Pakistan celebrates its 69th year of independence from British rule on August 14, 2016. The country has had an acrimonious relationship with democracy throughout its existence. It is a cyclical journey between direct military control versus indirect control, with a civilian front and an alleged democratic set-up. Unfortunately, even the democratic set-up we have had in our country is no less than an autocracy, leaving the populace with more complaints than they had with their predecessor rulers in uniform. So what has led to this game of musical chairs? Is it because this is what the masses want? Why has there always been an imbalance between the pillars of the sate in Pakistan? Is it because this was a trend set by the members of the first government? Allen McGrath in his brilliant book The Destruction of Pakistan’s Democracy gives us some clues as to what the possible causes could be. According to him, when Lord Mountbatten took over charge in the subcontinent in March 1947 he had the monumental task of reducing the violence, and tackling the issue of the formation of government upon the withdrawal of the British. As the process unfolded, history witnessed the creation of only two dominions, namely India and Pakistan, in a region that had multiple nations and kingdoms. When the two countries were created, both adopted constitutions that were completely drafted by the British parliament. The Indian Act of 1935, considered to be the basic constitutional document for both the nations, was an important step towards developing a federation with provincial autonomy, and reducing the role of federal government in provincial matters. Also in the initial phase of the British withdrawal, rather than designating the two new countries as completely independent states, a more subtle link was left intact by having a full responsible government but with dominions. The concept of dominion was invariably linked to the role of a Governor-General. Subsequent events and what became of this Governor-General role in Pakistan was to set precedence for the future de-stability of democracy here. India shed its dominion status in 1951, whilst Pakistan retained that status and the powers of the Governor-General that went with it until eight years after its creation. The book further describes how the role of the Governor-General was very much like the British king, where “he reigned but did not govern,” and was hence only limited to the tendering of advice. Apparently, Mohammad Ali Jinnah wasn’t very pleased with this concept, and wanted to expand the powers of this office, which to some British indicated that this role would acquire “dictatorial” powers. From the beginning the people of Pakistan had invested everything in Jinnah, and could not think of a Pakistan without him, and therefore, when he was alive, he was the government of Pakistan. Nothing was done with his implicit or explicit agreement. Hence right from the beginning, executive authority flowed from the Governor-General’s office. One of the most interesting things noted in the book is the claim by Sharifuddin Pirzada to have in his possession a note written by Jinnah himself in July 1947 whilst engaged in negotiations for dominion status. Reportedly, Jinnah wrote a note to self, titled “Danger of parliamentary form of government. 1) It has worked satisfactorily so far in England and nowhere else 2) Presidential form of government more suited to Pakistan.” Even though Mountbatten grew to respect Jinnah eventually, but the sense of mistrust between the two was very strong, particularly due to Mountbatten’s closeness to Nehru. This, therefore, became a hindrance, when the issue of appointing one Governor-General for the two dominions arose. Taking these sentiments on board, Jinnah took over the role himself, which suggested a departure from the dominion practice that the Governor- General should be non-political. This was an unelected official role, and should have been excluded from any share in political power. Jinnah and not the first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan went on to appoint the cabinet. That suggested an unconstitutional expansion of the Governor-General’s role, which was later to be used by his successor Ghulam Mohammed for his own agenda when he dismissed Prime Minister Khawaja Nizamuddin in a (un)constitutional coup in 1953. Jinnah also made the unusual move of serving as a cabinet member as well. This in essence suggested that Pakistan had a political Governor-General who controlled the executive, the cabinet and the assembly. Too much power had been accumulated in one office. Right after the creation of Pakistan, Jinnah decided to intervene in almost all provinces, in essence imposing the governor rule, and dismissing the ministries of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan in the NWFP and M A Khuhro in Sindh. The most important aspect of his involvement was in West Punjab against the ministry of Nawab of Mamdot and his finance minister Mian Mumtaz Daultana. Even though the two were not natural allies, they worked together at that time against Jinnah’s action, and the book goes on to describe it as “the feudal bonds of the Punjab landowner were stronger than allegiance to the new ruler in Karachi,” who was considered an outsider by them. Jinnah eventually gave up, and Mamdot continued with his government in West Punjab. I personally think that if Jinnah had not acquired the role of Governor-General, and had considered a more neutral non-political entity, this would have saved us from the precedence of acquiring multiple powers under one role, and creating an imbalance in the power corridors of the country. His direct involvement with provincial governments also set the tone of a more federal-centric government in Pakistan, and his defeat at the hands of the West Punjab feudal lords set the stone for Punjab’s dominance in Pakistani politics. We have been following very divergent paths when it comes to democracy; we yearn for democracy and yet denigrate it when we get it. We still think dictators and autocrats can fix the country. It is essential that all of us work together to strengthen the pillars of the state, so that a truly accountable democratic set-up can be achieved where no one is above the law. The writer is a Clinical Director, Consultant Psychiatrist and Honorary Senior Lecturer in the UK