India is all set to colonize Kashmir. Having failed to integrate or pacify the Kashmiris the Indian imperialism’s most evil reincarnation, Modi Government is all set to ride roughshod over all United Nation resolutions and bilateral commitments enshrined in Simla Agreement. It is a government bitten by the rabid Hindutva virus that is walking pell -mell into an alley of fire blithely unconcerned to the dangers of war or any human catastrophe. What is most unfortunate is that it is a government that cut its teeth under an environment of strategic cooperation with the United States. The bull in the China shop having unleashed state sponsored terrorism upon Pakistan in Balochistan and its restive tribal regions of under Duval doctrine is now aiming for the complete undoing of the Nehruvian dreams for a peaceful Kashmir. The Kashmir issue like few other princely states and principalities kept hanging fire in the initial tumultuous days of subcontinent’s partition. While India gobbled up Hyderabad and Junagadh, whose rulers acceded to Pakistan as per the terms of Indian Independence Act on 17 March 1948 and September 48, she responded with force to the request of a harried and disoriented Kashmir State ruler Hari Singh facing an armed revolt by his Muslim subjects. In flagrant violation of all canons of international norms and justice India blackmailed the scared ruler to accede to India, despite the opposition of over 76% of the Muslims in entire state. Kashmir Valley especially which comprised over 96% of Muslim population was especially livid at Hari Singh’s perfidy, especially after signing a standstill agreement with Pakistan, according to which Pakistan had to provide postal, communication, supplies, and telegraph services to Kashmir State. The Standstill Agreement accurately reflected the geographical realities since the natural layout of Kashmir’s geography preferred a linkage with Pakistan. The fate of the state is to be decided by the people themselves and not us, and the pledge we have given to not only the people of the state but to the world, we will serve it” (Jawaharlal Nehru) The dithering yet conniving Maharaja of Kashmir however committed some blunders that further alienated his oppressed Muslim population. The disarming of Muslim ex- servicemen and issuance of their weapons to Hindu Dogras enraged the Muslim population and a spontaneous uprising commenced starting from Neelabut engulfing Kashmir, Gilgit, and Skardu. In India the British Governor General Lord Mountbatten presided over an Indian Defence Council comprising Prime Minister Nehru, Home Minister Sardar Patel, and Defence Minister Baldev Singh. On Pakistan’s side Governor General Muhammad Ali Jinnah with Liaquat Ali Khan as his Prime Minister as well as Defence Minister called the shots. The Pakistani side had a clear disadvantage in military matters due to the presence of Generals Frank Messervey as Cin C and Douglas Gracey as Deputy CinC who refused to obey Quaid’s command to take military action in support of the vulnerable Kashmiris at the mercy of Dogra atrocities. The British commanders of the Pakistan Army used to refer all major decisions to the Supreme Commander of British Forces Auckinleck from where these used to be shared with the Governor General Mountbatten and the Indian Defence Council. Indian Army reached Srinagar on invitation of Hari Singh on 26 October 1947 and inveigled a controversial instrument of accession which according to historian and scholar Alastair Lamb had no evidence of its authenticity. After the retreat of Pakistan based Azad Forces comprising volunteers from ex Kashmir State and British Indian Army servicemen plus the volunteers from tribal areas, the Indian army launched its offensive to regain whole of the Kashmir. Now in face of this aggression General Gracey allowed Pakistan Army’s deployment and the Indo-Pak War of 1948 raged till 31st December 1948 when a hasty and ill -considered ceasefire was accepted by Pakistan. According to Major General Akbar Khan who fought as a Brigade Commander in the Kashmir war of 1947-8 was highly critical of this ceasefire. He writes in “Raiders in Kashmir” that “we all knew that ceasefire had to come-but its acceptance a month earlier would have left Poonch in our hands as a hostage. Or after the relief of Poonch-non agreement to ceasefire for another month or two would again have enabled us to counterbalance the Indian advantage. The writer is a PhD scholar at NUST