Pakistan has a new government in place. The party that leads it, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), a centre-right party, despite accusations of having links with extremists and being soft on them, promises in its manifesto there will be civilian control of intelligence agencies and considers trade and interaction to be a better security policy than purely military means. It also promises to improve relations with India. The new prime minister Mian Nawaz Sharif has, on more than one occasion, declared his government’s determination not to permit the use of Pakistan’s territory against anyone. This means he intends to bring some changes and not just tactical adjustments to Pakistan’s security/foreign policy including Pakistan’s Afghan policy. If he really means it and has the capability to do so, the results should be evident very soon. Change is not visible yet. Pakistan, to be able to make the best of its location and significance to Afghanistan, must start playing a role that really contributes to peace and is very visible. The first step is the conceptual framework, i.e. how you view terrorism and religious extremism, where you place it in your foreign policy/security policy. The Pakistani state has viewed religious extremism as a good tool, as a useful policy regarding India and Afghanistan, as well as internally in East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, and also Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. The change must start there; perceptions that jihadis/religious extremists/extremism can serve any foreign or domestic policy goal has to be abandoned. Thus an active policy of dismantling of the jihadi complex has to commence. There must be a clean break from such mindset/actions/policy, without any exception. In Afghanistan the policy of the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Taliban must go, as starters. It should be followed up with a more proactive policy. Pakistan must start with proactive pursuance of a policy of resolving its disputes with the government of Afghanistan. The first step should be a simple change: from asking for a friendly government in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s policy should be the desire of friendship with the state of Afghanistan. It must clearly refrain from supporting or opposing any Afghan party or ethnicity. This can start by changing this part of policy statements on various occasions. Pakistan must initiate action against terrorists, foreign or local, whether targeting Pakistan or others, especially Afghanistan. Therefore the policy of differentiating between the good and bad Taliban must go and be seen as gone. A very significant trust building measure can be the initiative of handing over the Afghan Taliban the Pakistan government keeps in its custody. If Pakistan wants to improve relations with India, it should have not created any problem in Indo-Afghan relations. Pakistan can permit the use of its territory for trade and other communication between its two neighbours. This step will be the on-ground implementation of the PML-N manifesto’s definition of security in trade and interaction. Such preliminary proactive actions will place Pakistan in a very strong position in the emerging regional peace centred on peace in Afghanistan. It must be remembered that time is not in favour of Pakistan. Changing track after December 2014 may be too late. US interests are very limited compared to those of Pakistan. The US is looking for a peaceful and respectable way out, which it will get with or without Pakistan. But the continuation of violence in Afghanistan will only escalate after the US drawdown; as for Pakistan, continued religious terrorism is an existential issue, threatening its security. The Pakistani state is giving mixed signals. These mixed signals are more a result of confusion and the lack of a clear policy than some conscious policy decision, good or bad. Calling it Pakistan’s double game is giving the policy confusion and indecisiveness a great deal of underserved respectability. It appears that the realisation of the need to change is there; however, the existence of required understanding and political will to go about it is lacking. The first step in correcting that would be changing the sources of input in decision making, both political and intellectual. Bureaucracies — uniformed or otherwise — have a tendency and expertise to present facts and available policy alternatives in such a manner that even the most intelligent and independent political bosses select the alternative that the bureaucrats intended to be selected. Then in Pakistan exist a large number of so-called independent security/foreign policy experts, mostly former diplomats, generals and journalists as well as some from academia, who actually promote deep state views, with minor variations. Whether they may genuinely think that due to their training and lifelong association or at times may be encouraged to do so is irrelevant. The political leadership, if interested in controlling and making its own decisions to take policy initiatives, need not know all policy details, need not be experts, and they are not so even in the most developed states. However, they must have the ability to identify independent minds and opinion, which is the real quality of a democratic leader. Time is moving. It has to be realised that agreement or not, December 2014 will arrive. The implications of that should not be lost on anyone. Pakistan faces a real existential challenge in the expected increased violence in the post-December 2014 Afghanistan, which will not remain limited to north of the Durand Line. (Concluded) The writer is a professor of International Relations at the University of Peshawar and can be reached at Ijazk.blogspot.com