The Indian nuclear programme is taking full advantage of the 2008 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) decision under the US initiative to exempt New Delhi from the restrictions on the supply of nuclear fuel and equipment to non-NPT countries. The Indo-US civil nuclear agreement is an active exemplar in this regard that undermines the global non-proliferation regime.
In this regard, India has claimed that it has a clean non-proliferation record and that it should be included in nuclear mainstream countries by making it part of the NSG. However, it is evident that India’s non-proliferation record does not meet the international standards for it to qualify.
It has been said a lot in the past nuclear suppliers groups’ debates that India’s first nuclear test was actually a device derived from Canadian and US’ exports, designated purely for peaceful purposes. That test stimulated the US and several other countries to create the NSG and to restrict global nuclear trade more severely.
It is a well-known fact that India’s nuclear programme is plutonium-based mainly. Its uranium reserves are apparently shown to be low for civil nuclear usage and are actually low for military usage. The trend of nuclear deals with India, set-in mainly by the US, though for its own interest, has and will further overwhelm India with uranium reserves. India’s civil nuclear programme will not only benefit out of it but will also keep extensive amounts of uranium for its growing nuclear weapons programme.
Although it is true that even the smallest nuclear arsenal requires a great deal of confidentiality and ambiguity, the absence of information about India’s nuclear programme has opened space for considerable speculation by observers, including in academic circles, both in India and abroad.
Some of that speculation is informed, while much is extrapolated from scant statements made by current and former Indian officials. Some of the recent commentaries on India’s changing nuclear strategy must be seen in this context. Gen Bipin Rawat, Indian army Commander-in-Chief, in an interview acknowledged that the Cold Start doctrine exists for conventional military operations. He is the first senior Indian official, military or civilian, to do so as all former Indian chiefs have avoided using the term Cold Start and preferred calling it as a ‘proactive strategy’.
Since India expects to be recognised as the world’s de jure nuclear power, US assistance to India in this regard has made it a potential aspirant to becoming a South Asian nuclear giant
However, it is essential to bring to light what we know about India’s nuclear strategy or intentions. In this regard, a special study has been carried out at the Belfer Centre by John Carlson titled India’s Nuclear Safeguards: Not Fit for Purpose. It accounts that currently, the Nuclear Suppliers Group is considering India’s application for membership.
In this context, the NSG members are reportedly discussing membership criteria for states not a party to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, including a requirement for clear and strict separation of current and future civilian nuclear facilities from non-civilian nuclear facilities.
In this write-up, the author examines India’s Separation Plan and safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and shows that they do not meet this standard. The current arrangements create an unverified grey zone between military and civilian material and are not sufficient to verify that India is not using the safeguarded material to benefit military purposes. In light of these deficiencies, it seems unlikely that there will be a consensus within the NSG to admit India unless the separation plan and the agreement are amended.
There are three major problems in the India-IAEA agreement. Firstly, the safeguarded plutonium can be substituted with unsafeguarded plutonium of lower isotopic quality; secondly, the safeguarded nuclear material can be used in facilities in the unsafeguarded programme; and thirdly, the safeguarded material can be used with unsafeguarded material. Today, it is clear that several provisions in this agreement can no longer be considered appropriate. This could also be the case for INFCIRC/66-type agreements applying in other non-NPT states.
The above would likewise have implications for Pakistan, which has raised concern about the strategic threat posed by India’s unsafeguarded materials and facilities and is also seeking to join the NSG. It needs to create a transparent and verifiable separation between the civilian and military nuclear materials and activities in India and to protect the integrity of IAEA safeguards.
The writer is associated with the Strategic Vision Institute and can be contacted at [email protected]
Published in Daily Times, February 17th 2018.