In 1998, the Taliban controlled 90% of Afghanistan. Whilst famous for their strict adherence to a political system based on Sharia Law and large fractional violations of human rights, it was only in September 2001 that the country found itself at the front of the international barrel guided by the United States. Blamed for providing sanctuary to Osama Bin Laden at the time, a US-led military coalition invaded Afghanistan in October 2001, and by December the same year, the Taliban had been removed from power. The strategic error of the United States in this invasion rested upon their lack of understanding and information about the culture, political system, stakeholders and perception of the Western world within Afghanistan. Expecting a welcome with flowers and chants for ‘saving’ the people of Afghanistan from the cruel clutches of Authoritarianism and fired with an ambition to overthrow a decades-old system and replace it with an American style liberal democracy, the United States had thrown itself into a region and fight that it couldn’t possibly escape or win. Whilst true that the Afghan population was largely frustrated with the Taliban regime, they weren’t necessarily welcoming of foreign invaders either. As the United States soon discovered, their ‘installed’ governments following a process of minimal (if not staged) voting through the next decade were unable to hold their own against a population and former Authoritarian who accused them of being Western puppets. Thus Uncle Sam soon found himself, his troops, and his finances expanding to an average of $45 billion annually over the past 18 years; a cost that was unintended, unexpected, and a grave miscalculation on part of the Bush administration. While the Taliban were removed from power by the United States in 2001, they have proven to be a formidable force within the country forcing the United States to accept that any sustainable picture of Peace in Afghanistan would necessitate the inclusion of the Taliban. Perhaps the largest reason behind the United States contending and accepting the Taliban as a major stakeholder in the Afghan Peace Process is the renewed willingness to bring back troops to further the agenda of ‘America First’ pushed forward by President Trump or the statistically accurate possibility that the Taliban now control more parts of Afghanistan than they have throughout the course of the 19 year-long war. With most Americans frustrated with the level of funding on international campaigns, and especially that in Afghanistan, it comes as no surprise that President Trump, close to the presidential elections for 2020, will leave no stone unturned in convincing his population that he aims to bring the troops back ‘home’. The newest deal signed between the United States and the Taliban promises a long, but optimistic journey to achieving Afghan peace. With US and NATO allies agreeing to withdraw troops in the coming 14 months (provided the Taliban uphold their end of the deal), the process has marked the beginning of US withdrawal from the region for good. However, the absence of representatives from the current Afghan government and its vocal opposition to certain clauses within the agreement, such as the call for a prisoner swap by March 10′ 2020, raises serious questions about the possible scenario’s in Afghanistan after and if the United States finally leaves. Perhaps the most important question is the lack of acceptance of the current government as anything more than a U.S puppet by the Taliban. Whilst the United States and Taliban have been in talks since 2018 to speak of the possibility of securing Afghan peace, the absence of the Afghan government in these meetings is an important element. The United States negotiating on behalf of the Afghan government, or signing agreements without a serious discussion with the government (as the current opposition to the deal by the Afghan government shows) only goes to reinforce the idea of who really is in power in Afghanistan to the international media, Afghani’s and the Taliban themselves. A post-US peace can only be achieved through the autonomous functioning of the government with the United States at its back rather than the Afghan government taking a backseat. Given that the Taliban and the Afghan government have held no independent or assisted talks only highlights the difficulties of negotiating a truce between the two. A truce that might prove to be as difficult as the US and Taliban talks themselves. When a previous ruler clash in ideology, foundation, and compliance to the rule of law to the current government, both actors serving as contenders in the next presidential election of 2020 raises serious concerns for the electoral process itself. Or the mere occurrence of elections in this case. Any possibility of stability in Afghanistan requires serious dialogue between all major stakeholders. Evading the possibility of the Taliban coming into direct contact with the Afghan government on fears of confrontation is, once again, a serious strategic error on part of the United States. Such a serious bluff at this stage could cost the United States another decade stuck in a war that began with President George W. Bush’s first-ever bluff of being able to ‘win’ the Afghan War. The writer is a graduate of the London School of Economics and has completed her Masters from the University of Warwick. She can be reached at