Since its inception in 1947, Pakistan has been in a state of war with India. The two countries have fought two major wars and two minor wars over Kashmir. The wars have hardly moved the ceasefire line from that approved when a UN-approved ceasefire took hold in January 1949. In 1971, Pakistan fought a bigger war with India over control of its eastern wing and lost.
India’s economy today is nine times bigger than that of Pakistan. Its population is five times bigger and its area four times. To counter India’s overwhelming size advantage, Pakistan maintains a very large standing army. It checks in at 620,000, almost half the size of India’s military that stands at 1,300,000.
Being on a war-footing for seven decades has taken its toll on Pakistan’s cultural, social, economic and political development, transforming the country into a praetorian state. Even when the military is not running the country – as it has done for 33 years – it is controlling major policy levers. It exercises control over the budget and the economy on the one hand and on defence and foreign policy on the other.
One wonders whether Pakistan’s conversion to a praetorian state was a foregone conclusion since its creation was premised on the idea that Hindus and Muslims were two separate nations. Unsurprisingly, religion proved to be a weak reed on which to hang a national identity. Pakistan, 72 years later, is fraught with sectarian conflict among Muslims and continuing attacks on its non-Muslim communities, including Christians and Hindus. The Two-Nation Theory was supposed to contribute to communal harmony and nation-building in both India and Pakistan. Instead, it morphed into a divisive conflict.
Pakistan’s fault lines are far more complex than those found in other developing countries, most of which are rooted in tribal conflicts or income inequalities. Pakistan suffers an insecurity psychosis that can best be called Indophobia. That arises from two factors: first, its traumatic separation from India in 1947, and, second, India’s dominance of Pakistan in all spheres of life. For reasons unknown, that led to militarism in Pakistan but not in India.
Gen Zia capitalised on the Soviet invasion to interject religion into the bodypolitic, arguing that it was the key to Pakistan’s salvation. Jinnah was reimagined as being an Islamic ideologue
After the secession of East Pakistan in 1971, the succeeding Pakistani government under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto embarked on a nuclear weapons programme. Bhutto was the architect of the failed 1965 incursion into Kashmir. He had famously told a British reporter that it was in Pakistan’s interest to acquire the bomb even if it meant that the country would “eat grass.”
As prime minister Bhutto sought to bring ‘Islamic Socialism’ to Pakistan, an idea that was inspired by his admiration of Chairman Mao. Bhutto proceeded to nationalise every major institution, wrecking the economy. His highhanded governance alienated most of his civilian opponents. When riots erupted after his re-election, the army under Gen Zia-ul-Haq overthrew him; Zia later hanged him. But Pakistan continued with its nuclear weapons programme.
Gen Zia capitalised on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to interject religion into the bodypolitic, arguing that it was the key to Pakistan’s salvation. Jinnah was reimagined as being an Islamic ideologue. Some Pakistani textbooks taught students that their country was not born in 1947 but in the year 711, when 17-year-old Arab commander Muhammed bin Qasim landed in Sindh.
Paradoxically, every military defeat has hardened the Pakistani resolve to resist Indian domination. After the Soviets were expelled from Afghanistan, the military inducted radical fighters into its arsenal. These fighters who believe that the scripture calls on all Muslim men to carry out a holy war against infidels and hypocrites believe that only they can win the war against evil, since it was they who defeated the godless Soviet Empire.
In the eyes of TV Paul, a professor of international relations at McGill University, the killing of Osama bin Laden epitomised everything that has gone wrong with Pakistan. In his book, The Warrior State, he says that Pakistan’s Indophobia has taken a terrible toll on its social and economic development. Its sole focus on the military dimension of strategy has yielded a double failure: (1) it has not contained India’s rise as the dominant regional power and (2) it has caused incalculable internal harm to Pakistan.
Paul argues that the warrior state model succeeded in European history but failed in the developing world. Egypt made peace with Israel, Turkey with Greece and Indonesia with Malaysia. Taiwan faced an existential threat from China but the two never went to war. While the political conflict remains unresolved, Taiwan engages in international trade with China and invests in its development. South Korea, born in the crucible of a large-scale war involving the US and China, has largely set aside its conflict with the north and transitioned into a successful democracy. Both countries became Asian tigers.
The example of Egypt seems to have been disproven by recent events. Despite the initial promise of the Arab Spring, Egypt has reversed course and lapsed into a military dictatorship.
Paul stays that Pakistan suffers from a “geostrategic curse” that arises from its location at the tip of the Persian Gulf. Pakistan’s leaders have exploited that location to acquire arms but that acquisition has only brought insecurity to Pakistan.
On the topic of religion and politics, Paul discusses the problem that religion has created for Pakistan’s national identity. Unfortunately, what should have been the lynchpin of the book comes across as an afterthought.
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