Political parties in Pakistan are mostly fiefdoms rather than institutions. Lack of organisation, structure and intellectual depth gives rise to reliance on political rhetoric rather than substance. This becomes a breeding ground for short-term political opportunism rather than long-term strategic planning. This state of affairs is exacerbated because Pakistan does not have a long democratic tradition. The first democratic government, which completed its tenure after the secession of Bangladesh, was that of Prime Minister Z A Bhutto. In the elections of 1977, the motivation to defeat the juggernaut of the PPP became grounds for the emergence of the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). This was an amalgamation of right and left wing parties with the right having a dominant voice. The major parties in that alliance were the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Istiqlal, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Jamiat-e-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) and Jamiat-e-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP), the National Democratic Party (NDP), Communist Party (CP), Baloch Republican Party (BRP) and Baloch National Party (BNP). In an established democracy with a long tradition, it is difficult to conceive that parties with diverse ideological bases can come together to form a united front. It was possible to forge this alliance in Pakistan because in our country politics are not driven by ideology but rather the special interests of those who control the political parties. The election results, in which the PPP secured a vast majority, were rejected by the PNA, which launched a protest movement. The alliance blamed the PPP government for massive rigging in the elections. The movement received credence as many analysts predicted a considerable win for the PNA as its jalsas (rallies) were drawing huge crowds. The PNA’s first step was to ask its winning members to refuse to take oath as they did not accept the election results. Their second, more drastic step was to pressure the government for fresh elections through street protests. For the next four months, the PPP government held various rounds of negotiations with the PNA leaders. At one point, it seemed that negotiations were making headway and a compromise had been reached including the announcement of new elections. However, instead, on July 5, the nation experienced a coup d’état, which brought Pakistan Army chief General Ziaul Haq to rule the country for the next 11 years. We all know the outcome of the policies of that martial law regime. It seems there is now an emergence of another PNA as the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI), Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT) of Tahirul Qadri, Awami Muslim League (or you can say the ‘lone ranger’ Sheikh Rasheed), Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and some other small factions are planning to initiate street protests to demand a fresh mandate as NADRA revelations about certain constituencies point to alleged rigging in the last elections. There are many commonalities between these two versions of the PNA. First and foremost, a clear majority by a dominant party, the PML-N this time compared to the PPP of last time, which also controls the government in a province. Economic uncertainty resulting from Bhutto’s misguided nationalism of industries at that time can be compared to the rising inflation, terrorism, energy crisis and fiscal crisis producing economic hardships now. Another similarity is the amalgamation of ideologically diverse parties to come together for political expediency. On the other hand, the two movements also have unique features. Original PNA members of the National Assembly refused to take oath and boycotted the provincial elections. In the current reincarnation of the PNA, some of the agitating parties are running a provincial government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Will this new PNA succeed in overthrowing the government of the PML-N? If we look back at history, the original PNA resulted in the emergence of a military rule. This time around it seems less likely that an army chief with celebrated family history would be willing to risk it all for illegitimate ascension to political power. If re-emergence of military dictatorship is less likely, then the other likely (but least probable) outcome can be that of new elections. If that happens, the chances are that political parties will retain their current position with minor changes rather than any of the opposition parties emerging as a majority to form the government. The third outcome, which seems to be more on the mind of the opposition, is to continue political pressure, which could translate into slow economic growth, increasing frustration among the masses that could undermine the popular appeal of the PML-N government. Another benefit to the opposition from such ‘agitational politics’ could be to appeal to the electorate to give them a majority mandate in the local bodies elections. I do not think this strategy is viable because local bodies politics are driven by local issues rather than national causes. The major political force in the reincarnation of the PNA is the PTI. As a member of the PTI, my personal view is that the PTI is damaging its own political goodwill by continuing on the path of the politics of agitation. It would be better for the top leadership of the PTI to focus on turning around the situation of the people in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province as well as strengthening the organisation of the party. The PTI has lost the local bodies elections in Balochistan and the situation looks bad in Sindh. In Punjab, it seems that the PTI is inducting ex-nazims belonging to the PML-Q and PML-N rather than giving an opportunity to its own youth while in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa it has the potential to emerge as a majority party. If the PTI focuses on the larger picture and on organisational development, it has a good chance to emerge as a majority party in the Centre in the next general elections. So far, it seems the priority of the PTI top leadership is short-term opportunistic politics of the street rather than the employment of wisdom and long-term vision to reform the country. Pakistan’s opposition parties should learn lessons from the Arab Spring movements in Tunisia, Egypt and Syria. It cost those countries billions of dollars of economic loss and thousands of dead people but the final result was only the re-emergence of the status quo. In Tunis, the old guard is about to take charge again. In Egypt, the military is once again controlling politics and in Syria the west is now seeking the continuation of the Assad regime. As a nation it is better for us to evolve institutions rather than rely on iconic leaders. We have had a peaceful transfer of political power, which is a big leap forward. In a similar vein, the judiciary has to demonstrate it is relevant after the retirement of Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry. The army has to prove that it is its institutional preference that democracy should prevail rather than the personal choice of retired chief General Kayani. If these two trends hold, the next step in evolution is the emergence of a political party that is an institution rather than a dictatorship or a family enterprise. The writer is chairman Council of Past Presidents, Pakistan Chamber of Commerce — USA. He can be reached at abdul.kundi@gmail.com