After more than 100 days of the most dangerous direct confrontation between Washington and Tehran in decades, the war may finally have found a diplomatic off-ramp. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s announcement that the United States and Iran have agreed on the wording of a memorandum to end the conflict places Islamabad at the centre of an endgame that few would have predicted when the fighting began.
The proposed understanding appears to offer both sides a face-saving exit. President Donald Trump can claim that pressure pushed Iran back to the table and reopened the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran can argue that it did not surrender its sovereignty, that sanctions relief and frozen assets remain on the table, and that the nuclear file has been deferred to a negotiating track rather than settled under fire. Such ambiguity may help a memorandum survive its first headlines. It will make implementation harder.
Islamabad’s role should not be understated. By keeping Washington and Tehran engaged, Pakistan has shown that it can act not merely as a worried neighbour but as a useful diplomatic bridge. If the “Islamabad Pact” materialises, it will mark a serious moment for Pakistani statecraft.
But mediation is not magic. Pakistan can help bring adversaries to the table; it cannot make them trust each other. Iran’s demand for enforceable commitments reflects the memory of broken understandings. Washington’s insistence on a performance-based deal reflects its fear that Tehran will pocket relief while preserving leverage.
Meanwhile, Israel refuses to be bound by any memorandum and its continuing operations in Lebanon expose the weakest point of the arrangement. A ceasefire that leaves Lebanon combustible is a ceasefire with a hole in its roof.
Nor can the region’s proxy wars be folded away by diplomatic language. Hezbollah, the Houthis and militias in Iraq all retain the capacity to turn a pause into another spiral. The nuclear question, too, has only been deferred. Verification, sequencing, sanctions relief and frozen assets will decide whether this memorandum actually becomes a path out of hellfire.
That is why the emerging deal should be welcomed without being oversold. Mr Sharif is right to say that the two sides are “closer to a peace deal than ever before;” the harder question is whether they are closer to a peace that can survive first contact with the ground realities. Reopening Hormuz, slowing the fighting and creating room for technical talks would be real gains, especially for a region exhausted by escalation. But they will not amount to peace unless the commitments are enforceable and the spoilers are contained. *