The statement by India’s Minister for External Affairs, Sushma Swaraj that India will not oppose Pakistan’s entry into the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) but would want its application to be considered on merit is no less than a deception if one understands the use of nuances by the Indian foreign policy leadership. First of all, the statement has been coerced on India because of China’s principled public stance at the Geneva meeting, blocking consensus on the India “gatecrashing” into the NSG. Once the Chinese opposition to an exclusive Indian membership without Pakistan became clear at the meeting, India “enticed” the United States — who is ever ready to play the Indian fiddle — to be the first to lay the trap through Secretary John Kerry’s statement that India would treat Pakistan’s membership of the NSG on merit if it gets into it (of course before Pakistan). The Indian foreign secretary has gone over Beijing to lure the Chinese on whose return Swaraj replayed the gambit. It goes without saying that India’s version of “merits” policy has been formulated differently than China-Pakistan “criteria”-based approach, although the genealogy of the two words is almost the same. It is essential to understand the inherent nuances invariably employed, albeit intentional, by the Indian leadership to cloak their real intentions behind statements made for public consumption. The first Indian prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, who is undoubtedly considered the architect of the Indian foreign and security policies, was very apt in projecting nuances whenever and wherever he wanted. It is noteworthy that throughout his premiership, while explaining India’s nuclear policy during the formative phase of its nuclear programme, Nehru was deliberately subtle about his choice of words, and excluded the term “military” from his assurances on the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. He invariably opted for terms that are more opaque; that India would not use atomic energy for “evil” and “destructive” purposes in the context of the debate on military versus peaceful uses of atomic energy. Nowhere in his entire range of views on the use of nuclear energy Nehru ever said that India would not use it for military purposes. Since Nehru was not willing to provide contractually binding obligations for peaceful uses of nuclear technology, he instead chose to give equivocal assurances. In an assessment on the “Atomic Energy Development in India,” the then scientific adviser to the British government, Dr H R Ambler, noted in January 1960: “The unequivocal statement by the Prime Minister (Government of India press note of 16.12.59) that atomic energy would never be used for ‘evil purposes’ means little, as self-defence would not be considered ‘evil’.” The Indo-US rhetoric to treat Pakistan’s application for the NSG membership is motivated by India’s burning desire to somehow get into the NSG without Pakistan, even if it means deluding Pakistan with false impressions. The 48-member cartel would formally commence the debate on June 23-24 on the requests for membership from Pakistan and India. The forthcoming plenary meeting is anticipated to undertake a watershed decision that would impact the future of South Asian strategic landscape. Both states, Pakistan and India, have formally applied for inclusion in the group; that, if accepted, would ensure their global nuclear commerce as “legitimate nuclear power.” India seeks membership to transpire from its developing-country niche to become a member that matters in the elite nuclear group, an ambition that eventually extends to becoming a hegemonic superpower. The basic purpose of the NSG is to provide a mechanism through which the non-proliferation goal could be achieved, but in the present scenario it is ironic that most of the group members are unanimously supporting a patent proliferator — India — to be a part of the group. However, the clamour over the inclusion of India in the NSG drew criticism from a few states because it was India’s nuclear weapon test in 1974 that gave birth to the NSG to prevent further nuclear proliferation. India’s favorite position to join the NSG due to its propping as a “pivot” in the US Asia-Pacific strategy assisted to become a rival great-power to China seems to be stymied. China is being viewed as the most probable contender having the potential to challenge the US claim to being a sole superpower. Hence, the policy adopted by the US is to contain China’s rise. To pursue this objective the linkages around the world are being created with the prime aim to encircle China to prevent its emergence as a global player. Hence as per US strategic thinking, India is being seen to have a substantial role to play in the containment of China, and therefore, being patronised as deserving of the NSG membership. However, this approach is complete nonsense in view of India’s track record as demonstrated in 1974 and 1988 nuclear tests, and mocking the entire non-proliferation regime until recently. Its labelling the full scope IAEA safeguards as “chaining the new born babies” (NNWS) while leaving the criminals free (NWS), its rejection of the NPT as instrument for “disarming the unarmed” and its vetoing the CTBT in 1996 at CD are part of a long trail of its sardonic dismissal of the NPR. India is facing a very critical situation as the unwarranted propping by the US and its allies seem to be failing to help it attain the NSG membership. These powers are generating tremendous pressure in favour of India’s membership to the NSG with China being an exception. China maintains, “NSG should have discussion on the joining of the non-NPT countries in a way agreed by all parties, so as to make a decision based on agreement. This position is not directed against any country and applies to all non-NPT states.” Pakistan wants to be granted the NSG membership, but it strictly adheres to the non-discriminatory and unbiased approach in the NSG band to accommodate the non-NPT signatories. Pakistan’s major concern is that India would permanently block Pakistan’s entry in the group by using the consensus clause if India becomes the member of the NSG. Pakistan also fears that India would divert its civilian nuclear technology to enhance its weapons capability. Recently, Indian External Affairs Minister Swaraj stated, “We are not opposed to any country’s entrance into NSG based on merit, including Pakistan.” The statement appeared at a time when both sates are making political and diplomatic efforts to create space for itself in the NSG. It seems like another diplomatic effort by India to deviate Pakistan from its stern response against Indian membership. Pakistan committed a grave mistake by not opposing this initiative back then where it should have opposed special waiver to India. Once again Pakistan is being expected to adjust to India’s formal membership to the group despite the fact that India does not meet any of the criteria for NSG membership. At the same time, this fact is intentionally being ignored by the West that materialisation of India’s NSG full membership is highly detrimental to Pakistan’s security future. Therefore, Pakistan should not repeat the same mistake and should stand firm on its stance to either have this membership simultaneously granted to Pakistan, or not be given to India either. Pakistan should work more stringently towards redefining its policies and making international community realise Pakistan’s genuine security concerns. Pakistan can survive without the NSG membership, but it is necessary for Pakistan to be acknowledged, accepted and treated as a nuclear weapon state by the international community. If rules are to be violated to entertain Indian interest then certainly Pakistan could seek the same treatment. The writer is the President/Executive Director of an Islamabad based think-tank, Strategic Vision Institute