On August 26, Hamid Karzai, President of Afghanistan, met Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister of Pakistan, in Islamabad and, on the next day, in Murree. It was the first visit of Karzai to Pakistan since Sharif’s government took over. Karzai’s visit took place in the wake of Kabul’s visit of Adviser to the Prime Minister of Pakistan on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Sartaj Aziz, in July this year. Karzai’s visit is generally being considered a failed one. Nevertheless, Karzai was able to underscore two important points. In his meeting with Sharif, the first point Karzai tried to put across was this: if Pakistan could promote talks between the US and the (Afghan) Taliban to take place in Qatar’s capital, Doha, in June this year, why could Pakistan not promote talks between the Afghan High Peace Council and the (Afghan) Taliban? It is relevant to mention here that Aziz’s visit to Kabul in July was to placate the Karzai government and assure it of Sharif’s cooperation in the future. Though the talks in Doha could not take place owing to the flag-and-a-sign controversy, the role of Pakistan to bring the US officials and the (Afghan) Taliban closer to sit on one table became conspicuously known. It was the objections raised by the Karzai government that led to obviating the talks. This point also means that in future no such talks will take place in which even a semblance of the independence of the (Afghan) Taliban is shown to the world. The point is simple: if it is acknowledged that the (Afghan) Taliban are a government-in-exile (or on the run and in need of the capital, Kabul), the whole exercise of running the Afghanistan affairs by the Karzai government will be considered a futile exercise. Pakistan has to decide unequivocally whether it recognises the Karzai government as a legitimate one or a puppet. The (Afghan) Taliban consider the Karzai government a puppet and prefer not to talk to it. Does Pakistan look at it the same way? If Pakistan deems the Karzai government to be a legitimate one, it should promote talks between the Afghan High Peace Council and the (Afghan) Taliban. So far, by not doing so, Pakistan has endorsed the stance of the (Afghan) Taliban on the issue of the legitimacy of the Kabul government. In this regard, one excuse Pakistan may forward is that it is the (Afghan) Taliban that are to decide whom to talk to. Nevertheless, the effort of Pakistan to promote talks between the US officials and the (Afghan) Taliban in Doha implies that Pakistan is a party to the issue of the legitimacy of the Kabul government. Secondly, the same point implies that Pakistan sides with the (Afghan) Taliban and endorses their point of view. This is the area that invites the ire of the Kabul government towards Pakistan and the former accuses Pakistan of destabilising Afghanistan. In his meeting with Sharif, the second point Karzai tried to articulate was this: if Pakistan is really interested in the restoration of peace in Afghanistan, why does Pakistan not release 53 Afghan Taliban prisoners including Mullah Baradar, a close associate of Mullah Omar. Despite persistent demands raised by the Kabul government to release those (Afghan) Taliban prisoners who can be instrumental in peace talks between the Kabul government and the (Afghan) Taliban, Pakistan is not acceding to the request. In this regard, Pakistan can forward an excuse that the release of Baradar and the like may be more harmful for Pakistan than beneficial for conducting any dialogue with the (Afghan) Taliban. If such is the case, Pakistan can carve out an alternative way to promote dialogue between the Karzai government and the (Afghan) Taliban to substantiate its true and sincere intentions. Pakistan’s failure to do so implies that Pakistan is ready to promote talks between the US and the (Afghan) Taliban but not between the Afghan High Peace Council and the (Afghan) Taliban. Secondly, the same point also implies that Pakistan is a party to the issue of talks. Thirdly, the same point also implies that it is not the (Afghan) Taliban who are to decide but it is Pakistan who is to decide whom to talk to. This is the second area in which Pakistan incurs the wrath of the Kabul government and the latter accuses Pakistan of the perpetuation of conflict in Afghanistan. Now, the question is this: in the presence of these two irritants, how will Pakistan continue to extend its support for the peace and reconciliation process in Afghanistan? There are other pertinent questions too. Is Pakistan fearful of the outcome of the reconciliation between the Afghan High Peace Council and the (Afghan) Taliban? Does Pakistan think that the resultant peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan will harm Pakistan in some way? It seems that there are five major presumptions Pakistan is sticking to tenaciously. First, the reconciliation between the US and the (Afghan) Taliban is still possible; second, the forthcoming elections in Afghanistan in April 2014 will be a sham and give room to the (Afghan) Taliban to re-establish their roots in Kabul; third, the prospects of peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan lie in Pakistan’s hands; fourth, the Kabul government is a puppet one and about to fall in 2014 and the gap will be filled by the (Afghan) Taliban; and fifth, the installation of any government in Kabul is Pakistan’s responsibility. It is now obvious that Pakistan is following a two-pronged policy towards Afghanistan: one is official and the second is unofficial. Practically, the latter takes precedence over the former. Before the arrival of Karzai, Sharif said that Pakistan’s Afghan policy needed revision and that the policy should be made more practical. This intention may give rise to another conflict in Pakistan’s power corridors, as there are circles who want Pakistan to keep on continuing with an ambiguous foreign policy towards Afghanistan and wait till the sun of 2015 sets. The writer is a freelance columnist and can be reached at qaisarrashid@yahoo.com