Swamped opinion pages, provocative editorials, flying tweets, blog after blog, chit chat on talk shows and the unending stream of chartered flights from Washington to Islamabad — all faced with the same dilemma: what is it going to take to win over Islamabad? Is the Pak-US relationship even worth maintaining? The latest assault on the Pakistan border post is set to further deepen the mistrust and resentment in this relationship, with Islamabad shutting the NATO logistics supply line.
‘Endgame’ is the new phrase on the street and political pundits and observers in Pakistan view this endgame with much suspicion, pointing to 1989 and how Washington washed its hands of the region after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan.
Officials in Islamabad and the khakis in Rawalpindi view the swiftly changing dynamics of the Afghan endgame as being entirely against Pakistan’s vital national security interests. These evolving dynamics, they (Pakistanis) claim, are creating space for the devil — archrival India. And the only way to limit India’s growing footprint is to keep the insurgency alive and make Afghanistan a living hell for the Indians along with everyone else. Let us face it, Islamabad is broke and does not have the pleasure of having the same kind of economic resources New Delhi has at its disposal. Pakistan knows well that it cannot win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people. Hence, the only way to maintain its influence is through promoting pro-Pakistani Afghan warlords who use coercion as a tool to establish their writ.
The growing Indian influence, however, is not the only primary concern of Pakistan. The other, more pressing concern is the fear of reigniting Pashtun nationalism. Pakistan’s contention is that any government in Kabul that does not include the Pashtuns, who represent the major ethnic group in Afghanistan, will continue to induce Mullah Omar’s Taliban and other factions to continue fighting. Pakistan also fears that alienating the Pashtuns could spark and renew past demands for a separate Pashtun homeland — Pashtunistan. The geographical boundaries of Pashtunistan would include Pakistan’s entire North West Frontier, now the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, and parts of Balochistan. This represents a serious existential threat for the Pakistani state, considering a similar ongoing separatist insurgency in Balochistan. These are Islamabad’s legitimate fears of disintegration.
This precisely explains Pakistan’s fixation on playing and promoting the Haqqani network — led by father Jalaluddin and son Sirajuddin Haqqani — and the Quetta-Kandahar Shura: because it fears that these same elements will demand their own country if they do not get their share of Kabul. The Pakistanis, however, face a crucial question regarding their policy of promoting the same old Soviet-killing hawks. If, in future, there were a political settlement in Afghanistan where Omar and Jalaluddin get their fair share, how long would such an agreement be sustainable for? Considering the billions of dollars being pumped into Afghanistan by the US and the international community, would the Haqqanis and Omar’s Taliban be able to provide for their respective constituencies — that they claim — the same way other power brokers will? Pakistan should consider these scenarios whilst keeping its capabilities in mind. Islamabad, as I mentioned earlier, partly survives at the behest of international financial institutions, foreign aid, grants and deferments. It cannot afford to provide financial assistance to other states for economic development when it direly requires it itself. However, to win over Islamabad, Washington needs to clearly address Pakistan’s legitimate security interests and concerns regarding the Pashtun question. The Pashtuns should be represented proportionately, i.e. in Afghan ministries, security forces, local districts, jirgas, shuras and other essential government institutions.
Pakistan’s India-centric mindset cannot be addressed while bilateral outstanding issues stay unresolved, primarily the Kashmir dispute. As Rudra Chaudhuri, professor at King’s College, London, points out in The Proxy Calculus, “The road to Kashmir could pass through Kabul.” This might very well be true. India and Pakistan could put an end to their confrontation by cooperating in Afghanistan, where both countries have legitimate interests. Afghanistan could serve as a model where both countries can jointly collaborate in the development of the country and this could serve as a platform towards resolving the Kashmir dispute. A joint effort by the two nuclear neighbours could act as a strong confidence building measure and moisten the soil to resolve outstanding disputes.
For a stable Afghanistan, hostilities and proxy wars must end, and this is in the interest of Pakistan as much as other countries in the region. A stable Afghanistan can ensure a stable Pakistan, enabling it to focus inwards on domestic issues rather than get bogged down by external, yet legitimate threats. In order to convince Islamabad, and to ensure a respectful and reasonable conclusion to the Afghan war, the US must ensure that Pakistan’s legitimate security interests are taken into account. The only government acceptable to Islamabad and Rawalpindi in Kabul will be one with proper Pashtun representation and one that limits India’s role in economic development.
The writer is a freelance columnist