Sifting the obscure from the obvious often takes considerable effort. Usually the flawed process of information dissemination, lack of gauging the public mood and a hampered decision-making process results in crises escalating way beyond intended goals. Civil-military relations in Pakistan are complicated. A glimmer of hope recently emerged of how uninterrupted civilian governments would turn this uncomfortable partnership into the sort of relationship that might thrive despite their differences. Apparently, the ambitions espoused by the establishment remain on a collision course with the emerging realities in the region.
The current crisis unfolding over the last month shows that the gulf will take a lot more before being channeled into a harmonious relationship. Earlier, it appeared that the alleged malpractices in the last elections had triggered a crisis. That perception dissipated as many events again pointed to existing troubles between the civilians and a section of the establishment.
Difficulties between the military establishment and civilian governments are not unique to Pakistan. Many countries have had similar problems. In South America, after a protracted struggle, partnerships finally evolved to create space for conflicting groups to develop rules for coexistence. In many other countries, a consensus was hard to find. Pakistan is still among the troubled states. The question is: what will it take to bridge the gulf or generate some rules for coexistence?
Pakistan has often been shown as following the praetorian model that grew first in Turkey and later in Egypt and Syria. These are not the only countries. South American states of the 1960s or even the Thailand of today fit that model. A modern praetorian state is one in which the army tends to intervene to dominate the political system. The unique characteristics of countries force necessary adjustments in applying the praetorian model.
Modern praetorian states tend to sponsor ideologies to justify their intervention and continued dominance of the political sphere. Beliefs need protection, hence the need for strong armed forces. Turkey, after the crushing debacle of the First World War, disowned the khilafat system and promoted secularism. The generals in Turkey, led by Kemal Ataturk, enforced secularism to paint a picture of the modern state. The Egyptian and Syrian armies pushed their agendas with the Baathist brand of Arab nationalism. Pan-Arabism sprinkled with secularism progressed as anti-Israel sentiment grew in the Arab world. Elitist ideologies forced from the top fell into disarray as the political and economic crises deepened. After contrived ideologies weakened over the years, Turkey, Egypt and Syria are undergoing dramatic political upheavals. These socio-political battles are pushing them back onto the same course of dominant army dictatorships suppressed for more than half a century.
In Pakistan, the civil and military bureaucracy of the 1950s inherited a religion-dominated ideology and owned it to maintain dominance over the political discourse. Over the years, the new generation of the establishment has bought this narrative and has started to believe in the story the previous generation of establishment thinkers developed to maintain unchallenged influence over Pakistan. They are the primary sufferers of the narrative.
The events in Turkey, Egypt and Syria have shown the fallacy of elitist ideologies. On the face of it, the political makeovers taking place in Turkey, Egypt, Syria, India and Pakistan seem to have different tracks. However, one common feature stands out: a spectacular failure of elite-sponsored ideologies in all countries. The rolling back of Turkish and Indian secularism, Egyptian and Syrian Pan-Arabism show the way the wind is blowing.
Throughout the 1990s, the elite found all major political parties to be willing players in the game of musical chairs. The political parties also sustained the establishment in its ideological goals in the region. Civilian rule from 2008 revealed that major political parties were not interested in musical chairs anymore. The main opposition party, the PML-N, refused to be part of any game to bring an elected government down. Now, in 2014, the PPP and ANP stand by the elected government of the PML-N. An even bigger setback was that all major political parties do not wish to remain part of the ideological goals pursued by the establishment in the area.
The unanticipated solidarity among the major parties caught the establishment on the wrong foot. For the first time in Pakistan, the establishment failed to find partners in the first tier of politicians in the country. Imran Khan emerged from the backwaters of a political wilderness as the sole alternate or the ‘go to’ politician. An obscure preacher discovered from Canada was launched too. Imran Khan, in the 2013 elections, failed to convince the voters that he could replace the experience and maturity of established politicians in the PML-N or the PPP. He did bring along an urban middle class that, for the last 30 years, has been doused in the hot air of ideology and conspiracy theories.
Imran Khan seemingly supports the Taliban. He firmly believes in the prescribed ideology and looks like a willing partner in suppressing the growing tide of democracy in the country. Aspiring politicians and others who have remained the establishment’s eyes and ears for the last couple of decades also surround Imran. A revolution launched on the backs of the known counter-revolutionaries, instead of swaying public opinion, ended up chastening the scriptwriters.
The Imran-Qadri duo successfully managed to confound the elite. However, the gap between the civilians and the establishment has widened even more. The country has been at a near standstill for a month or so. Economic losses are growing. No one is backing off. The political government survived a significant confrontation but there is no room for it to bask in the glory. The alliance put together against the civilian government was not formidable enough but does not mean that any future effort will forget the lesson learned from this current failure. The next effort could be more frightening.
Many may ponder whether the current effort to dislodge the civilian government is worth the economic losses and the harm to international prestige. They will need to look at the cost in Syria and Egypt of the continued campaign by the old guard to defy change and maintain their supremacy. Secularism lost out already in Turkey. A majority of Turks associated secularism with dictatorial rule in Turkey. Secularism in India became the victim of misrule by the Congress. The guardians will continue to resist and protect their ideological ambitions in the region. The conflict will go on disregarding the high cost the country and the people might pay. However, no one should forget that problems are not stop signs — they are guidelines.
The writer is a management consultant
based in the US. He is a freelance writer
and tweets as @HarPasha