The Pakistan-US relationship is at an important inflexion point. Much has been said about the exchange of accolades between the Pakistani leaders and the U.S. President. Clearly, something is shifting in the Washington-Islamabad corridor, and the shift has opened a window not seen in the long and turbulent history of their bilateral relations. This is worth recognising.
Notwithstanding the above, it is no secret that the current U.S. President is unpredictable. Take last week, the U.S. President did not give time to PM Shahbaz for a meeting during the BOP visit. So, while we can continue to foster his good graces, goodwill at the top is neither a sustainable nor a reliable foreign policy strategy. And long-term good relations among nations cannot be reliant on individual camaraderie or friendships among leaders. Yet, taking advantage of the warm relations between the leaders, Pakistan can convert this moment into a durable partnership and influence. However, to accomplish this, Pakistan must do something it has not done before: build a broad, sustained, and genuinely reciprocal presence across the full spectrum of American power structure.
Remember, administrations end. Trump’s shelf life is confined to one term. On the other hand, the first branch of the U.S. system is the Congress, which – with its committees, its subcommittees, its appropriations powers, and its constituent pressures – operates on an entirely different clock. Pakistan has consistently underinvested in that relationship, and it shows. We have no friends in Congress to speak of and certainly not in the committees that matter – the committees on foreign affairs, foreign operations, intelligence, and appropriations.
In a recent meeting, a key Senate staffer was surprised to learn that Pakistan has a population of 250 million and is the 5th largest country in the world. He was even more shocked to learn that 95 per cent of the cases of blasphemy in Pakistan are between Muslims and less than 5 per cent are against minorities.
Examine the mechanics. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee and its Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia and Counter-terrorism hold direct jurisdiction over U.S. policy toward Pakistan. The Senate and House Appropriations subcommittees on State and Foreign Operations control the funding. The House Foreign Affairs Committee and its Subcommittee on South and Central Asia shape the legislative narrative. These are not fringe bodies. They are where Pakistan’s reputation is made and unmade, without Pakistan having any meaningful voice in the room.
The potential midterm realignment of the U.S. Congress increases the urgency. The House will flip toward Democrats in November, reshuffling committee chairmanships and, with them, the ideological orientation of oversight on South Asia policy. Democratic leadership has traditionally applied greater scrutiny to Pakistan on human rights and democratic governance – yet they have little knowledge about the realities.
Case in point. In a recent meeting, a key Senate staffer was surprised to learn that Pakistan has a population of 250 million people and is the 5th largest country in the world. He was even more shocked to learn that 95 per cent of the cases of blasphemy in Pakistan are between Muslims and less than 5 per cent are against minorities. His comment was “I didn’t realise that for 250 million people nation, the cases of blasphemy on Christians are less than a handful. But Imran, unfortunately, those are the ones that make it into the news here”. And I retorted, “Yeah. Pakistan is seen as the land of intolerance while U.S. is taking American citizens off the streets and deporting them, and there have been more than 6000 cases of intolerance against the various ethnicities in the U.S.” Pakistan needs to engage and set the record straight, and not a moment too soon.
The Congressional Pakistan Caucus, which should be Pakistan’s primary institutional anchor on Capitol Hill, is currently dormant. Its Senate equivalent does not exist at all – a striking contrast to the India Caucus, which operates with energy and bipartisan membership. Rebuilding the Pakistan Caucus, recruiting both Republican and Democratic members, and targeting representatives from districts with large Pakistani-American populations is a necessity. I would even extol the virtues of targeting congressmen from non-Pakistani populous constituencies, but constituencies that are solid red or blue, and the members have been elected for decades and have a rank in the congress due to longevity. Making inroads into the elected leaders of the Congress is the minimum viable infrastructure for a country that wants to be taken seriously.
But institutional repair is only one dimension of the problem. Pakistan’s broader posture in Washington has too often been that of a petitioner – arriving with requests for aid, assistance, and exemptions, rather than as a partner offering value. This must change, and the change has to be visible. Strategic investment in congressional campaigns, coordinated engagement by Pakistani-American civic organisations, and substantive dialogue on the issues members actually care about – particularly human rights and the rule of law – would signal a maturity that has too often been absent. Generosity in politics, as in diplomacy, tends to be remembered.
The executive branch requires a parallel strategy. Beyond the headline relationships with senior figures in the administration, real policy influence flows through the career professionals: the Chargé d’Affaires, the Deputy Chiefs of Mission, the Defence Attachés, and the State Department’s Pakistan Desk. These are the people who write the cables, draft the talking points, and shape institutional memory across administrations. Pakistan’s engagement with this layer of the U.S. bureaucracy has been episodic at best. Sustained, substantive relationships with in-country officers as well as DOS country desk staff should be prioritised.
There is also a regional dimension that Pakistan has underplayed. Deeper ties with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal – pursued through shared platforms and coordinated engagement with U.S. embassies across South Asia – would strengthen Pakistan’s position in Washington’s regional calculus. The perception, within allied capitals, that the United States supports Pakistan’s role as a constructive regional actor carries weight that bilateral lobbying alone cannot generate.
The window is open. The personal rapport between leaders matters, and Pakistan should use it. But the lesson of the last several decades is that windows close, presidents change, and the relationships built into institutional infrastructure outlast them all. Pakistan has an opportunity, right now, to stop managing its American relationship through moments of warmth and start building the architecture of lasting influence. The strategy is not complicated. What it requires is consistency, investment, and the willingness to show up – not only when asking for something, but when others need Pakistan to be present.
The writer is a freelance columnist.