Peace tidings may be on the horizon. But, then, it has been so in the past also! The document released on the occasion of the inauguration of the Kabul Peace Process on February 28, reflecting a major shift in the government’s approach to negotiations with the Taliban, also expressed the desire to engage with Pakistan for the cause of peace: “By owning our problems, knowing our strengths, and believing in the prospects of our country as a land bridge and the Asian roundabout, we have been able to make a genuine peace offer to the Taliban and renewed our call to engage with Pakistan”. The document had stated that the National Unity Government (NUG) was responding to this desire by developing a vision for peace and a process and programme for realising it. At the regional level, the policy document had envisaged demonstrating to the neighbours the economic advantages of a stable Afghanistan. Four requisites were set in place as integral to any proposed peace agreement: Ensuring the constitutional rights and obligations of all citizens (especially women); Accepting the constitution and proposing amendments through appropriate provisions; Continued functioning of the defense and security forces and civil services according to law, and Armed groups with ties to transnational terrorist networks and transnational criminal organizations, or state/non-state actors seeking influence in Afghanistan, to be barred. The document also stressed on seven building blocks on the road to attaining the objective of peace encompassing a sustainable political process, a legal framework for constitutional review, justice and resolution of grievances, reorganisation of the state including rule of law and reform, security, economic and social development including inclusive and sustained growth, international community support and partnership, and developing implementation modalities. Afghanistan, Pakistan and the US — the contours of this three-pronged dilemma are likely to clear out soon, either through a statement which appears unlikely, or through related actions which could be construed either conducive or detrimental to the cause of the proposal. It is a watershed moment for peace in the region and the likely trajectory of relations between Afghanistan, Pakistan and the US. In spite of the renewed prospect, it may be rather premature to make firm predictions The offer of peace has since been supported by all factions of the Afghan society including former President Hamid Karzai who exercises immense political relevance and centrality. There has been a spate of activity involving Afghanistan and Pakistan since the announcement. Most recently, Pakistan’s National Security Advisor, Lt. Gen. (R) Nasser Khan Janjua, has returned from Kabul after detailed discussions with the Afghan leadership on formalising modalities to pursue an elusive peace. He is reported to have told his Afghan counterparts that “an isolated, blamed and coerced Pakistan is of no use to Afghanistan”. President Ghani has also extended a formal invitation to the Pakistani Prime Minister to visit Kabul to take the peace process forward. When President Ghani first came to Pakistan after taking oath of office, expectations ran galore that peace was round the corner. That initiative had taken long in coming and one had hoped that it would chisel the path to the attainment of eventual peace. It did not. Instead, over time, it led to further aggravation of bilateral relations to touch a new low in decades. The fresh offer of re-engaging Pakistan is like the second coming which needs to be grabbed with both hands. The offer is not without its load of multiple compulsions which may actually have necessitated it. The government in Kabul has been losing ground and even the change of engagement rules by the US did not bring about much improvement as the Taliban have remained ascendant. Pakistan has its own stock of imperatives for pursuing engagement with Afghanistan. On the cusp of a potential economic take-off, it needs peace within its borders and with its neighbours for an optimum utilisation of the opportunity. This economic revival may also help soften the strategic centrality in its thinking which has been a perpetual impediment to unravelling its true potential. A positive shift in the trajectory of relations with Afghanistan will dent the prospect of growing isolation in the region and enhance its accessibility to countries of Central-Asia and Russia. The one factor that remains unanswered so far is the possible US role and involvement in the new initiative. Going by the nature of the US influence in Afghanistan, the given yardsticks of its South-Asian policy, and the manner in which it has been pursuing the stated objectives, it appears unlikely that its own compulsions may not have played a role in transiting to a policy of engagement. It is also important to note that such a comprehensive policy statement could not have been issued by the Kabul government without taking the US on board. Therefore, does this new approach signal a shift in the US policy towards Afghanistan and the region? More specifically, does it encompass a qualitative shift in its approach towards China? If so, this could potentially heal its growing divergences with Pakistan. In a daring move, Afghanistan may have laid bare its eagerness for peace, but the success of the proposed policy hinges on many factors: the Taliban response, a fresh reiteration of US thinking and the steps that Pakistan would take in clearing out some messy issues with Afghanistan. Inherently, Pakistan’s growing partnership with China runs counter to the current US strategic perception in the region which has accentuated in direct proportion to the progress on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). This divergence is not likely to subside as there is no prospect of the work on CPEC slowing down any bit. There are other things that Pakistan would be expected to do to facilitate the process. For one, it can’t nurture its grandiose ambitions which are construed disproportionate with its genuine strategic requirements. A balance of sorts, somehow, has to be garnered. It also can no longer ignore its dichotomies and paradoxes imperilling its anti-terror effort. The hydras of radicalisation and militancy are demons that threaten the existence of the state. Giving an impression, at best, of being oblivious to it is not a credible policy option for Pakistan. Based on some possible corrective measures, will the US be willing to look at the prospect of engagement with Pakistan in preference to pursuing a coercive diktat? Such a transition may also signify a major shift of approach towards the entire region including China and India. Afghanistan, Pakistan and the US — the contours of this three-pronged dilemma are likely to clear out soon, either through a statement which appears unlikely, or through related actions which could be construed either conducive or detrimental to the cause of the proposal. It is a watershed moment for peace in the region and the likely trajectory of relations between Afghanistan, Pakistan and the US. In spite of the renewed prospect, it may be rather premature to make firm predictions. The writer is a political and security strategist, and heads the Regional Peace Institute — an Islamabad-based think tank. Email: raoofhasan@hotmail.com. Twitter: @RaoofHasan Published in Daily Times, March 20th 2018.