There is a trend of ‘Democratic Backsliding’ all over the world including in the developed countries and democracy is receding in many regions. We are going to extend democratic backsliding argument to focus on the concept and operationalization of hybrid regime with a particular focus on Pakistan. We are going to refer to some literature (Adeney 2015; Economist Intelligence Unit’s report ‘Democracy Index 2018: Me Too?’ 2019) to illustrate the discussion. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index rates countries on the basis of 60 indicators that are clubbed together under five main categories of ‘electoral process and pluralism’, ‘the functioning of government’, ‘political participation’, ‘democratic political culture’, and ‘civil liberties’; and the Economist has been doing this exercise since 2006 while producing the 11th edition of index for the year 2018. Each indicator is rated on the scale of 0 to 10, and the overall index is based on the average of score of indexes in the above-mentioned five categories. On the basis of their scores on the index, 167 countries of the world are ranked as ‘full democracies’ (20 countries comprising 4.5% of world population), ‘flawed democracies’ (55 countries comprising 43.2% of world population), ‘hybrid regimes’ (39 countries comprising 16.7% of world population), and ‘authoritarian regimes’ (53 countries comprising 35.6 % of world population). In flawed democracies, there are fair and free election and respect for basic liberties. Yet, there might be curbs on freedom of media as well as prevalence of governance problems, low political participation, and underdeveloped developed political culture. In hybrid regimes, there are serious irregularities in the elections and the opposition parties face the governmental pressure. There are also more substantial weaknesses in the political participation, governmental functioning, and political culture compared to the flawed democracies. Rule of law is weak and corruption is widespread with a weak civil society in hybrid regimes. Judiciary is not considered independent, and journalists face pressure and harassment. Pakistan is ranked as a hybrid regime by the Economist Intelligence Unit in its 2018 index on the basis of the above-mentioned criteria. Pakistan’s overall score is 4.17 (out of 10), and it falls at 112th place in the global rank out of 167 countries. According to further sub-division, Pakistan’s score is 6.08 in electoral process and pluralism, 5.36 in the functioning of government, 2.22 in the political participation, 2.50 in the democratic political culture, and 4.71 in ensuring civil liberties. It might be worthwhile to plug in Adeney (2015) article on Pakistan’s hybrid regime (worked out by using a different methodology) by highlighting the significance of a ‘multidimensional continuum’. Although, some of the insights in this paper might be worth updating post July 2018 elections in Pakistan and the rule of PTI government in Pakistan; yet it provides nuanced discussion on the nature of hybrid regime in Pakistan in contemporary times. The country is considered to be in ‘grey zone’ with ‘some attributes of democratic political life’ as well as some ‘serious democratic deficits’. Hybrid regimes overlap both with democratic and authoritarian dispensations, and can be mapped from these ‘both sides of the spectrum’. The paper highlights that in order to understand the nature of power and institutional differentiation, it is important to use a multidimensional approach to discuss democracy and hybrid regimes. It is just not enough to view democracy only through the prism of civil liberties and categorize it as ‘illiberal democracy’ for example; or to only gauge the influence of ‘reserved powers’ of the non-representative institutions and label it as ‘tutelary democracy’; or to use only two-dimensional approach to flag democratic deficits. It has to be analysed on the basis of multidimensional gamut and ‘dichotomous categorization’ needs to be avoided. Overall, it is important to keep in mind the ‘regime heterogeneity’ and to simply not focus only on electoral processes while evaluating democracy; but to also take into account the whole spectrum of civil and political rights and freedoms and institutional development The extent and limitations of Pakistan’s democracy are classified on the basis of three dimensions of ‘competitiveness’, civil liberties, and ‘reserved domains’ of the non-representative institutions. Competitiveness includes the degree of free competition allowed for electing officials/governments/decision-makers, universal suffrage to allow all citizens the right to vote, the right to candidacy where it is possible for citizens to contest elections on the principle of political pluralism and participation, and holding of free and fair elections. Civil liberties are conceptualized on the basis of political rights and they include press freedom, freedom of association, the rule of law. The ‘reserved domains’ of the non-representative institutions includes both formal and informal powers that also determine the ‘red lines’ the civilians better not cross, and it is evaluated along the degree of control over external defence, internal security, military organization, public policy, and elite recruitment. The score for each of these above-mentioned categories varies from low (0), medium (1), and high (2) or some in-between values (such as 0.5, 1.5). Pakistan scores 1.5 (close to high) on ‘competitiveness’, 0.3 (close to low) on civil liberties, and 1 (medium) on the ‘reserved domains’ of non-representative institutions. Within civil liberties, Pakistan’s score on the rule of law is low (0) with a qualification: “Although an independent judiciary is an important element of a democratic political system, a politicized judiciary is not”. In terms of recent developments in protecting civil liberties, it is worth mentioning the promulgation of the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Actions (In Aid of Civil Power) Ordinance 2019 that extended curtailment of civil liberties previously limited to ex-FATA/PATA. It is tantamount to curtailment of rights. It brings us to an era where the rights and freedoms cannot be taken for granted as ‘inalienable entitlements’, at least in certain aspects/geographies if not more. Similarly, there is hue and cry against the governmental proposal of setting up ‘media tribunals’ that are considered to further curtail freedoms of press and media. In a later positive development, the Peshawar High Court struck down the KP Actions (In Aid of Civil Power) Ordinance 2019. However, the Supreme Court has suspended the Peshawar High Court judgment and fixed a later date for the hearing of case in this regard. Pakistan has improved on ‘competitiveness’ as in the previous decades of democracy from 1988-1999, the electorate voted in four governments (in 1988, 1990, 1993, and 1996) but could not vote out even a single one of them and all these four governments were removed through other means. Since the restoration of democracy from 2008 onwards, Pakistani voters have voted out two elected governments (2013 and 2018) and brought in different political parties to power, even if the power of civilian governments is limited to the de jure level mostly. Another positive development from the recent past has been the civilian consensus on the transfer of power and resources to provinces through the NFC award and the 18th Amendment. It heralded an era of both vertical (between the centre and provinces) as well as horizontal (between the provinces) transfer of resources. Politicians from different political parties cooperated and addressed the long-standing issues that have been confronting the politics of Pakistan for decades to bring in the 18th amendment and the NFC award. Overall, it is important to keep in mind the ‘regime heterogeneity’ and to simply not focus only on electoral processes while evaluating democracy; but to also take into account the whole spectrum of civil and political rights and freedoms and institutional development. Pakistan has overall performed better on political competitiveness than civil liberties. By analyzing the nature of hybrid regime along the ‘multidimensional continuum’; one can better understand the strengths and challenges of transition to democracy in Pakistan and elsewhere in the world. The writer is an Islamabad-based social scientist. Email: fskcolumns@gmail.com