In December 2001, five gunmen attacked the Indian parliament. 14 people were killed including five suspected terrorists. India without a thorough investigation blamed Pakistan. Subsequently, India mobilised its forces on the borders, and threatened to carry out surgical strikes against the alleged Islamic militants undertaking jihad in Kashmir. India also demanded cessation of support to the alleged cross-border terrorism, and to hand over 20 suspects involved in alleged terrorist activities in India. Indian Army Chief General S Padmanabhan issued a statement that indicated the intention of Indians, “This is not an exercise. A lot of viable options (beginning from a strike on camps to a conventional war) are available. We can do it…if we go to war, jolly good.” India’s demands challenged Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Pakistan’s leadership denounced the terrorist attack. However, it was made clear that the threatened surgical strikes would be taken as hostile acts that would be responded to in the same coin. At the same time, to counter India’s aggressive posture Pakistan also mobilised its armed forces, energised its diplomatic channels, and General Pervez Musharraf, the then president of Pakistan, in his televised address to the nation on March 23, 2002, conveyed an indirect nuclear signal to India stating: “By Allah’s grace, Pakistan today possesses a powerful military might, and can give a crushing reply to all types of aggression. Anybody who poses a challenge to our security and integrity could be taught an unforgettable lesson.” The standoff between the two nuclear powers continued for almost a year. India having not been able to accomplish its mission to launch a swift military response, its army began to look for a new doctrine that would enable the country to achieve its political and military aims in a short war without running the risk of crossing Pakistan’s nuclear red lines. The Indian army developed a Cold Start Doctrine (CSD). Conceptually, it envisages application of 8 to 10 Integrated Battle Groups (IBMs) on multiple thrust lines, assisted by overwhelming fire power to degrade Pakistan’s military before it is completely mobilised. The Indian military leadership unveiled the doctrine in April 2004. “The goal of this limited war doctrine is to establish the capacity to launch a retaliatory conventional strike against Pakistan that would inflict significant harm on Pakistan’s army before the international community could intercede, and at the same time, pursue narrow aims to deny Islamabad a justification to escalate the clash to the nuclear level.” The Cold Start Doctrine was further refined into a Proactive Operational Strategy in 2007-2008. Keeping in view the present strength of the two armies, India’s CSD and Proactive Operations are unlikely to achieve any desired objective in a given period in the future on any level, from a surgical or a punitive strike to a full-scale Cold Start Operation. The Indian army hopes to destroy the Pakistan army, the 7th largest in the world, in a few days using its rapid deployment Pakistan-Specific force, which is placed right on the Pakistani border. The concept of the Indian CSD and later the Cold Start Operations seems to be based on the 1967 model of the pre-emptive Israeli attack on Arab countries The concept of the Indian CSD and later the Cold Start Operations seems to be based on the 1967 model of the pre-emptive Israeli attack on Arab countries. In addition, Indian strategists think that the war would be space-oriented, and that it would be a limited war, whereas in Pakistan there is no concept of a ‘limited War’. Any war with India is seen as a total war for survival. With the present strength of the armies of both the countries India does not have the capability to outclass the Pakistan army in a time frame that falls in the category of a limited war. Stephen P Cohen defines India’s CSD as “a short cross border punishing raid in response to a major terrorist act.” In short, CSD or Proactive Operations are not applicable in the India-Pakistan scenario to achieve specific objectives and keep the war constrained or limited. Pakistan and India being nuclear powers this doctrine is least practicable between THE two nuclear adversaries. On February 26, 2019 India tried to achieve her objectives by following the ‘New Normal’, which was first conceived and then employed by the US and Israel in their foreign policy or geopolitics, especially after 9/11. Under the garb of fighting terrorism, Americans and Israelis justified the breach of sovereignty of other states, such as Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine and Syria. Using their superior military and technological power, Washington and Tel Aviv turned the abnormal act of breaching the sovereignty of these states into their New Normal. In simple words, it has been ‘okay’ for Americans and Israelis to conduct surgical strikes against Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine and Syria because these states, claimed the US and Israel, are either incapable or unwilling to take action against militant groups or non-state groups based in their territories and serving as proxies for other powers. India carried out air strikes on Balakot on a so-called militant camp. No damage to life and property occurred. Pakistan gave a swift, timely, accurate and measured response the next day. However, it was not on the International Border unlike India that attacked inside the territory of Pakistan. It is considered an act of war. India has not been able to achieve her desired aims and objectives. It is proposed that Pakistan may launch a protest in the United Nations against India for carrying out air strikes inside the territory of a sovereign state. It will be on the record of the United Nations that India committed an act of war against a sovereign state. The writer is a Senior Research Fellow at the Strategic Vision Institute