Russia has always been different from the rest of the world in regards to making its defence policy. For centuries, it sought (traditional) security by dominating immediate neighbours and then their neighbours until the demise of the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Now it is unable to enjoy this benefit in the contemporary era due to the presence of the ‘post-modern nations’ as neighbours of its immediate neighbours. However, it still can aspire for its traditional sphere of influence, and can resist the rise of liberal democracy in its surroundings. History undoubtedly brings changes, but it seems unable to change Russia’s old aspirations for having an extended sphere of influence across the European continent. The USSR’s dismemberment reduced Russian geopolitical leverage and confined the former communist republic in terms of political influence. However, aspirations could not die and in fact remained in hibernation for two decades that (now) seem to be unearthed again. In this regard, protests and change of regime in Ukraine and the subsequent Russian intervention in Crimea should not be surprising because Vladimir Putin’s attempt to recreate the old Soviet sphere of influence inevitably demands reassertion of Moscow’s influence over Kiev. And it does not seem unreasonable to argue that Moscow is likely to send its forces to other parts of Ukraine, especially in case of the Ukrainian armed reaction to the Russian forces, to prevent western-style democratisation of each of the former Soviet societies in the years to come. Since Putin’s rise to power, Moscow seems to be struggling to influence the nascent democracies of Europe. However, Moscow without its number two, Kiev, seems unable to satisfy its aspirations. Once Moscow achieves its strategic goals attached with Kiev, it will once again be able to intimidate its European neighbours. As a result, the worst of the European assessments about the future of Russia is likely to see the light of day that Russia may prefer to remain at its ‘modern’ status rather than moving towards the post-modern status. Putin probably understands that his decision to send forces into Crimea has sent a strong message across the world, though he has called it “an act to save the ethnic Russians in Crimea”. Moscow’s uncontested influence over the pro-Russian parts of Ukraine is likely to prove a double-edged sword: “Not only will it threaten the Russo-antagonists in Ukraine, but also send a strong message to anti-Russia states in Western Europe.” Ukraine’s dependence on Russia in import of oil and gas, and its former leaders’ comfort to ally themselves with their Russian friends inevitably made the country’s journey to complete independence in decision making and transparency difficult. During the early 1990s, the Ukrainians were so uncommitted with their Moscow-based leaders that they were among the first ones who declared independence and tried to promote a culture of resistance towards the former rulers. And, later on, history has witnessed that one who tried to get closer to Moscow was overthrown by a popular movement that is remembered as the ‘Orange Revolution’. In spite of Moscow’s robust attempt and initial success in its policy to influence Kiev, there are multiple challenges ahead to face. For instance, Putin has once again taken a daring step by sending Russian troops into Crimea. He has probably forgotten the lesson learnt from his collaboration with Viktor Yanukovych, which has led to the demise of the Yanukovych regime. Putin’s attempt to hijack the decision making powers of Kiev has led to a backlash. Even today hundreds of thousands of the people who earlier protested and ousted Yanukovych can ultimately take up arms against Russia. Before the change of regime, Ukraine’s partnership with the EU was beneficial in terms of economic development but, in future, partnership with the EU would certainly be a reaction to Russian policies. Furthermore, this decision will inevitably send a strong message across western Europe. The EU nations, in response, are likely to put substantial overt and covert efforts to keep Russia at bay whether through expanding their support to anti-Russia elements within the country or pouring in aid to the new government. The EU nations’ frustration with this development, therefore, is not irrelevant, especially when they have seen their prime threat moving towards a position of strength. The writer is a PhD candidate at Area Study Centre Quaid-i-Azam University, and can be reached at shoaibm37@yahoo.com