Every time the Taliban in Pakistan strike, a question that keeps arising is what drives the militants’ violence. This article contends that the vicious circle of militancy in FATA has been repeating itself because of the weak state conditions there on the one hand and ambitious policies of various governments on the other. Whereas for the British the weak state conditions resulted in armed mobilisations, for Pakistan it is both weak statehood and the ambitious policies of various governments that give rise to militancy in the tribal areas. According to Edward Newman, a weak state “refers to a situation where central government has poor capacity to control public order within its territory, is unable to consistently control its borders, cannot reliably maintain viable institutions or services, and is vulnerable to extra-constitutional domestic challenges.” Pakistan has all the hallmarks of weak statehood in FATA and so had the British. Islamabad’s control of the tribal areas remains tenuous at best, more so for the last eight years. The 2,500 kilometre Pak-Afghan border has always been notoriously porous for people — militants, smugglers and nomads — to end up either side of the frontier. Since 2004, the US has carried out a total of 358 drone attacks in the tribal areas. The situation is abysmal when it comes to the delivery of basic amenities of life in terms of security, education, health and livelihood. Traditionally, the state has resisted the temptation to involve itself in the internal affairs of tribesmen until the government’s interests are at stake. The people of FATA live in a state like Kenneth Waltz’s anarchy. They have to pursue security first and everything later to survive. The many tribal feuds take a heavy toll on the masses only to result first in a truce and later in a settlement of the dispute, both brokered by a jirga (tribal council). The jirga decides a case according to Pashtun tribal traditions. In non-protected areas, the execution of jirga decisions necessitates the making of a lashkar (tribal force) to implement them. The state’s abdication of its many responsibilities remains sanctioned by law, the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR). The various functions that in a modern state are performed by its various organs, like the legislature, executive and judiciary, are shared with non-state entities such as jirga, traditions and lashkars in FATA. The assumption is that weak statehood leaves behind a power vacuum that is amenable to the rise of non-state actors. In fact, loose state authority makes the organisation of an armed struggle easier. There were some high-profile episodes of armed mobilisations against the British and resultant punitive expeditions by the colonial power. The British pursuit of mutineers in the 55th native infantry from the 1857 war of independence culminated in the Ambela campaign of 1863. In 1916, the Shaikhul Hind, Maulana Mehmoodul Hasan, conceived an armed insurrection codenamed Tehreek-e-Reshmi Rumal in the Indian northwest tribal areas in order to dislodge the British from India. Similarly, on various occasions, Afghan rulers from Amir Amanullah Khan to Nadir Shah mobilised the tribesmen from across the Indian side of the Durand Line most noticeably during the third Anglo-Afghan War of 1919 by the former and the ouster of Bacha Saqao, the only Tajik ruler of Afghanistan, in 1929 by the latter. By 1937, the armed struggle of the Faqir of Ipi led to the British deployment of troops in large numbers. Since 1849, when the British arrived in Peshawar, until 1908, a total of 48 military campaigns were undertaken in the northwest of then British India. It best suited the British scheme of things to keep the state weak but brutal enough in the northwest tribal areas. The imperial policy in the hinterland was geared towards creating a buffer zone to a buffer state called Afghanistan. As Afghanistan would only grudgingly concede to the British claims to Pashtun populated areas east of the Durand Line divide, any Afghan trespass was meant to lose its steam before it reached settled areas. It almost became a standard operating procedure that the British would ignore Afghan interference in but not beyond the British tribal areas. Nevertheless, the weak state condition was the British Achilles heel with regard to the outbreak of innumerable armed mobilisations with various ends. Post-colonial Pakistan continued with the British policy of keeping the state weak in FATA. Additionally, since the late 1970s, various central governments have pursued ambitious policies. Resultantly, militants of different hues have been spearheading militancy. Pakistan survived both the Faqir and his struggle until the man’s death in 1960. In October 1947, the tribesmen in their thousands from Pakistan’s tribal areas launched their armed struggle against the Dogra forces in Kashmir, ostensibly to liberate their Muslim brethren. The tribal areas remained calm until 1960 when the Pakistan air force carried out aerial strikes against miscreants in Bajaur Agency. In the early 1980s, Pakistan played proxy in the US’s bid to contain the Soviet Union. FATA served as a launching pad in order to oust the Soviets from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the Soviets from the country in due course led to a power vacuum that would give rise to the Taliban. The religious militia was strongly supported by Islamabad until 9/11. Emboldened by the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, armed fighters poured into Kashmir to liberate the occupied territory from Indian rule. In the wake of the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, the Taliban and Muslim militants of all hues including al Qaeda operatives poured into FATA. It was only a matter of time before various militant outfits emerged in the tribal areas to wreak havoc. The blowback effect remains in full swing. Taliban militancy is neither the first nor last but the latest episode of the drama of militancy that spans the colonial and post-colonial periods. It is high time to decisively break from the past. The solution lies in strengthening the state and laying its many proxy wars to rest. The writer is a freelance journalist stationed in Quetta