Pakistan is one of the few states worldwide to possess nuclear weapons, and it aspires to be a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), an association of 48 nations that oversees the international trade of atomic and atomic-related materials and technologies with a shared commitment to global nonproliferation. Even though Pakistan is not a signatory of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, but nevertheless, the country’s experience in civil nuclear programme demands attention of the NSG at this point. Mohammad Kamran Akhtar, Director General of Disarmament at Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told The Korea Herald that his country’s membership would allow for a safer and more accountable trade of nuclear materials in line with global standards and best practices. Dismissing allegations that Pakistan had supplied nuclear-related items to North Korea, Akhtar expounded Islamabad’s efforts to curb Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions through the United Nations Security Council sanctions, and allay regional tensions in South Asia through coordinated efforts at arms control with India. The most recent debate over the NSG or on the expansion of the NSG is moving towards what is going to be the criteria that can be accepted by consensus at the organisation. Yet even after the great hype followed by hot debates internationally in this meeting, the outcome over the NSG membership remained stalled. To end this deadlock some of the states are now working to decide some criteria mutually acceptable to all. Indubitably, in order to step forward and improve the global non-proliferation goals, putting in new members in the NSG would be an encouraging and constructive option. Moreover, it would be equally vital to uphold the efficacy and effectiveness of the NSG. Therefore, the expansion should be carried out on non-discriminatory basis — by taking on the Criteria Based Approach. The meeting of June 26-27 in Buenos Aires called for discussion on the NSG’s relationship with India. In this regard, on June 22, 2014 in Argentina, India ratified its Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to expand oversight over its civilian nuclear programme. This protocol was approved back in 2009 that paved the way for the NSG to grant India-specific waiver for it to have commercial relations with other countries in the civilian atomic field. In effect, the waiver was necessary as India despite being a nuclear-armed state is not a signatory to the NPT, and thus does not qualify for nuclear trade. But even then, the US labelled this ratified protocol as another important step in bringing India into the international non-proliferation mainstream. Although the NSG is not a formal organisation and its guidelines are not binding, its members, nevertheless, are expected to incorporate the guidelines into their national export control laws. Ironically, it does not mean that any country-specific diversion or waiver would become legal under the guidelines of the NSG. The criteria-based approach can really facilitate the NSG to universalise the regime’s application. Nevertheless, the NSG would eventually be labelled as an “illegitimate cartel of industrialised countries” if it continues with its country-based approach instead of adopting non-biased, criteria-based approach for its expansion of member states. The NSG at the 26th plenary expressed its concerns regarding continuing proliferation activities around the world, and stated its unwavering support for the full and effective implementation of the nonproliferation treaty. However, a “challenge to non-proliferation norms was the granting of discriminatory waivers and arrangements, which denoted double standards, and opened the possibility of diverting material intended for peaceful use to military purposes.” The writer works for the Strategic Vision Institute and can be reached at beenishaltaf7@gmail.com