Overall, there is a long historical legacy of the centre’s perceived exploitation of Sindhi resources. Tension between native Sindhis and the mohajir (immigrant) community has helped preserve ethnic narratives in the province.
Pakistan’s second largest ethnic group, the Pashtuns, reside primarily in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan and in Pakistan’s northwest region. Conservative in social outlook and traditional in policy, Pashtuns have a distinctive cultural identity. Although rules for self-identification as Pashtun vary widely, Pashtun belonging tends to require commitment to Pashtunwali (an ethical code) and adoption of a traditional lifestyle. The resulting broad linguistic and cultural conformity across Pashtun territories offers a particularly cohesive sense of shared ethnic identity.
The province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, formerly the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), has historic ties to Afghanistan, and both Pakistan and Afghanistan continue to dispute the Durand Line, the border between the two countries. Geographical contiguity, porous borders, and high levels of social interaction with Afghanistan in some ways render the region an extension of Afghanistan. At the time of Pakistan’s independence, the country’s northwest region, identified overwhelmingly as Pashtun, displayed furious opposition to the idea of an independent Pakistani state.
After independence, Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s dismissal of NWFP chief minister, Khan Abdul Jabbar Khan’s ministry marked a catalytic event for the Pashtuns, who saw this development as a sign of the centre’s hostility. Establishment of “One Unit System” further curbed NWFP’s provincial autonomy, which was limited yet again when Ayub Khan’s regime imposed the Elected Bodies Dismissed Ordinance that effectively banned all political activity in the country. The Pashtunistan secessionist movement emerged largely as a result of these developments.
The 1970s again proved a tumultuous period for centre-province relations in NWFP. Bhutto jailed many of the province’s mainstream leadership for alleged anti-state activities. Additionally, the inequitable distribution of water resources and diminished share in provincial resources aggravated Pashtun grievances against the centre and encouraged regional identity politics. As in Sindh, consolidation of peripheral identity in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has directly correlated to the tone of centre-province relations.
However, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa there are suggestions of a changing tide. Many of its most entrenched grievances against the centre originated from the existence of a Concurrent List in the constitution of Pakistan. In 2010, the central government adopted the 18th Amendment, which devolved political authority in numerous areas to the provinces and eliminated the Concurrent List from the constitution. In a further effort to recognise political demands of Pashtun tribes, the Amendment changed the province’s name from the NWFP to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Balochistan has played host to five insurgencies over the past 70 years, which demonstrates the worsening state of affairs between the centre and Pakistan’s largest province. The Baloch conflict has emerged as a major internal security threat in Pakistan, given that strong local ethnic identity and weak national identity in the province drives a robust secessionist movement. The province’s abundant natural resources and its strategic access due to the vital Gwadar seaport and Iranian-Afghan border render it central to Pakistan’s national interests.
In the aftermath of partition, the Khan of Kalat — the ruler of the princely state of Kalat comprising a substantial part of present day Balochistan — sought for his state to retain its independent status. Initially, Jinnah supported Khan but within a few months, Pakistan’s federal forces annexed Baloch territory, and put down the Kalat riots. Accordingly, Balochistan’s conflict with the centre began even before the emergence of the official Pakistani state, and Baloch riots did not end with the creation of Pakistan. An uprising in 1948 proved more intense than the first one, and in 1958, the state arrested the Khan of Kalat. Four years later another uprising — Balochistan’s longest — broke out, and the conflict between Ayub Khan’s government and the Baloch separatists lasted for approximately six years.
A third insurgency took place in 1963 when Bhutto discharged the province’s local administration. At the height of the insurgency in 1973, 55,000 insurgents faced 80,000 Pakistani troops supported not only by the Pakistan Air Force, but also by Iranian Air Force. More than 5,000 insurgents and over 3,300 soldiers died in the protracted insurgency, which continued through 1977. Balochistan’s military conflict against the central government repelled the Baloch people from any sort of national Pakistani identity. In Balochistan, the Baloch ethnic identity became paramount.
The Baloch separatist movement reemerged in 2004 to demand greater provincial autonomy. Both the Baloch Liberation Front and Balochistan Liberation Army expanded their regional political and military influence. Furthermore, after the 2006 murder of Baloch governor and tribal leader Nawab Akbar Bugti, the insurgency adopted exclusively secessionist aims and increased the frequency of their anti-government attacks.
Balochistan is Pakistan’s largest and least-populated province, and its culture is diverse. The literacy rate in Balochistan remains devastatingly low compared to that of other provinces, and its number of development projects is negligible due to political instability in the province. Although Balochistan has been able to attract modest amounts of foreign direct investment, the Baloch continue to accuse the central government of depriving the province of any economic benefits. The centre has failed to enact policies that can help the Baloch to develop and advance their circumstances. In return, the Baloch share minimal allegiance to the Pakistani state and broadly reject a national identity.
Pakistan has never exhibited a monolithic national identity, but today a sense of national identity feels weaker than ever before. Though national leaders invoke Pakistanis’ common religious beliefs to inspire a sense of unity, over the years this narrative has eroded, and cleavages between ethnic groups have grown. The catalytic factors in this changing landscape include the political marginalisation of Pakistan’s less populous provinces, perceptions of unequal distribution in state resources, and policies by military regimes that are disadvantageous to provinces’ political and economic opportunities. As a result, Pakistan has witnessed the rise of indigenous and peripheral identities. This is not a recent phenomenon. Growing ethnic solidarity, and the pattern of secondary identity construction have taken place over decades, allowing preexisting seeds of ethnic nationalism to come to the fore.
The passage of the 18th Amendment, however, indicates the federal government’s posture may be changing. For now, lack of policy implementation and reluctance to transfer power to the provinces render the Amendment’s effectuation, let alone success, an open question. Moreover, steady military campaigns against Taliban and Baloch insurgencies, and newly established military courts discourage devolution of power from the centre to the provinces. In this context, constitutional reforms alone will not satisfy Pakistan’s marginalised provinces and ethnic groups. The government must adopt policies guaranteeing the provinces’ political autonomy, and strengthening their economies through altered distribution of state resources from the current method. Pakistan can only achieve a shared national identity if all provinces believe that they are equally valued by the centre. For that to happen, the centre must prioritise an alternative and sustainable division of financial resources, and political autonomy.
(Concluded)
This article originally appeared in the SAIS Review of International Affairs, Journal of John Hopkins University, Summer-Fall 2015, and is published in the form of opinion article for the general interest of the readers
The writer is a lecturer in the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan. He is the author of Democracy in Pakistan: From Rhetoric to Reality (Islamabad: Narratives, 2015)