economy, the people in the cities and on the media still debate over who the real enemy is: Taliban? TTP? Or the Americans? The nation has developed such ‘critical skills’ that despite the TTP’s acceptance of terrorist attacks, it has turned a blind eye, and instead blames the United States for the attacks, thanks to certain political leaders who have led the nation into an abysmal state of confusion by being sympathetic to militant outfits, and blaming the US and its drones for whatever is wrong in Pakistan, not realising that drones came out of the need to deal with militants, not the other way around. In war, confusion is bad, and tragically, more than a decade into the war, the same Pakistani politicians call it an ‘American war’, an idea utterly disrespectful to all those Pakistani soldiers and families who laid down their lives in this war to save Pakistan.
What is even more unfortunate is the role of the top brass of the Pakistan military, which somehow gets little limelight within Pakistan. The first basic step in any counterterrorism strategy is to define the target, forge a national consensus, and make people firmly believe in the absolute necessity of wiping out the target, something that the United States did in the case of Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. However, the military in Pakistan with all its budget and might during authoritarian rule when mobilising the people would not have been an issue, either forgot to strike up a consensus against terrorism, or deliberately allowed controlled chaos in information. Today, a decade later, as my study reveals, there is no consensus in Pakistan over the militant and terrorist groups, and the little consensus if any, tilts positive towards the TTP and Taliban. Either the state has lost its power over the narrative, or, the agencies are deliberately constructing this controlled narrative to meet their strategic interests in post-US withdrawal Afghanistan. Whatever the military advisors are doing, the reality should hit them hard by now that they are doing just about everything wrong.
The strategic policies of the Pakistan military are not helping Pakistan increase its external sphere of influence, nor helping to resolve the Kashmir or Durand disputes, nor giving Pakistan an economic advantage in terms of natural resources. The strategic policy is only leading to more Pakistanis, ethnic and religious minorities, being killed inside the country, and the country eventually reaching a point of splitting asunder.
What needs to be done?
The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) needs to take bold steps. For one it needs to push the Pakistan military to open up its vault of secrets, and make its policies and strategies transparent so that the government knows what exactly the ground situation is. Second, the government must invite all political actors and reach a strict consensus on the national narrative towards terrorism. Parliament cannot stand divided with one side sympathetic towards the TTP, while the other side is being killed by the same group. Without consensus Pakistan entered this war, but without consensus, Pakistan cannot get out of this war. Third, the media must be taken on board to ensure that it supports the national narrative on terrorism. The voices that create confusion and chaos must not be entertained on the media. Last, the PML-N government needs to take the step forward to negotiate with the US, and with the terrorists themselves, rather than letting the military turn to diplomacy, something that the military is not genetically prepared for.
Taking the forefront on the issue of terrorism will not be an easy task for the PML-N, but there is no other way out either. The clash between the PML-N and the military is inevitable; the clock, as a lot of people within the government and military know, is ticking. For a military that only believes in limited democracy and does not allow civilians to touch foreign and defence affairs, a strong Nawaz Sharif with both foreign and defence portfolios is a major crisis situation. The military will push back and is likely going to scheme. However, with the nation behind the PML-N, Sharif must take the leap of faith, once again.
The writer is a lecturer at the National University of Science and Technology (NUST) in Islamabad. He is also an Associate Fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), Kings College, London. He can be reached at [email protected]