Finally the report of the Abbottabad Commission is out in the open. The foreign news outlet, Al-Jazeera, is credited with having posted the 337-page document on its website. However, immediately, responsibility for access to the report was denied in Pakistan. It is not clear who has spilled the beans in the media. The opposition and the establishment want the whistleblower to be punished. The government seems to be watching the development from the sidelines. The publication of the report is a blessing in disguise for the government as it would have been difficult for the government to officially make the document public. But the leaks in the press have made its task easier. The report was submitted to the last government in January by the Commission but it was swept under the carpet like the fate of all previous commission reports.
There is very little that is a surprise in the findings of the Commission because it has stated only what was already known. It has not indicted any specific individual for the May 2, 2011 debacle. At best, the Commission has made general observations, and these generalisations complicate things. It is not enough to hold the military and civilian leadership collectively responsible. Is there someone at the top who is held accountable? Everyone is guilty but no one is held responsible. The Commission claimed to have interviewed almost all ‘high-level’ military and civilian officials to investigate the causes of one of the biggest security lapses in the country. Contrary to tall claims, the army chief, the president and the then prime minister refused to appear in person before the Commission.
The real question before the Commission was not how CIA agents expanded their footprint in Pakistan but it was how the most wanted man remained undetected from the microscopic lens of the ISI. It is either complicity or incompetence of the intelligence agencies. There is nothing in the middle. Fix the responsibility without ambiguity and some heads must roll. It is ironic that the report blames the civilian government for issuing visas to the CIA agents, but fails to address the larger question: who made Osama bin Laden invisible in the small city of Abbottabad?
Let us give the credit to the ‘devil’ CIA for meticulously following the world’s number one terrorist. It is no secret that the Americans stopped sharing information with our intelligence agency, fearing its connivance with al Qaeda. The US’s complaints of alleged cooperation between the ISI and the Haqqani network in North Waziristan had dented the credibility of the top spying agency in the eyes of the Americans, but even then there was no effort made to remove this mistrust.
Pakistan’s intelligence agencies not just failed to trace bin Laden, they also faltered in keeping track of the CIA agents who were on valid visas. The CIA agents reportedly established the safe house in Abbottabad. They extensively carried out reconnaissance of the site that was under the nose of the Pakistan Military Academy. Even such increased activities around the compound could not catch the attention of the agencies. All strange living arrangements of the fort-like-built compound could have been easily detected, even by the police. But for that to happen, the security establishment needs to put its own house in order.
The prescription part of the Commission report merits due attention. The Commission’s recommendation for restoring civilian supremacy and better coordination among the civilian and military agencies is the best way forward. Foreign and security policy formulation is the exclusive prerogative of the civilians. The military’s intervention and encroachment into the foreign and security domains has resulted in strategic blunders such as the East Pakistan break-up, the Kargil fiasco and, last but not least, the Abbottabad debacle.
Parliamentary oversight needs to be enhanced to bring ‘the state within the state’ under some check or control. The nation is providing resources to the ISI for spying on enemies of the state like bin Laden, not for tracking journalists and politicians. So the intelligence agencies must be made answerable to parliament and its committees. However, security-related briefings before parliament can be held in-camera.
It is high time the civilian leadership takes the initiative in giving guidelines to the military. It would have to act pro-actively to take over foreign affairs and defence. Only time would tell how much the military is willing to give in. Raising a hue and cry over the leaks of the Commission’s report and holding inquires would only further tarnish the image of the military.
In the end, it is concluded that the Abottabad Commission’s report cannot be termed as a mere eyewash. It is a first step towards accountability. It is time to depart from the usual pattern of commissions that deliberate for long periods of time without recommending concrete action. However, it is fair to say that the Abbottabad Commission may have done its best in its limited capacity. It has lessons for the military as well as civilian high-ups.
Finally the report of the Abbottabad Commission is out in the open. The foreign news outlet, Al-Jazeera, is credited with having posted the 337-page document on its website. However, immediately, responsibility for access to the report was denied in Pakistan. It is not clear who has spilled the beans in the media. The opposition and the establishment want the whistleblower to be punished. The government seems to be watching the development from the sidelines. The publication of the report is a blessing in disguise for the government as it would have been difficult for the government to officially make the document public. But the leaks in the press have made its task easier. The report was submitted to the last government in January by the Commission but it was swept under the carpet like the fate of all previous commission reports.
There is very little that is a surprise in the findings of the Commission because it has stated only what was already known. It has not indicted any specific individual for the May 2, 2011 debacle. At best, the Commission has made general observations, and these generalisations complicate things. It is not enough to hold the military and civilian leadership collectively responsible. Is there someone at the top who is held accountable? Everyone is guilty but no one is held responsible. The Commission claimed to have interviewed almost all ‘high-level’ military and civilian officials to investigate the causes of one of the biggest security lapses in the country. Contrary to tall claims, the army chief, the president and the then prime minister refused to appear in person before the Commission.
The real question before the Commission was not how CIA agents expanded their footprint in Pakistan but it was how the most wanted man remained undetected from the microscopic lens of the ISI. It is either complicity or incompetence of the intelligence agencies. There is nothing in the middle. Fix the responsibility without ambiguity and some heads must roll. It is ironic that the report blames the civilian government for issuing visas to the CIA agents, but fails to address the larger question: who made Osama bin Laden invisible in the small city of Abbottabad?
Let us give the credit to the ‘devil’ CIA for meticulously following the world’s number one terrorist. It is no secret that the Americans stopped sharing information with our intelligence agency, fearing its connivance with al Qaeda. The US’s complaints of alleged cooperation between the ISI and the Haqqani network in North Waziristan had dented the credibility of the top spying agency in the eyes of the Americans, but even then there was no effort made to remove this mistrust.
Pakistan’s intelligence agencies not just failed to trace bin Laden, they also faltered in keeping track of the CIA agents who were on valid visas. The CIA agents reportedly established the safe house in Abbottabad. They extensively carried out reconnaissance of the site that was under the nose of the Pakistan Military Academy. Even such increased activities around the compound could not catch the attention of the agencies. All strange living arrangements of the fort-like-built compound could have been easily detected, even by the police. But for that to happen, the security establishment needs to put its own house in order.
The prescription part of the Commission report merits due attention. The Commission’s recommendation for restoring civilian supremacy and better coordination among the civilian and military agencies is the best way forward. Foreign and security policy formulation is the exclusive prerogative of the civilians. The military’s intervention and encroachment into the foreign and security domains has resulted in strategic blunders such as the East Pakistan break-up, the Kargil fiasco and, last but not least, the Abbottabad debacle.
Parliamentary oversight needs to be enhanced to bring ‘the state within the state’ under some check or control. The nation is providing resources to the ISI for spying on enemies of the state like bin Laden, not for tracking journalists and politicians. So the intelligence agencies must be made answerable to parliament and its committees. However, security-related briefings before parliament can be held in-camera.
It is high time the civilian leadership takes the initiative in giving guidelines to the military. It would have to act pro-actively to take over foreign affairs and defence. Only time would tell how much the military is willing to give in. Raising a hue and cry over the leaks of the Commission’s report and holding inquir