The element of surrealism continues to thicken in US politics this election season. A race for the White House pitting arguably the two most unpopular candidates in American history has entered the homestretch amid gaffes and divisive rhetoric unlike anything witnessed in previous cycles. If Hillary Clinton outlasts Donald Trump for the presidency, as polls presently indicate, it will be thanks to her rival’s loose lips and inability to stay on message rather than the visibly underwhelming nature of her campaign. To add to this bizarre state of affairs, the US Congress in late September dealt President Barack Obama the biggest political embarrassment of his tenure as commander-in-chief by overriding his veto of a 9/11 bill allowing ordinary Americans to sue the Saudi government for its complicity in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 15 of the 19 hijackers who ploughed two commercial airliners into the World Trade Centre buildings on September 11, 2001, were Saudi citizens. Saudi Arabia is also America’s closest ally in the Middle East alongside Israel. Back in May when the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA) emerged in Congress as a bipartisan initiative, Saudis were quick to voice their displeasure. In one breath, Riyadh both painted the proposed legislation as part of a larger witch-hunt against Muslims, and threatened to dump hundreds of billions in US holdings if JASTA became law. Saudi Arabia justified the threat saying this would foreclose any possibility of frozen assets should mass civil suits prompt such a move by US judges. Obama, meanwhile, calls JASTA “a mistake,” and has repeatedly cautioned against opening a can of worms that could potentially pull US military and intelligence assets into legal crosshairs of foreign governments. Since his predecessor George W Bush green-lit the global war on terror 15 years ago, US military actions around the globe have contributed to the suffering and deaths of countless people, mainly Muslims. JASTA, Obama fears, would embolden foreign governments to freeze diplomatic immunity and prosecute US citizens for alleged war crimes. Or in very least, make Washington cough up substantial cash for the bereaved families. Such a development would severely curtail America’s espionage activities and shackle its hitherto freewheeling military operations. It does not surprise, however, that Saudi Arabia again finds itself at the centre of controversy regarding 9/11 and its marquee role in promoting the ultra-orthodox strain of Islam called Salafism, which is the cornerstone of modern jihadists enterprises like ISIS and al-Qaeda. Moreover, long before JASTA, rumors ran rife in American media circles that the Bush administration had deliberately covered up Riyadh’s involvement in the attacks because of his family’s deep ties to the kingdom’s royals. Fuelling such innuendo were the 28 classified pages of the 9/11 Congressional Report from 2004 that Bush, using executive privilege, had secreted from public scrutiny. Mounting pressure from 9/11 ‘truthers’ on the 15th anniversary of the attacks eventually forced the incumbent administration to declassify the pages in July. Soon enough, an ‘indirect link’ between Abu-Zubaydah, a member of Al-Qaeda’s inner circle, and Prince Bandar bin Sultan, former Saudi ambassador to the US, became apparent. This revelation touched off a political firestorm that quickly dissipated any opposition to JASTA in Congress. In his 2007 authoritative tome, The Siege of Mecca, journalist Yaroslav Trofimov detailed the Faustian bargain struck by the House of Saud with Islamist radicals who in 1979 barricaded themselves in the Masjid al-Haram for two weeks. Led by firebrand cleric Juhayman al-Otaybi, these rebels had set out to overthrow a regime they considered corrupt, scandalous and forever kowtowing to the West. Following a bloody standoff, both sides settled on a compromise. In return for Otaybi’s followers keeping the peace, the Saudis would actively pump funds into promoting Salafism worldwide: from financing madrassas peddling takfiri Islam to arming jihadist fighters across the region. As luck would have it, Russian troops moved into Afghanistan as an occupying force the same year, making local mujahedeen the primary beneficiaries of this pact. With Washington’s blessings and the unqualified support of Pakistan’s then dictator General Zia-ul-Haq — an eager crusader for Islam’s glory days — the Saudis kept their end of the deal, and in the process rendered Russia’s defeat inevitable. They repeated this prescription with the Taliban half-a-decade later at the behest of American ‘big oil’, then helping an unknown band of Kandaharis led by the one-eyed warlord Mullah Omar vault to the top of Afghan politics. Over time, the Saudis figured their pact with the Salafis could be used as a geopolitical lever, especially following the rise of Shia ideologues in Iran. Replaying their age-old rivalry in the Middle East, Iran and Saudi Arabia since 1979 have backed opposing militant factions to achieve regional hegemony. Most recently, the crises in Syria and Iraq are manifest examples of both Iean and Saudi Arabia supporting groups or governments that operate outside of international law. For the Saudis, Congress’ override is a telling reminder that their special relationship with the US is slowly crumbling to dust. Still smarting from its military debacles in Iraq and Afghanistan, Washington no longer wishes to dive headlong into Middle Eastern wars that serve scant national security purpose. Obama, too, has made his displeasure with Arab allies clear by calling them “free riders” unwilling to shed blood and treasure in dismantling global terrorist networks, if not actively sponsoring them. Now, a Riyadh long used to crowding under the US regional security umbrella against Tehran finds itself caught between pride and practicality. It understands that domestic politics would most likely push Washington towards isolationism in the near term, but fears this would embolden Iran to consolidate its ‘Shia Crescent’ gains in Syria and Iraq. The stock Saudi response to this dilemma has been to direct even more cash at the jihadist patchwork comprising Syria’s opposition currently battling the Ayatollah-backed President Bashar al-Assad, in the desperate hope that Iran can be outmuscled by sheer monies. These are highly uncertain times for the kingdom. The million-dollar question is whether its present leadership has the wherewithal to guide Saudi Arabia away from its historical dependence on the US military, while still retaining parity with Iran. The ayatollahs, lest we forget, are erstwhile masters at regional geopolitics. The writer is an Islamabad-based freelance journalist