The merit of the Pakistani credentials: Pakistan has emerged as a responsible nuclear weapon state by developing strong credentials in the fields of nuclear safety, security, and stability, by developing a stringent strategic export control system. Pakistan has not only fulfilled its national obligation of safeguarding its national security objectives vis-à-vis India, but it has been also fulfilling its international obligations, to win the trust of the international community. To strengthen its nuclear credentials further, Pakistan wanted to become an effective part of the international Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime (NNPR). It is primarily the NNPR which will gain more by including advance states into nuclear technology rather than other way round. The international community, including the US, appreciates Pakistan’s nuclear safety and security standards. One of the important aspects of Pakistan’s credentials is its safe operational experience of handling peaceful nuclear technology for over 40 years.
With the creation of the National Command Authority (NCA) and the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), Pakistan’s nuclear security culture has undergone a supersonic change and control. Since 1998 the SPD has been managing and conducting external audits on all nuclear inventories, thereby implementing regular and surprise inspections at facilities. Hence, any nuclear or radioactive materials that enters into the safeguarded system comes under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which monitors and tracks the movement of materials through the system until they are disposed.
Though some of the NSG members may recommend a strategy of equidistance from both India and Pakistan vis-à-vis the NSG bid, yet given the need to consider the justification beyond a nuclear apartheid approach
Nuclear security in Pakistan rests on three basic pillars: Legislative and Regulatory Framework (LRF), Institutions and Organisations and Nuclear Security Systems and Measures. Pakistan’s LRF comprises more than a dozen regulatory and legal rules and ordnances including Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission Ordinance (1965), the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority Ordinance (2001) and the National Command Authority Act (2010). Under the LRF, Pakistan also defined a comprehensive Export Control Act in 2004 on goods, technologies, material and equipment related to nuclear and biological weapons as well as their delivery systems.
Pakistan has established Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV) in 2007 to scrutinise the enactment of the Export Control Act. The Pakistan Centre of Excellence on Nuclear Security (PCENS) is functioning as an exemplary facility with the responsibility for the provision of innovative training and the sustainability of nuclear security. Another training institute, the National Institute of Safety and Security (NISAS), was established for professionals, technicians and managers in the fields of nuclear safety and security. Nuclear security systems and measures in Pakistan are based on the concept of 5Ds that includes deter, detect, delay, defend, and destroy. Nuclear Emergency Management System (NEMS) is emplaced to appropriately tackle and cope with nuclear or radiological emergencies.
Pakistan has been positively collaborating with international mechanisms designed to support national and global nuclear security infrastructure. Pakistan is party to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS), the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. Pakistan also collaborates with various IAEA committees as an active member such as the Nuclear Safety Standards Committee, Transport Safety Standards Committee, and Nuclear Security Guidance Committee, Committee on Safety Standards and Global Nuclear Safety and Security Network.
All these credentials merit strengthening of the NSG by Pakistan’s inclusive exports control laws as well as the designed regulatory frameworks. Only a discriminatory view may deny Pakistan’s credible candidature for NSG. By possessing comprehensive nuclear fuel cycle experiences, Pakistan can undoubtedly adopt an effective separation plan and apply IAEA additional protocols as per same criteria of the safeguards agreement finalised between the government of India and the IAEA.
How to mitigate the discrimination/nuclear segregation: The real obligation of the NSG is to find a way to conform the nuclear power states ‘needs and emerging nuclear states concerns vis-à-vis the nuclear states’ expanding weaponization programs. Ideally, this transparency would come with an opening of the doors of the NSG to be more all-encompassing. The US has been pushing for India’s NSG membership while China has been reportedly backing Pakistan’s bid to join the nuclear trading club. India, though not a member, enjoys the benefits of membership under a 2008 exemption to NSG rules for its atomic cooperation deal with the US and other states. The NSG looks after critical issues relating to nuclear sector and its members are allowed to trade in and export nuclear technology. The NSG works under the principle of unanimity and even one nation’s vote against a country could scuttle its bid.
Objectively, a non-discriminatory criteria-based approach on NSG membership could expediently help pacify the Pakistani concerns as it would be equally helpful to accommodate non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS), and nuclear weapon states, outside the domain of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The membership extension issue has become a dilemma for the NSG. It is deemed necessary to initiate talks with non-membership states to achieve the long-term goal of non-proliferation, but this hinders optimization in terms of membership. Those limitations mitigate the effectiveness of the regime. Thus, it is necessary for the NSG to provide clear standards for full membership. The NSG works under the principle of unanimity and even one nation’s vote against a country could scuttle its bid.
The criteria-based approach for NSG membership can strengthen NPR and enables states to play a more constructive role in raising the credibility of NPR. This approach is meant to give a balanced opportunity to the states that seek NSG membership and the states that meet the criteria should be granted membership. Presently, NSG criteria cannot admit non-NPT states due to the technical hitch of the January 1967-cutoff principle of NPT; Pakistan and India cannot join NPT as Nuclear weapon States (NWS) and will not roll back their nuclear programs. Therefore, NSG membership can be one approach to take them on board the whole gist of NPR and yet address their peaceful energy needs.
Conclusion: Though some of the NSG members may recommend a strategy of equidistance from both India and Pakistan vis-à-vis the NSG bid, yet given the need to consider the justification beyond a nuclear apartheid approach, to whom the NSG bid is approved or rejected, such a decision would intrinsically require to have a judicious consultation based on equality, impartiality and merit. The recently resisted Indian move– to chair the Nuclear Non-proliferation committee of the UNSC –by several Western countries who considered that India was not suited to head this important panel since it is not a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ( NPT)—thus raising a question mark on New Delhi’s nuclear status. Nonetheless, a judicious perceptivity in this regard argues to equally approve or reject the Indian-Pakistani applications for the NSG bid. Concluded