A recent diplomatic development between Pakistan and Bangladesh – the agreement to allow visa-free entry for diplomatic and official passport holders, alongside enhanced cooperation in internal security and police training – reflects the evolving regional balance of power in South Asia. This signals the gradual erosion of India’s traditional regional dominance, increasingly challenged by China’s assertive economic and strategic engagement with its neighbours.
In recent years, the foreign policy priorities of Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, and the Maldives have begun tilting toward Beijing. Under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has invested heavily in mega-infrastructure projects in these countries – ports, airports, and highways – offering alternatives to Indian aid and influence.
In recent years, the foreign policy priorities of Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, and the Maldives have begun tilting toward Beijing.
In Sri Lanka, following the 2022 economic crisis, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake assumed office in September 2024. Though his first foreign visit in December was to India, a visit to Beijing in January 2025 signalled a shift toward a more balanced foreign policy. China now operates the Hambantota Port, giving it strategic access to maritime routes traditionally dominated by India.
Bangladesh, after its political shift in July 2024, has also repositioned itself. Chief Advisor of the interim government, Professor Muhammad Yunus, clearly prioritised relations with China. During his March 2025 visit to Beijing, he signed several agreements, including one for the expansion of the Mongla Port. His “relations with all” foreign policy doctrine reflects a multipolar approach. However, India views this realignment with apprehension and has reportedly attempted to destabilise the interim government, fearing growing Chinese influence in Dhaka.
In Nepal, K.P. Sharma Oli returned as Prime Minister in July 2024. Widely seen as pro-China, Oli visited Beijing in December 2024 and signed new frameworks under the BRI, including a proposed underground highway and a rail link connecting Kathmandu to Huangguan in China. Although two-thirds of Nepal’s international trade is still with India, the current leadership is intent on reducing this dependency through deeper economic ties with China.
The Maldives witnessed a major political shift with the election of President Mohamed Muizzu in November 2023. Backed by the populist slogan “India Out,” Muizzu demanded the withdrawal of Indian military presence and immediately revived several China-backed infrastructure projects. During his January 2024 visit to China, both countries elevated their ties to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” China’s investments in the Maldives now exceed $3.7 billion, and its banks hold nearly 20% of the nation’s external debt. Despite Indian attempts to maintain influence through aid and investment, signs point to the Maldives tilting more firmly toward Beijing.
Bhutan, traditionally aligned with India in both foreign policy and defence, is also showing signs of quiet recalibration. In 2023, it made significant progress in border negotiations with China. A landmark visit to Beijing by Bhutan’s Foreign Minister in March 2024 led to the country’s first public indication that it was considering formal diplomatic ties with China. This development is alarming for India, particularly because of Bhutan’s proximity to the Siliguri Corridor – the “chicken’s neck” that connects India’s northeast to the mainland. China’s invitation for Bhutan to join the BRI further complicates the strategic calculus in the Himalayan region. Though Bhutan remains officially non-aligned, its evolving posture sends a subtle message to New Delhi.
Together, these developments point to a declining Indian influence in South Asia. China’s expanding investments and strategic outreach are drawing regional states away from New Delhi’s orbit and closer to Beijing. India fears that China’s growing maritime and infrastructural presence could undercut its traditional dominance across land and sea.
Pakistan, on the other hand, views this realignment as an opportunity. The shift presents Islamabad with a chance to forge new regional partnerships, enhance strategic depth, and recalibrate its foreign policy to align with emerging geopolitical realities.
As of mid-2025, South Asia’s strategic architecture is undergoing a fundamental transformation. India’s historic hegemony is being challenged by China’s emergence as a regional heavyweight. With most new regional leaders leaning toward Beijing for economic development, it is imperative for Pakistan to understand these shifting dynamics and shape its foreign relations accordingly. The recent military setbacks suffered by India in its standoff with Pakistan have only accentuated this transition in regional leadership. The message is clear: South Asia’s balance of power is shifting – and the future belongs to those who adapt wisely.
The writer is a senior media professional, researcher, and columnist. He writes extensively on South Asian geopolitics and international relations. He can be reached at [email protected] or on LinkedIn at @tahirmawan.