The recent Indian media hype surrounding Pakistan Navy’s Hangor-class submarines, particularly the speculative piece by Zee News, betrays a mixture of technical naïveté and political desperation. To a professional eye, the commentary is not an objective assessment of maritime realities, but a thinly veiled attempt at psychological warfare, designed more for domestic consumption than serious naval analysis. From a submarine and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) standpoint, it is imperative to set the record straight.
Since the advent of the nuclear age, undersea warfare has been synonymous with survivability, strategic depth, and assured second strike. Submarines, particularly conventionally powered Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) platforms like Pakistan’s Hangor class, provide the kind of opacity that surface fleets and aircraft can never achieve. They thrive on stealth, ambiguity, and tactical surprise. India’s assumption that its P-8I fleet and a handful of MH-60R Seahawks can sanitize the Arabian Sea and neutralize Pakistan Navy’s submarines reflects a shallow grasp of ASW. Modern Maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) are effective in wide-area surveillance, but their success depends on accurate cueing, persistence in hostile environments and unchallenged air dominance, conditions that are unlikely in a contested battlespace adjoining Karachi and Ormara, well within Pakistan’s layered Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) envelope.
Submarines, particularly conventionally powered Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) platforms like Pakistan’s Hangor class, provide the kind of opacity that surface fleets and aircraft can never achieve.
The Indian narrative rests heavily on the dismissal of Chinese technology, an underestimation that has recently cost India heavily. On 6-7 May, the Indian Air Force learned this lesson the hard way, suffering aircraft losses to the lethal combination of the J-10C and PL-15 Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missile system. This “bloody nose” should have been a sobering reminder that Chinese combat systems have matured beyond the stage of mere imitations. The Hangor class, derived from the Type-039A Yuan design, embodies this evolution. Fitted with AIP modules, advanced quieting measures, and modern combat management suites, these submarines represent a quantum leap in Pakistan’s underwater warfare capabilities. To dismiss them as vulnerable to standard ASW playbooks is as reckless as underestimating the Chinese technology and Pakistani skill in the skies.
Unlike the exaggerated claims of Indian analysts, Pakistan Navy’s submarine force carries a record of professional competence and operational credibility. The most celebrated example remains the sinking of INS KHUKRI by PNS/M HANGOR in 1971, a singular event that cemented Pakistan’s place among professional undersea forces. But more recently, Pakistan’s quiet but effective tracking and exposure of Indian submarines, including the much-hyped Kalvari-class, demonstrates that the PN is the dominant maritime force in the littoral battlespace of North Arabian Sea. Repeated detections of Indian submarines attempted intrusion into Pakistani waters, only to be forced to surface or retreat under the shadow of PN’s P-3C Orions, leave little doubt as to where operational skill and discipline lie. The Kalvari incident, in particular, was not merely a tactical embarrassment for the Indian Navy, but a strategic indictment of its undersea force’s material state and poor professional training.
Beyond tactical failings, the material condition of India’s undersea fleet leaves a troubling picture. A navy that has suffered collisions, dockyard mishaps, and even the unimaginable blunder of diving a nuclear submarine with its hatch open cannot credibly claim mastery of undersea operations. The resignation of a serving Indian Naval Chief after a string of accidents remains a rare and damning event in modern naval history. This accident-prone culture reflects systemic issues: inadequate maintenance regimes, overconfidence bred by political rhetoric, and a dangerous reliance on imported hardware with limited indigenous absorption of complex technologies. The list on such accidents is so long that Wikipedia has dedicated a page to the list of Indian Naval Accidents which is second only to the crashes of Indian Airforce.
Much of the Indian argumentation hinges on the near-mythical capabilities of the P-8I Poseidon fleet. While undoubtedly globally one of the most capable long range maritime patrol aircraft in service, the P-8I is no panacea. Its effectiveness is contingent on uncontested access to airspace, permissive electronic warfare conditions, and sustained tactical coordination with surface and subsurface assets. Expecting P-8Is to patrol freely in waters directly abutting Karachi and Ormara, inside Pakistan’s integrated air defense and A2/AD bubble, is the height of operational fantasy. The P-8Is may excel in peacetime constabulary patrols, but in a high-threat scenario, its survivability against long-range SAM systems and fighter cover is highly questionable. Relying on it as the silver bullet against PN submarines borders on reckless self-deception.
Indian policy makers and media organs have for too long relied on chest-thumping narratives rather than sober assessments of capability. The so-called “two-and-a-half front” excuse floated after the May 25 crisis was less an admission of strategic overextension than an attempt to pacify domestic audiences disillusioned by the IAF and Indian Army’s performance. Similarly, repeated references to Chinese and Turkish support for Pakistan are meant to externalize failure rather than recognize the very real operational shortcomings of India’s own armed forces. In the ASW domain, this propaganda-driven blindness manifests as overconfidence in imported platforms. This hubris has turned what should be serious naval debate into a comedy of errors, epitomized by the IAF Chief’s bizarre claim of shooting down a PAF aircraft months after the event, a statement more fit for late-night satire than strategic discourse.
Submarine warfare is an unforgiving domain. Unlike surface ships that can mask weaknesses behind visible hulls and ceremonial deployments, submarines expose professional flaws ruthlessly. Noise discipline, sonar proficiency, crew training and damage-control drills cannot be faked. A submarine force either performs or it is simply hunted down. Pakistan Navy has repeatedly demonstrated mastery of these fundamentals. India, by contrast, continues to grapple with accidents, overestimates its ASW strength and systemic neglect of undersea force readiness. The expectation that Indian submarines can lurk unchallenged off Karachi or Ormara reveals not just ignorance of PN’s operational capabilities in layered defenses, but also a poor grasp of submarine vulnerability in congested littoral waters.
The continued underestimation of Chinese technology, the misplaced faith in imported ASW assets and the chronic accidents afflicting the Indian Navy leave a sobering conclusion: New Delhi’s maritime chest-thumping convinces no one beyond its Hindutva-driven domestic audience. For professionals in the field, these narratives only reinforce the perception of a force adrift between inflated rhetoric and underwhelming capability. Pakistan Navy’s Hangor-class submarines, coupled with a tradition of disciplined undersea operations and proven ASW detection track record, remain credible guarantors of deterrence in the Arabian Sea. While no port approaches are invulnerable, to imagine that P-8Is and MH-60Rs can sanitize waters adjoining Karachi under wartime conditions is to confuse Hollywood with operational art. In the unforgiving calculus of submarine warfare, professionalism, discipline and survivability matter more than propaganda. And by those metrics, Pakistan’s undersea arm continues to dictate the strategic reality in Arabian Sea.
The writer is a PhD Scholar of International Relations at the School of Integrated Social Sciences, University of Lahore, and Deputy President Maritime Centre of Excellence at Pakistan Navy War College, Lahore.