Relations between America and Pakistan have reached peaks of such heights and descended to valleys of such depths as exist in the Hindu Kush. From the Indo-Pak War of 1971, when President Richard Nixon “tilted” towards Pakistan to prevent further dismemberment after the disastrous loss of East Pakistan and indeed to preserve the links with China that would lead to the historic 1972 visit, to the Clinton years with imposed sanctions following Islamabad’s nuclear tests in the late 1990’s, the two states often seesawed between euphoria and despair in their relationships. And the attacks of September 11th paradoxically made the relationships even more vital and tense. Pakistan was significantly made a “major non-NATO ally.” Military and economic aid was increased, the latter through the Kerry-Lugar bill that provided an extra $1.5 billion a year for five years. However, tensions over Afghanistan and allegations of Pakistani support of Afghan Taliban induced outgoing chairman of the US Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mike Mullen to declare that the Haqqani network was “a veritable arm of ISI,” Pakistan’s intelligence agency. 2011 was a disastrous year for the relationship. In January, CIA contractor Raymond Davis gunned down two Pakistani nationals who were keeping tabs on him. A rescue car from the consulate, driving the wrong way down a one-way street, killed a third innocent Pakistani. Davis was released after great pressure was, unfortunately, applied from Washington. That Osama bin Laden had lived secretly in Abbottabad for a number of years until Seal Team Six hunted him down, violating Pakistani airspace in the early hours of May 1st, 2011, stretched credulity in Washington over how this could happen and provoked fury in Islamabad over America’s violation of Pakistani national sovereignty. The “trust deficit” was never greater. Many in the U.S. Congress declared Pakistan no longer a “frenemy” but now an outright adversary of the United States. The Obama administration, despite Secretary of State John Kerry’s intimate knowledge and understanding of Pakistan’s strategic importance, did not choose to put the relationship on a better track. The crucial question is what will President Donald Trump do towards Pakistan? That he spoke glowingly of Pakistan in a conversation with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif shortly after the election was extraordinary. Clearly, this exchange raises the prospect of positive change in the very complex and crucial U.S.-Pakistani relationship. The questions are how real is this opportunity and how might both sides go about exploiting such a situation? Pakistan needs a strategy and a plan for answering both questions. Pakistan’s leadership also needs to understand that the 45th president is very unconventional and instinctual in his approach to decision-making. In that regard, he may also be fickle. If developments are not in line with his thinking, he can react quite negatively. This has been his modus operandi in his business career for nearly half a century: he intimidates, bullies and retaliates if unsuccessful. It should not be assumed that his presidency will be any different. Pakistan presents a great opportunity geostrategically, economically and in the battle against Islamist violent extremism for the new administration. The President-elect has declared that among his top foreign policy priorities is the defeat of the Islamic State (IS). Pakistan has demonstrated in its campaign in North Waziristan and elsewhere its commitment to defeating Jihadi inspired terrorism. Ensuring IS will never have a safe harbour in Afghanistan and Pakistan is a mutual interest. Second, Pakistan has important relations with China, the Gulf States and Iran. The embassy in Washington represents Iranian affairs. As Nixon used Pakistan in that regard, so too might the Trump administration. Similarly, the Trump administration must balance Iran and the Gulf States. Pakistan could be an interlocutor. Third, Pakistan represents an economic opportunity for foreign investment. While Trump is strongly opposed to exporting American jobs, surely building new markets for job-creating American exports makes great economic sense. Pakistan not only has a large population of about 200 million, but it is also a gateway to the famous “silk road” into Asia. Fourth, as Trump views himself as the ultimate dealmaker, reducing and eliminating tensions with India would establish an international reputation as a diplomatic leader. And it would also create an even larger market for American exports given India’s 1.3 billion citizens. Any strategy Pakistan develops must have both an immediate and longer-term aspect. The shorter term could begin with a discussion on finally taking on the Haqqani network. This would be the most effective way of closing the trust deficit. And that Secretary of Defense-designate General James Mattis is held in high regard in Pakistan and reciprocates that view towards the Pakistani Army will be helpful. The broader strategic case for a “pivot” towards Pakistan is essential. As sketched out above, geography and events are powerful arguments. From the northern part of Africa to the Bay of Bengal, conflicts are ubiquitous. Solutions will be complicated and require multiple players. Russia, Turkey, Iran, Iraq and the Gulf States will be part of any successful negotiations that can defeat IS. Pakistan has good relations and, importantly, access to these important players. Pakistan is also a democracy, one of the very few in the Muslim world, a very vital reality that should not be downplayed by Washington and indeed valued. Each of these assets can be shown as important to the Trump administration as it fashions its foreign policy. That said, expectations must be kept reasonable. The most successful approach is to under promise and to over deliver. An overly optimistic vision or plan that did not yield full expectations and results could easily lead to negative reactions by the White House. Conditions around the world are volatile and potentially explosive. Rarely have so many deep crises persisted in such large numbers. Pakistan has an opportunity to provide the new leadership in Washington with potential solutions and means to alleviate some of the more significant dangers. It would be a pity not to try. Harlan Ullman is UPI’s Arnaud de Borchgrave Distinguished Columnist and a Senior Advisor at Washington D.C.’s Atlantic Council and Business Executives for National Security. His last book is A Handful of Bullets: How the Murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand Still Menaces the Peace. His next book due out next year is Anatomy of Failure: Why America Loses Wars It Starts that argues failure to know and to understand the circumstances in which force is used guarantees failure