The prime minister has appointed a new cabinet. The move has evoked a sense of hope against the backdrop of usual pessimism permeating our statecraft. The rationale for the dissolution of the previous cabinet was to ‘rightsize’ it by removing members who were the cause of undue burden on the government exchequer without corresponding utility. The second plausible contributing reason could have been the charter of demands handed to the government by the major opposition party, asking for downsizing of the cabinet as one of the key components. Regardless of the motivations, the decision needs to be welcomed. However, it has led some to draw the fallacious correlation between the number of cabinet members and the performance of the government. The right size of the cabinet may be a necessary condition for good governance but is by no means a sufficient condition. A far superior consideration is the mode of selection of members to the cabinet.
One point of convergence regarding eligibility to the cabinet between all political forces seems to be that the members should not be corrupt. However, the ascertainment of corrupt individuals is far more complex and leads to violent disagreements. Corruption is an empirical question, and determination can only be done by competent courts. Hence, theoretical discussions regarding the corruption of individuals are futile. The competence and suitability of members of the cabinet, however, do not attract the same amount of attention and consideration as corruption.
During the Ottoman Empire, the Turks employed no specialist headsman to undertake the considerably high demand of conducting executions. The job of the executioner, rather unusually, was held instead by the Sultan’s bostanci basha (head gardener) from the Ottoman corps of gardeners. Besides cultivating the Sultan’s paradise gardens, these men tripled as customs inspectors, policemen and executioners. It was the royal gardeners who sewed condemned women into weighted sacks and dropped them into the Bosporus. However, when very senior officials like grand viziers and chief eunuchs were sentenced to death, execution was not the inevitable result of a death sentence. Instead, the condemned nobleman and the head gardener took part in what was surely one of the most peculiar customs known in history: a race held between the head gardener and his anticipated victim. For someone like a grand vizier, for as soon as the sentence of death had been passed, it was the practice to allow the condemned man to run as fast as he could from the palace to a particular gate. If the vizier reached the gate before the head gardener, his sentence was commuted to mere banishment. If, on the other hand, the condemned man was caught by the head gardener, he was summarily executed and his body hurled into the sea. Hence a nobleman theoretically had an equitable opportunity to save his life. Except he really did not; it was a trap. The head gardener was always chosen for his running abilities instead of his expertise in horticulture.
The reasons that led the Turks to employ athletic gardeners to execute people instead of employing a separate corps for gardeners and executioners are not immediately obvious, but rightsizing is unlikely to be one of them. The Turkish Sultan had considerable resources at his disposal to enlist separate corps for two qualitatively different functions.
Cabinet selection in Pakistan resonates closely with the gardener-cum-executioner custom of the Turks. Individuals are selected to be part of the cabinet where their envisaged role is completely different from their ostensible responsibilities pertaining to a particular department. For example, a majority of cabinet ministers are appointed not because of their expertise or familiarity with the particular department, but instead because of their ability and enthusiasm for defending the party. The defence of the political party, while imperative, should be left to the spokespersons of the party. The inability to differentiate between political parties and governments is responsible for the focus on politics instead of policies.
Some criticisms of cabinet formation in Pakistan remain common to all Westminster democratic forms of government in general and coalition governments in particular. And this particular model of government is admittedly supposed to be a government by amateurs, though not to be confused with amateurish government. However, there remains in Pakistan an extraordinary dearth of choice and clarity regarding assignments of particular portfolios. As an example, previously, the chairman of the Kashmir Committee (though not a member of the cabinet) was a gentleman whose entry in the US and most of Europe was banned. The purpose of his appointment does not seem to be his ability to meaningfully canvas and lobby for Pakistan’s viewpoint on Kashmir in the international arena. It will not be entirely fair to blame the present government alone for the confusion and speculation surrounding cabinet appointments. The genesis of this problem can be traced to the political culture in Pakistan. One glaring example of the contributory negligence of all the political parties in this respect is the conspicuous absence of active and vibrant shadow cabinets.
In most parliamentary parties, members of the shadow cabinet are either elected by party members, and the leader of the opposition then allocates portfolios to the shadow ministers or, alternatively, they are selected by the leader of the opposition. The task of a shadow minister is to monitor the activities of the relevant ministry. Members of the shadow cabinet are often appointed to the cabinet post corresponding to their ministry if and when their party comes into government. It is the shadow cabinet’s responsibility to pass criticism on the current government and its respective legislation, as well as offering alternative policies. The rationale of a shadow cabinet is to make the government’s cabinet accountable for its pre-election manifestos and performance. A shadow minister is expected to maintain close connection with various stakeholders in relevant fields. This enables him to know about the various needs of the sector and put pressure on the government to take initiatives to solve various problems. A shadow cabinet helps the opposition party allocate work to members of parliament. This allows not only for specialisation in the opposition members but also allows clarity in regards to appointments to specific portfolios when the opposition replaces the government.
The implications of this generalist political culture are visible in the charter of demands presented to the federal government and the Punjab government by the opposition and coalition partners respectively. To demand for eradication of corruption en bloc in the absence of specific suggestions, while being noble, is either outrageously naive or rhetorical. Similarly, demanding for petrol prices to be lowered without displaying cognisance of the international oil prices and an alternate policy to achieve the stated decrease is disingenuous. Criticism without rational and viable alternates is not credible. As for the government, the formation of a new cabinet should have been viewed as an opportunity to not only rightsize in terms of numerical strength but also quality and suitability.
The writer is a lawyer based in Lahore and can be reached at [email protected]