The changing nature of dominant security threats during the last 14 years’ war on terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the lack of intelligence cooperation between the two states have caused misunderstanding, the blame game and severe fatalities in the region. Every month and every week, terrorists target either the Pakistani security forces or Afghan civilians but they never think to develop a joint strategy to tackle the menace of sectarian terrorists across the Durand Line. Last year’s intelligence memorandum signed between the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and National Directorate Security (NDS) enraged Afghan politicians and members of parliament. The president came under severe criticism from all segments of society that even called him a traitor but, later on, realised the important of intelligence sharing with Pakistan. As intelligence is more than just surveillance and information gathering, the two states can exchange data of their surveillance on people who pose precarious security threats to their national security. At its core, intelligence differs from research information management and investigative interviews in that it includes three unique activities: interpreting threats, the use of actionable intelligence and intelligence-led secret operations. Afghanistan and Pakistan lack these professional skills and cannot interpret threats within their traditional form. The capability of an agency to make comprehensive intelligence estimates for policymakers depends largely on its assessment and analytical capabilities but the ISI and NDS have hardly contributed to their states’ policymaking process. They are confused between the traditional principles of counterinsurgency operations and conventional warfare. Their parameters of intelligence information gathering have shrunk. The ISI is now mostly confined to Punjab and is unable to collect true intelligence information from Balochistan, Waziristan and the FATA region, while the NDS has no professional capacity to even compile a single intelligence report from Kabul. The escalating violence between India and Pakistan and their support to extremist groups inside Afghanistan threaten to get worse after the recent Pathankot and Bacha Khan University attacks. Pakistan, for instance, alleges that India, with the support of Afghan intelligence agencies, covertly finances the Pakistani Taliban and the Baloch National Army (BLA). India thinks Pakistan facilitated terror attacks on it consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif, and on the airbase in Pathankot, while Pakistan says India was behind the attack on its consulate in Jalalabad. This blame game among the three states has given a chance to terrorist organisations to inflict fatalities on civilians and security forces. Last week, the Indian defence minister warned that those who had inflicted pain on India would also feel the pain. This was a limp warning to Pakistan that Indian agencies would do the same as the terrorists had done in Patankot. The ISI says that India trains and finances the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and provides financial assistance to the Islamic State (IS) leadership as well. Pakistan’s concerns are genuine, therefore, its intelligence agencies want to expedite their counterintelligence efforts in Afghanistan to intercept trained terrorists from crossing into the country. Afghanistan too has concerns about Pakistan’s support to the Haqqani network. The three states are in deep water and have nothing to convince their citizens on security issues. India’s alleged involvement in Afghanistan raises serious questions about why the country wants to use Afghanistan against Pakistan. What does India want to teach Pakistan in Afghanistan and why does India not counter Pakistan within Kashmir? These questions need a thorough investigation on the trilateral level in order to crystallise the basic agenda of this proxy war on Afghan soil. The Taliban war in Afghanistan has intensified as the second phase of reconciliation talks have ended with no results. The security situation in Helmand, Kunduz, Jalalabad and Kabul remains challenging as IS and Pakistani militia groups (Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and TTP) have entered a decisive war against the unity government. Terrorists want to maintain high pressure on Kabul to gain control of some important provinces bordering Pakistan in order to clear their supply line. During 2015, more than 10,000 terrorist and security incidents recorded. Two weeks ago, acting Defence Minister Masoom Stanekzai told Afghan parliament that with the withdrawal of foreign forces and the military operation in Waziristan insecurity in Afghanistan had increased. He said regional rivalries had led to the creation of extremist forces in the country. Mr Stanekzai regretted the deteriorating security in the north and said that Tajik, Uzbek, Chechen, Afghan and Pakistani extremists had made the north insecure through Ghanzni, Zabul, Faryab and Chitral, and added that there were some powerful Afghan commanders and leaders who transport Taliban and IS fighters in their vehicles to Northern Afghanistan and settle them along the Russian and Chinese borders. Mr Mirdad Salangi, head of parliament’s internal security commission, criticised the government for its inability to manage the war against terrorists and warned that the next fighting season would be a hard one for the shrinking Afghan army. NATO commanders also warned that the next season of fighting would be dangerous. Experts view this warning as a total failure of the US and NATO forces in fighting insurgents, or they want to shift the parameter of the war closer to the Russian and Chinese borders. On January 20, 2016, terrorists attacked the bus of a local television channel (ToloNews) in Kabul and killed seven of its anchors. The incident occurred after a suicide bomber detonated explosives near the bus. In Jalalabad province, Afghan commanders warned that the terror networks of Mangal Bagh, IS and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba were spread across the region. Mr Mangal Bagh recently joined hands with IS military command in Shinwari district against the Afghan government. Last week, Nausher Khan, a commander of Mangal Bagh group in Achin district told an Afghan journalist that his group had recently held a meeting with the leadership of IS to further organise attacks against the Afghan security forces. As the security situation in deteriorating by the day, President Ashraf Ghani appointed a former communist general, Abdul Jabbar Qahraman, as a special security commander of Helmand province. Mr Qahraman is member of the lower house of parliament, who has served under the Dr Najibullah administration in the 1980s. “We are working on the professionalisation of intelligence and a coordination plan to fight militants because we can improve the security situation using intelligence techniques within limited resources,” General Qahraman said. The writer is the author of The Prospect of Nuclear Jihad in Pakistan. He can be reached at zai.musakhan222@gmail.com