The bellicose rhetoric flying back and forth between the US and North Korea increases the perception of both sides readying to come good on respective threats. Thereby reinforcing (skewered) notions of the power of deterrence. Each is trying to build up specific arsenals to meet security concerns that may or may not be legitimate. Nevertheless, there is no getting away from the fact that cherry-picking certain polices represents an overt attempt — to quote Henry Kissinger — to “translate power into policy”. Washington’s official position remains the same. Meaning that it will settle for nothing less than Pyongyang surrendering its entire nuclear weapons programme. This has clearly not worked — not even with Trump in the White House — and today North Korea boasts a missile capability that is said to able to hit the US on its East Coast. Yet Washington has seemingly yet to cotton on to the fact that it is too late to demand that the North Korean regime give up all its nukes. And it is this stubbornness that risks seeing the US push its nemesis to the point whereby the threat of war that would kill millions upon millions could become a reality. The Trump administration must recognise the very real need for a tangible policy shift. It may be time to turn to history for some clues about the way forward. Namely, the post-Cold War strategy of ‘containment’. This would aim to minimise the North Korean nuclear programme and also dilute the power of a totalitarian regime that rallies a united population against a warmongering enemy. It is worth remembering, however, that it was fear of American aggression that first prompted Pyongyang to go nuclear. Thus have its security policies long revolved round the threat of war with the US. Additionally, it sees its nukes as a legitimate safeguard against American attempts at regime change. There is only one workable option: both sides co-existing as nuclear rivals. After all, there is no concrete evidence to show that Kim Jong-un actually wants to hit the US first Today, we must ask: can the international community, particularly Washington, live with a nuclear North Korea? Three countries in the world have never signed the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Yet their nuclear capability is seen as a threat only as far as the regional context goes. Unlike Israel, India and Pakistan, however, the North Korea question remains somewhat different. Meaning that the latter’s ambitions extend far beyond deterring regional rivals. In short, Pyongyang is seeking capability to directly strike the American homeland. Moreover, it doesn’t have democracy on its side, especially after successive US moves have seen it isolated from existing multilateral systems. This leaves only one workable option on the table: both sides co-existing as nuclear rivals. After all, there is no concrete evidence to show that Pyongyang actually wants to hit the US first. Despite it being a hyper-repressive regime at home — it knows that would be tantamount to committing nuclear suicide. Indeed, the Pyongyang paradox is this: despite rogue ballistic missile and ICBM tests, combined with pugnacious verbal threats directed towards Washington, leading to increased pressure not seen since the Korean War — North Korea strongly feels that it is the US that can’t be trusted. In fact, Kim Jong-un has firmly taken on board the international lessons learned from the American manoeuvres that saw both Saddam Hussein (2003) and Col Gaddafi (2011) toppled by superpower might. Be that as it may, North Korea must remain mindful that the escalation of aggressive rhetoric may well heighten the prospect of catastrophic miscalculation. China in this regard may represent potential leverage against Pyongyang, though the extent of this can’t be overestimated. Nevertheless, it is in Beijing’s interest to hold both sides back from war. For if the worst were to happen, the Chinese would find it difficult to manage the cost of the fallout of North Korean regime change in terms of the inevitable surge of refugees scrambling across the border. Then there is also the likelihood, if Pyongyang fails to dial down its belligerent rhetoric, of a critical rearmament of the Korean Peninsula. However, if this were to happen, the US would need to extend its nuclear umbrella over its Asian allies in a similar fashion to how it brought its European allies within the NATO fold. Conversely, all of this might well make the North Koreans feel under even more threat. Thus the diplomatic solution has to be put back on the table and soon. In short, the Pyongyang regime is not as crazy as the western media would have the world believe. Hence a peace deal, including a focus on economic development as well as a US commitment not to seek regime change represents potential currency for diplomatic exchange in the future. To sum up, therefore, diplomacy, coercion, sanctions and deterrence all have an unequivocal part to play in the Korean Peninsula. Yet the question remains as to whether the Kim Jong-un regime is prepared to genuinely enter into negotiations. And the only way to find that out is for the US to offer it tangible gains. The writer is currently working as Research Affiliate at Strategic Vision Institute Islamabad Published in Daily Times, October 19th 2017.