Discussing Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) needs conceptual understanding. Conceptually, Pakistan’s treatment of FSD has been different from what others perceive. Dr Zafar Iqbal Cheema, the president/executive director of the Strategic Vision Institute (SVI) maintains that Pakistan’s National Command Authority (NCA) is clear that full spectrum deterrence, in its qualitative term, exists to plug the gaps in deterrence and address all forms of aggressions. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Stimson Centre report, titled ‘A normal nuclear Pakistan’, authored by Michael Krepon and Toby Dalton, urged Pakistan to shift its declaratory policy from “full spectrum” to “strategic” deterrence, commit to a recessed deterrence posture, limit production of short-range delivery vehicles and tactical nuclear weapons, lift Pakistan’s veto on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMNCT) and reduce or stop fissile material production, separate civilian and military nuclear facilities and sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) without waiting for India. It is discriminatory in nature just to maximise India’s position vis-à-vis Pakistan. In an international conference, few confessions were made public by a prominent Pakistani figure in order to convey to the international community our ensured minimum deterrence capability. The Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference 2015 was held from March 23 to 24 in Washington DC, where Lieutenant General (retd) Khalid Kidwai, who is advisor to Pakistan’s NCA and was the pioneer Director General of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which he headed for an unprecedented 15 years till December 2013 (with an unheard of 12 extensions after his retirement from the army) was in attendance. As the head of SPD, Kidwai is credited with conceiving, articulating and executing Pakistan’s nuclear policy and deterrence doctrines into a tangible and robust nuclear force structure. The development of Pakistan’s Shaheen-3 missile having a range of 2,750 km has the objective of preventing India from gaining second-strike nuclear capability from the Andaman and Nicobar islands. It is suspected that India was developing strategic bases on its Andaman and Nicobar islands in the Bay of Bengal. Pakistan was also confronted with a credible threat from India, which was pursuing “dangerous, provocative and irresponsible doctrines like the Cold Start Doctrine and Proactive Strategy, and whose conventional military build-up was Pakistan specific”. It is absurd to ask Pakistan to revert from FSD to strategic deterrence when Pakistan aims only for ensuring equilibrium and not a quantitative balance to India. More specifically, Pakistani officials define our full spectrum minimum deterrence as India-specific. To put it simply, the strategic calculus is narrowed down to deterring a militarily and economically stronger India. But officials have articulated that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons’ programme is not open-ended. In the Washington conference Lieutenant General Kidwai explicated Pakistan’s quest for the Nasr shoot-and-scoot missile system, saying that it was in response to concerns that India’s larger military could still wage a conventional war against the country, thinking Pakistan would not risk retaliation with a bigger nuclear weapon. Since these tactical nuclear weapons are mounted on short distance missiles, their command and control is delegated to lower levels in the military. It is a well-known fact that these short-range, tactical nuclear weapons are a defensive response to India. More precisely, the development of Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons is actually in response to India’s Cold Start Strategy. Rakesh Sood, the former Indian special envoy for disarmament and nonproliferation, views that it is extremely destabilising for any country to develop tactical nuclear weapons. He asserted that Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is “cloaked in ambiguity”, which undermines confidence between the two countries. Ironically enough, how will Prahaar be perceived here: as a stabilising or destabilising factor? Prahaar is a solid fuel rocket surface-to-surface guided short-range tactical ballistic missile by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) of India. It will be equipped with omni-directional warheads and can be used for striking both tactical and strategic targets. Besides, why is the Indian space programme with Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) potential, India’s nukes or its missiles’ programme troublesome for anybody, particularly to the international community?Taking into account the fact that India is operating a nuclear submarine, the INS Chakra, and is currently testing another indigenously developed nuclear submarine, Lieutenant General Kidwai also revealed that Pakistan’s sea-based second strike capability is a “work in progress” and will come into play in the next few years. Ruling out nuclear submarines for Pakistan, he said, “I will not say nuclear submarines but if broadly talking about a second-strike capability, for which submarines are a platform, then yes.”However, Lieutenant General Kidwai also revealed that while Pakistan had already moved from minimum deterrence to full spectrum deterrence, the current arsenal size would be sufficient for the next 10 to 15 years. As per the estimates of the arms Control Association, Pakistan currently has between 100 to 120 nuclear warheads as compared to India’s 90 to 110 warheads.Nevertheless, Pakistan believes that the rising conventional disparity with India fetched its inherited security dilemma from the eastern borders, lowering its nuclear thresholds and forcing it to bolster efforts to play the much0anticipated numbers game. It also gauged the efficiency of Pakistan’s credible minimum deterrence, termed as FSD. The full spectrum deterrence, as being implemented by Pakistan, is a little different than that perceived by others, specifically the west. For that matter, it needs coherent literature and elucidation on the subject. It would be helpful in neutralising the international community’s concerns regarding the concept that Pakistan aims for nuclear parity with India. Factually, Pakistan does not seek parity; it only aims for balance. The opposite could be true for India because its programme is neither for balance nor parity but rather for prestige and supremacy. The writer is associated with the Strategic Vision Institute, Islamabad and can be reached at beenishaltaf7@gmail.com