The power sharing agreement signed on 17th May between President Ashraf Ghani and former Chief Executive Abdullah-Abdullah should be taken as a good omen and a step in the right direction aimed at achieving peace and stability in Afghanistan. Taliban have reportedly criticized the deal as a repeat of past exercise when in 2014 elections similar situation had developed and US Secretary of State John Kerry had to broker a deal between Mr. Ghani and Dr Abdullah. However, polemics apart, the agreement removes one of the major impediments in the way of initiating a political dialogue between the Taliban and Ashraf Ghani led dispensation. The deal between the two sounds familiar. In 2014, the two leaders squabbled to gain power but ended up forming a National Unity Government (NUG) in which President Ghani enjoyed the executive power while Dr Abdullah contended with the office a Chief Executive, a de facto Prime Minister without executive or constitutional powers. This conjoined rule presented a dilemma to the governments dealing with Afghanistan as their officials had to repeat a brief twice to the two power houses due to sensitivities of the situation. However, Afghan watchers say that this time the US arm-twisted the two sides to come to a compromise and make the conditions conducive for the initiation of peace dialogue with the Taliban. The US also has taken exception to President Ghani’s pretext that since he was not part of the US-Taliban dialogue he owned no responsibility towards the Doha Agreement and its provisions including the release of 5000 Taliban prisoners-a pre-condition by the Taliban for the initiation of intra-Afghan peace dialogue. Stakes are high on both sides; for Taliban it is the final moment of their victory after 19 years of war with the US-led coalition, and, for Ashraf Ghani it seems the end of his political career if Taliban emerge victorious without a deal or become a major partner after the deal in the future national coalition government. Certainly, it’s a tightrope walking for the US to pull out of Afghanistan without leaving behind a durable set up. The dilemma for the US further compounds due to Doha deal with the Taliban in which Ashraf Ghani stood on the sidelines without a role or meaningful participation in the dialogue process leading to Peace Agreement between the Taliban and the US. Of late, there have been a flurry of activity on putting the Afghan peace process back on track. The most significant development at the regional level was the joint statement issued by the Special Representatives of Russia, China, Iran and Pakistan on 18th May which, inter alia, welcomed the agreement between the two main political leaders and hoped that it would lead to an intra-Afghan negotiation. The 13-paragraph joint statement supports an “Afghan-led, Afghan-owned” peace and reconciliation process which is inclusive and also calls on “foreign troops withdraw in an orderly and responsible way so that the situation in Afghanistan will experience a steady transition”. The above statement is a clear signal that immediate neighbours of Afghanistan seriously want peace and stability in that country and have adopted a non-partisan approach towards the main actors of Afghanistan who are supposed to hold intra-Afghan dialogue and pave the way for smooth withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. A peaceful Afghanistan means no more proxies or use of Afghan soil against Pakistan or other neighbours. In such a scenario India would have little room to manipulate. Interestingly, US Special Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad’s advice to India last week to hold talks with the Taliban was also instructive. In a way, Khalilzad’s advice to India was not to muddy the water and avoid instigating Ashraf Ghani to adopt a rigid stand on intra-Afghan dialogue. Foreign Minister J. Shankar’s lamentation that India would only talk to the Taliban if the latter announced their “allegiance to the Afghan constitution and recognize Ashraf Ghani as legitimate president” did not cut ice in major capitals, including the US. Consequently, Indian media has been criticizing the government for being isolated and failing to open a channel with the Taliban. The media is also critical of Indian decision to shut down its two consulates in Jalalabad and Herat. While closure of Jalalabad consulate is understandable due to growing anti-Indian feelings amongst majority of Pashtuns in Afghanistan and in anticipation of a possible Taliban resurgence, closing down of Herat consulate is intriguing as Herat borders Iran. Indian pretext of COVID-19 to close down Herat consulate is not convincing enough. Most probably, Indian stratagem to rope in Iran to spoil the show did not succeed. Taliban cannot impose their will arbitrarily without taking into account the interests of other stakeholders, be they are religious or ethnic minorities or women All is not well at the Taliban front either; they may have fought the Americans against all odds and forced them to come to the negotiating table, but the real battle begins now. How they behave on the negotiating table would be watched closely by their friends and foes. UNSC Resolution 2513 adopted on 10th March 2020 (merely ten days after Doha Agreement) is still a hanging sword upon the Taliban heads which clearly notes that “the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is not recognized at the United Nations, and furthermore that the UN Security Council does not support the restoration of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan”. This means that Taliban’s conduct would remain under international scrutiny even if they may control whole of Afghanistan. Secondly, Taliban cannot impose their will arbitrarily without taking into account the interests of other stakeholders, be they are religious or ethnic minorities or women. One reason for the delay of intra-Afghan dialogue is Taliban’s vagueness in spelling out their future manifesto and confidence building measures they are required to adopt to raise the comfort level of groups feeling vulnerable under Taliban control. Thirdly, and more importantly, Taliban are still on the watch-list under UNSC Resolution 1988 (2011) and their prominent leaders are yet to be cleared of future prosecution by the Security Council. The latest UNSC resolution 2513 (2020) has just reiterated that point. Under the US-Taliban agreement, the US will take the matter of delisting Taliban to the UN Security Council by 27th May, 2020. So far, the US has not taken the action, perhaps, to make the Taliban realize that their conduct in the forthcoming days and weeks would enable the international community to decide about future course of action towards them. Lastly, whatever may be the outcome of the intra-Afghan dialogue, Taliban are likely to emerge as major stakeholders. This would require statesmanship on the part of Taliban and other Afghan interlocutors. There is no doubt Dr Abdullah-Abdullah is an astute diplomat and has all the right credentials to lead the dialogue with the Taliban. In the past he has been opposed to President Ghani’s rigidity on reconciliation with the Taliban. Hopefully, good sense would prevail and all stakeholders keep Afghanistan’s peace and stability supreme, and discourage confrontationist forces within the country and their supporters abroad. Writer is a former ambassador and a Senior Research Fellow at IPRI