Prime Minister (PM) Nawaz Sharif’s recent visit to the US was largely overshadowed by media leaks and speculations as to what may mark the agenda of the meeting between the two leaders. The media frenzy started with an interesting proposition published in The Washington Post a week before the actual meeting, suggesting a probable discussion on extending a civil nuclear deal to Pakistan among other issues. David Ignatious, a renowned writer, stated that a similar kind of deal to the one offered to India in 2005 might be on the menu in return for some “brackets” on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme. In this particular opinion piece, the writer did not specify what those brackets would possibly be. However, this had been in discussion for the past few months. The possibility of any ‘blockbuster’ was played down by the White House before the commencement of the visit and, as expected, one did not find its reference in the joint statement. Interestingly, the White House spokesperson did not rule out the possibility altogether. Similarly, one also finds “resolve” in the joint statement “to continue working together to address the issues of greatest interest to both nations”. Thus, this indicates that it continues to be part of the debate even if it occurs at a later stage. The timings of the series of media leaks were interesting and, apparently, they have successfully pre-empted the ‘environment’ for any such announcement in the near future. However, the whole idea of mainstreaming Pakistan with certain conditions requires close analysis. There are few western scholars who have been advocating ideas about mainstreaming Pakistan into the global nuclear order — what they call a “normal” nuclear Pakistan. The recent Carnegie-Stimson Report echoed what Mark Fitzpatrick wrote in his Adelphi paper a year earlier. Ruling out the possibility of a commercial pathway, the writers have put forward certain conditions/criteria regarding the nuclear policy that Pakistan should meet before being considered for what they term nuclear normalcy. The list includes: (a) a shifting declaratory policy from “full spectrum” to “strategic” deterrence, (b) commitment to a recessed deterrence posture and limiting production of short-range delivery vehicles and tactical nuclear weapons, (c) lifting its veto on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) negotiations and reducing or stopping fissile material production, (d) separate civilian and military nuclear facilities and (e) signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty without waiting for India. One may assume that potential official brackets from the US government for a probable civil nuclear deal might revolve around these ideas. What could possibly be the Pakistani response to this new ‘grand bargain’? Would it agree to some, if not all terms and conditions, in return for a civil nuclear deal? Pakistan has been demanding a civil nuclear deal to meet its energy requirements and seeking entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) through a criteria based approach. The acceptance of attached conditions, however, have a direct bearing on Pakistan’s national security and a potential change in its stance requires, as a prerequisite, an overhaul in the regional security architecture. Sans a shift in the prevalent security environment, a change in policy would be tantamount to a compromise on national security. In this regard, Pakistan’s persistent stress on the need to address the primary issues that motivate the acquisition of weapons holds great weight. As long as there is existence of conflict, threats from larger conventional and non-conventional forces, and discriminatory treatment at the international level, mere change in policy statement will not enhance the sense of security. In response to media speculations, Pakistan has reiterated its official stance, which it has already spelled out at various forums. The recent Nuclear Command Authority’s (NCA’s) statement, while giving primacy to national security, categorically reiterated its “resolve to maintain full spectrum deterrence capability in line with the dictates of credible minimum deterrence to deter all forms of aggression while adhering to the policy of avoiding an arms race. It was reiterated in the official statement by the permanent representative of Pakistan to the UN in Geneva and the Conference on Disarmament in the general debate of the first Committee on October 15, 2015. It also re-emphasised the need of a fissile material treaty that takes into consideration the issue of existing stockpiles. This official statement sheds some light on the Pakistani thinking that has developed in response to the ground realities and growing regional security challenges. However, in order to increase international confidence, Pakistan may consider taking enhanced technical measures. One suggestion merits some serious consideration: separating civil and military facilities. This is doable mainly because it is a technical matter and not a national security issue. At present, Pakistan does have some overlapping at the initial stages of the nuclear fuel cycle and it should not be that big an issue to separate the two for more transparency on the civilian side of activities. Similarly, Pakistan should also sign and ratify the Amendment to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Facilities, an announcement to that effect was made at the last Nuclear Security Summit. Pakistan already has an impeccable nuclear security record and has received global recognition for its efforts in this regard. Some additional concrete steps in this regard would add to its credentials as a responsible nuclear weapons state and pave the way for a mutually benefiting agreement. The writer is a former visiting fellow at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, California. She can be reached at sitaranoor@hotmail.com