Negotiators for the Pakistani government and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) are meeting to formulate a peace deal aimed at finalising a truce. The TTP has delivered a set of conditions that put the negotiators’ plans to a real test. This time, analysts say that the conditions placed by both parties present potential pitfalls, as it remains uncertain if the Taliban, who have declared the country’s constitution and democratic system un-Islamic, will agree to change their entrenched hardline position. It will be interesting to see if Islamabad will be stern rather than meek when negotiations resume with the TTP. Both parties have rubbed each other the wrong way so many times in the past that it is a wonder that the friction did not start any serious fires. But their joint efforts radiate warmth of a different kind now, although said warmth was perhaps summoned by a forceful show of power by the army. Had the TTP not declared a truce the final script would have been written and delivered by the army in Waziristan. The war against the insurgents has been redefined by using talks, with the use of force as an option only if the TTP insists on continuing violence. But precisely how those talks will be different from negotiations that led to failed peace deals in the past is not entirely clear, except that these negotiators represent an elected government rather than the military government of the previous decade. Negotiations with terrorist groups are part of a holistic counter-terrorism strategy that is used to encourage terrorists to enter a dialogue rather than using violence, and to introduce proposals that may make them change their tactics. Countries may want to avoid negotiations; however, negotiations often become inevitable and have been accepted as a formal strategy even by nations such as the US and the UK, who have traditionally been averse to what is generally seen as surrender to the demands of violent rebels. On the other hand, there are governments across the world from Europe to the Indian subcontinent to Central America that have an unwritten policy of negotiations for tactical purposes. Given the proliferation of terror and other forms of violence such as suicide bombings and piracy, negotiations have become an essential tool in the counter-terror armoury of every nation. As in any negotiations, when the Taliban are convinced that the search for a solution is legitimate and acceptable to both sides, they will join the search for a solution. In searching for a solution, there is room for a wide range of tactics. At some points, take-it-or-leave-it offers are useful; at other points, invitations to creative thinking are appropriate. At some points, firmness is in order; at other points, parties can explore alternatives and options. Structurally, time is on the side of the negotiator, a point the Taliban may seek to reverse by acts of terrorism. Negotiators have a range of tactics available, but this does not mean that the Taliban’s demands should be considered legitimate or that concessions may not encourage terrorism. It all depends on how many of the Taliban’s demands can be considered acceptable and the kind of deal that the negotiators are able to extract. The official negotiators’ task is a difficult one. The goal is to give a little, while making the Taliban give a lot. How can this be achieved? Essentially, there are two appropriate negotiating strategies to reduce or change the Taliban’s terms. Negotiators need to construct legitimacy for a negotiated agreement and get the Taliban thinking in terms of lowered expectations and thus lowered demands. Negotiators can also show the Taliban that their future situation is open for discussion, but their original demands are not. These two messages must be delivered in tandem, indicating that though one area is closed for discussion, the other is open and more compelling, since it gives them the prospect of something real and attainable. It is well recognised that absolutists are beyond negotiation and attempts to deal with them directly are pointless. But not all absolutist demands are totally comprehensive. The point is to identify potential conditionals and encourage the terrorists to see the hopelessness of their situation and the potential hopefulness in responding to negotiations. The Taliban have listed a host of conditions for stopping terrorist activities. Terrorism is ultimately related to structural issues like poverty and inequality that are far beyond any immediate remedy. But steady attention to related issues may eventually reap rewards. Do not negotiate a belief system. In the course of implementing the outcome of a negotiation it may be possible to instil doubt about the basis of motivating beliefs, but the negotiation itself needs to focus on specific items. Recognise that unlike many hostage situations, the acts of the Taliban are not self-contained events. Hence negotiation is not an autonomous subject or policy but a long process. Respect is the basic condition of any negotiation. Approaches that seek to impart a sense of inferiority are unproductive. Effective negotiations begin when both groups perceive themselves to be in a mutually painful stalemate. Maintain pressure (stalemate) while offering a way out. Show militants that there is something to gain from negotiations. Mediation is often necessary: the mediator can carry messages and formulate ideas. The parties may mistrust each other, but both must trust the mediator for mediation to work. Identification, separation, and moderation are the general aims of negotiation with militants. Identify those who seem open to talks. Split moderates from extremists by emphasising alternative means to the moderates at a lower cost than the use of terror. Moderation is a process and not a condition for negotiations. Engagement in negotiation, and the new situation it produces, can gradually produce deeper changes, but this will take time. Investigation, contact, and communication are the general means of negotiation with absolutist militants. Find out as much as possible about the militants’ values and goals. Establish and maintain contact. Contacts are the crux of negotiations. Building contacts will doubtless be done in secret but must be backed by public statements indicating openness to negotiate. Use step-by-step agreements to advance negotiations. Negotiation is a matter of giving something to get something; the negotiator needs to offer the terrorist concessions to his demands as payment for abandoning violence. The terrorist too must make concessions, and the absolutist terrorist does have something to offer as payment — his use of terrorist tactics. Specific tactics must be employed for negotiating with militants who seek negotiations. Specific tactics must also be employed to open the possibility of negotiating with absolutists who refuse negotiations. The key challenges facing negotiators are: to sense who the contingents are among the absolutes and to convert them to negotiability; to reduce and then change the terms of negotiations for the cessation of terrorist activities; and to move from a reduction of terror to a reduction of motivation. Patience and persistence are key to dealing with both contingent and absolutist militants. Given the dynamics of the problem and the necessity for negotiations, there is a need to evolve strategies, techniques and procedures to be better prepared to respond without losing the initiative to terrorist groups. Operating on the assumption that the Taliban are ambivalent, the Pakistan government ought to keep lines of communication open so that the state can shape the terms of engagement and respond to outbursts and standoffs with targeted force. This would deliver the message that acts of violence do not pay. The writer is an associate professor of psychiatry and consultant forensic psychiatrist at the Huntercombe Group UK. He can be reached at fawad_shifa@yahoo.com