The Crisis States Research Centre defines a ‘failed state’ as a condition of ‘state collapse’, i.e. a state that can no longer perform its basic security and development functions and has no effective control over its territory and borders. The index’s ranks are based on 12 indicators of state vulnerability, four social, two economic and six political. The social indicators lie in: (1) demographic pressures, including pressures deriving from high population density relative to food supply, massive movement of refugees and internally displaced people, and forced uprooting of large communities as a result of random or targeted violence and/or repression. (2) A legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance. Based on recent or past injustices, this could date back centuries, including atrocities committed with impunity against communal groups and/or specific groups singled out by state authorities, or by dominant groups. (3) Chronic and sustained human flight: both the ‘brain drain’ of professionals and intellectuals. (4) Political dissidents and voluntary emigration of ‘the middle class’. Growth of exile/expat communities are also used as part of this indicator. Economic indicators dwell on: (1) uneven economic development along group lines, determined by group-based inequality, or perceived inequality, in education, jobs, and economic status. (2) Sharp and/or severe economic decline, measured by a progressive economic decline of society as a whole (using per capita income, GNP, debt, child mortality rates, poverty levels and business failures). Political indicators constitute: (1) criminalisation and/or delegitimisation of the state. (2) Endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites and resistance to transparency, accountability. (3) Progressive deterioration of public services, a disappearance of basic state functions that serve the people, including failure to protect citizens from terrorism and violence and to provide essential services such as health, education, sanitation, public transportation. Also, using the state apparatus for agencies that serve the ruling elites such as the security forces, presidential staff, central bank, diplomatic service, customs and collection agencies. (4) Widespread violation of human rights, an emergence of authoritarian, dictatorial or military rule in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated. Some more political indicators represent the security apparatus as a ‘state within a state’, an emergence of state-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorise political opponents, rise of factionalised elites, a fragmentation of ruling elites and state institutions along group lines, use of aggressive nationalistic rhetoric by ruling elites and finally intervention of other states, military or paramilitary engagement in the internal affairs at risk by outside armies and states. The characterisation of Pakistan as a failed state is one that has become so ingrained in popular discourse that its mention is often taken as a given and barely raises an eyebrow. It is certainly a cause for concern to be ranked as the only country in the subcontinent in the high risk category, where all others in that bracket, apart from northern neighbour Afghanistan, are either in Africa or the Middle East. Pakistan is the fifth most populous country in the world and one of a handful of nations possessing nuclear weapons. Whether it is deemed to have failed is debated across the globe. While Pakistan is wracked with problems of militancy, social inequality, environmental degradation and bureaucratic incompetence, it is still in most parts a functioning society where millions of people manage to live, work and raise families with a reasonable degree of stability and security. Democracy has returned after numerous bouts of military intervention but Pakistan’s political and civilian institutions lack capacity and competence. However, while the military usually takes the blame for this, civilian institutions also often legitimise the coups. The Pakistan Supreme Court (SC) often validates coups, even taking oath to support the dictator. Jurists upholding their commitment to the constitution are ousted and replaced with compliant judges. The military leader forms a coterie, co-opting self-serving politicians who put personal power over principles. Finally, they are elected in flawed contests. This produces a weak parliament, which rubber stamps the diktats of the military leader. There are, however, cadres of professional workers working enthusiastically towards significant progress even in this unsatisfactory situation and life goes on more or less normally in Pakistan. They are undoubtedly driven by patriotism, which runs deep despite the nation’s divisions. This is why I object whenever I hear Pakistan referred to as a ‘failed state’. So long as Pakistani society remains strong and provides some inbuilt guarantees, Pakistan will not become a failed state. The situation is no doubt difficult but matters are gradually improving. Admirable are those who labour under the most difficult conditions, yet achieve extraordinary goals. For example journalists and doctors, mostly underpaid and overworked, in dangerous conditions, contribute their might. The government has successfully established its writ across most areas despite difficulties and challenges. The return of democratic governance and strengthening of the judiciary is a healthy sign. Decisions are made constitutionally and democratically. Pakistan can provide admittedly far better public services to its citizens than in a failed state. Pakistan is now working responsibly with the international community. Foreign policy is shaped so as to get necessary benefits from allies and friends of Pakistan through trade and commerce while participating in international forums. We still have many priorities but the chief thrust can be summarised as the following priority order: elimination of fundamentalism and terrorism, with restoration of law and order. There should be a major thrust at real, non-ideological education through better institutions, serious focus on rural development, lack of which still incapacitates the nation, and remodeling of our foreign policy with due civilian control, including proper checks and balances. There must be thrust on public health including elimination of preventable diseases such as polio. Development of public infrastructure such as power, water, and non-urban roads, development of trade, commerce, tourism and even heavy industry, which we mostly lack so far, are the needs of today. In sum, despite our problems, Pakistan is certainly not a failed state. Pakistan still has a significant presence in software, banking, electronic media and crafts markets. Our universities have produced good professionals working domestically and abroad. We have a functioning democracy and judiciary. We have rapidly rising public awareness for a need to change. We have proved the prophets of doom false and can proudly look forward to a proud and elite nationhood. The writer is a freelance columnist and is independently conducting research on partition 1947. He can be reached at janjuaharoon01@gmail.com and tweets @JanjuaHaroon