The relationship between Pakistan and the United States since 9/11 has seen insurmountable mistrust, and steep ups and downs. The West in general and the United States in particular have been trying to present Pakistan as a hypocrite and double-dealer in the war against terror. The huge sacrifices and human and material looses borne by Pakistan are intentionally being minimised. An impression is being created that Pakistan is not sincere in the war against terror, and that it is helping the Afghan Taliban despite the fact that it has received billions of dollars of aid from the US. The entire blame of the US failure in Afghanistan is laid at Pakistan’s door.
There is no denying the fact that Pakistan has its own shortcomings and weaknesses, and errors of omission and commission that might have contributed to the failure of the war against terror and caused misapprehensions in the minds of Americans. But to say that only Pakistan is responsible for the fiasco of the allied forces in Afghanistan, and that the US does not have its share of blunders and disregard for Pakistan’s security interests is to close one’s eyes to the ground realities. It is important to highlight the blunders of the US in the war against terror, and the perfidious attitude of the US towards Pakistan, which has created mistrust between the two states.
After 9/11, Pakistan’s decision to back away from the Taliban — the only Afghan government in history that had close relations with Pakistan — and support US efforts to topple that regime was a great strategic reversal for Pakistan that should have been wholeheartedly appreciated by the US and internationally community. The US honoured this huge step by Pakistan by disregarding it. By withdrawing its support from the Taliban, and putting all its eggs in the basket of US retribution against the Taliban, Pakistan had placed all its strategic interests related to Afghanistan in the hands of the US. The US should have done all it could do to protect Pakistan’s legitimate interests in Afghanistan, but the US, unfortunately, did not do anything to assuage Pakistan’s apprehensions with regard to protection of its interests in the post-Taliban Afghanistan despite the fact that it could do so.
Pakistan was much concerned about the occupation of Kabul by the Northern Alliance, which was en bloc opposed to Pakistan, and was being backed by India, Iran, and Russia. Any undue preponderance of the Northern Alliance was against the demographic realities of Afghanistan where Pakhtuns were in majority, and against its strategic interests because the Northern Alliance was inimical towards Pakistan as compared to Pakhtuns who did not have any such feelings towards Pakistan. Therefore, it was essential for Pakistan to ensure that the Northern Alliance did not get domination in Afghanistan. President George W Bush had given this assurance to President Pervez Musharraf three days before Kabul was overtaken by the Northern Alliance in October 2001. But no practical step was taken by the US to put that assurance into effect.
The result was Kabul’s occupation by the Northern Alliance with its attendant bad consequences for Pakistan in the shape of an anti-Pakistan attitude and policies of the post-Taliban Afghan government. The way Pakistanis who were in Afghanistan were treated by the new rulers, and how Hamid Karzai rejected Musharraf’s offer of coming to Islamabad in a plane sent by Pakistan, and then flying to Kabul, were harbingers of the future relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The US did not persuade Karzai and the Northern Alliance to change their attitude towards Pakistan in the light of the new strategic environment in which Pakistan had taken a full U-turn by withdrawing its support from the Taliban and fully backing the US and the new Afghan government in the war against terror. As Pakistan changed its policy towards the Taliban, the new Afghan government and the Northern Alliance should have also reciprocated in the same spirit as a gesture of goodwill.
India’s influence in Afghanistan has always been a matter of great concern for Pakistan. Pakistan had a very bad experience during the Zahir-Daud era when Afghanistan was the centre of all types of conspiracies against Pakistan, and the propaganda of the “Pakhtun-istan” issue was on the peak. That is why Pakistan always tried to limit Indian sway in Afghanistan to the least possible extent so as to avert security threats from that side. It was with this end in view that Pakistan had agreed to its full cooperation with the US in the war against terror on the verbal condition that India would not have any role in the future direction of Afghanistan, either in war efforts or in the making of the future set-up. But after the fall of the Taliban, India gained tremendous clout in the new Afghan set-up to the detriment of Pakistan’s security and strategic interests.
The new Afghan government headed by Karzai and dominated by the Northern Alliance left no stone unturned in ingratiating India in total disregard of Pakistan’s concerns. Indian consulates in Jalalabad and Qandahar allegedly became training centres for Baloch separatists and Pakhtun militants. The Afghan government gave all indications that it preferred India to Pakistan. The US did not press India for limiting its role, especially anti-Pakistan activities, in Afghanistan.
On the contrary, the US enhanced the level of its relations with India to a very high limit of their bilateral relations. The US policy towards India and Pakistan after 9/11 was based on the principle of de-hyphenation, which meant that the US would not regard Pakistan’s apprehensions in enhancing relations with India. This was a complete deviation from past practice when the US regarded Pakistan as its ally in the Cold War, and limited its interaction with India within the limits of Pakistan’s acceptance. In the new era the US made it clear that it would not care for Pakistan’s interests in its dealings with India.
(To be concluded)
The writer is an Islamabad-based independent researcher and jourNorthern Alliance list