Home grown terrorism by Islamist militant, sectarian and separatist groups poses a key threat to national security in Pakistan. Both the civilian and military leadership recognises the very real danger these militant outfits pose but there is a clear division and lack of clarity of how to tackle the menace of terrorism and extremism at a national level. For instance, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) chairman Bilawal Bhutto is against negotiations with the terrorists whereas the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) led by Imran Khan is a strong supporter of negotiations with the Taliban militants. On the other hand, the Pakistan military is ready to use an iron fist against Taliban insurgents, arguing against negotiations unless the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) disarms and accepts the writ of the state. While efforts so far towards eradicating religious extremism and terrorism have primarily focused on addressing the symptoms of terrorism, little emphasis has been paid to dealing with the root causes that spur individuals towards violent acts. Similarly, the use of kinetic force has had a limited impact on eradicating terrorism. Counterinsurgency policies are ad hoc in nature, oscillating between military operations and peace agreements. For a long-term solution, therefore, it is necessary to adopt a comprehensive counterinsurgency model and learn from past operations as well as the best international counterinsurgency practices. In order to eliminate the insurgency, the government needs to adopt a multifaceted approach to deal with terrorism by outlawed militant groups. First, the Taliban insurgency is ideologically driven, and would best be fought by a counter-narrative. For instance, the Taliban deliberately misinterpret fundamental concepts of Islam such as jihad and Sharia. They are calling for jihad against security forces and the secular leadership and imposing their own type of Sharia in the country according to their own brand of Islam, which otherwise does not mandate the use of force and the killing of innocent people. Therefore a counter-narrative is mandatory for dealing with the Taliban insurgency in the country. However, it must come from mainstream religious groups that have a popular say with the public. The famous proverb ‘set a thief to catch a thief’ aptly fits in this scenario. Local clerics can be very effective in de-legitimising the extremists’ narrative. Also, the media can play a very productive role in exposing the extremists’ agenda and their violent ideology. For instance, the previous PPP government utilised the media and exposed the extremist agenda of the Taliban by telecasting the footage of a teenage girl who was flogged in public by the Taliban in Swat, generating public support for an operation in the area. Second, political will is essential to winning any counterinsurgency operations. The current scholarship on counterinsurgency shows that both political and military victories are compulsory to completely eliminate insurgency. Therefore, military operations are not the only solution and there is a need for a political solution to the insurgency. However, the civilian leadership is divided on the issue and they have failed to create political consensus across the country. Third, public support plays a pivotal role in counterinsurgency operations. According to Mao Tse Tung, an insurgent (terrorist) is like a fish that swims in a sea of public support. The fish dies without water. Similarly, the insurgents are helpless without public support. Hence the government needs to engage the local community in order to isolate and eliminate extremists in the country. This can be achieved only if the government starts formulating effective policies and reaches out to the people. In an insurgency, it is obligatory that the government should speak through its actions, not words. Finally, the comprehensive counterinsurgency model of ‘clear, hold, build and transfer’ used in Swat provides a pre- and post-operation strategy. The dynamic of threats in the tribal areas is more or less similar to the threat in Swat. The ideology and motivations are the same but operationally the nature of terrain and tribal dynamics differ. Subsequently, this model should be adapted according to the circumstances in the tribal region but following the same basic guidelines, including the follow up of rehabilitation into normal social life. To completely defeat the Taliban insurgency, the civilian authorities and state institutions need to act together to counter militancy in the country. Learning a lesson from past mistakes, the government must take concrete measures to avoid political, military and humanitarian crises in the country against the backdrop of a military operation in North Waziristan. Also, there is a need to strengthen local governance institutions in the country. Bad governance leads towards deprivation and reduces the government’s writ and influence in society. The writer is a senior research analyst at the Institute for Security and Peace Studies, Islamabad. He holds a master’s degree in Strategic Studies from the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore