After presenting the budget in the National Assembly for the Financial Year 2024-25 on June 12, the next task before the government was to address the Chinese concerns over the security of their engineers and whether Pakistan was still interested in the continuation of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). With a high-powered delegation, at the beginning of June, Pakistan’s Prime Minister (PM) Shehbaz Sharif visited China, which was vexed at the loss of lives of Chinese engineers, who were hit by the proscribed Tehreke Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in the northwest and by the Baloch insurgent groups including the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) in the southwest of Pakistan. Though Pakistan tried to compensate for the loss monetarily the air of fear persisted in disheartening fellow engineers from working on projects related to the CPEC. Pakistan is indebted to China not only for China’s investment in the CPEC worth US$ 62 billion but also for extending loans to help Pakistan avoid sovereign default. China’s commercial banks also provided Pakistan with credits to let the country show its foreign exchange reserve appropriate for securing loans from international lenders. Against this background, it has been embarrassing for Pakistan to see terrorism consuming the lives of Chinese engineers on its land. Above all, if China cannot invest in Pakistan, no other foreign investor can do so either. Years ago, the US remained wise in dealing with the restive tribal area of Pakistan and the volatile neighbouring Afghan suburbs with drone strikes. Pakistan has been caught by a dual devil: Islamic militancy and separatist insurgency. Worryingly, both TTP and BLA acquired modern weapons and equipment which were left by the US-NATO troops while leaving Afghanistan on August 30, 2021. In late 2022, both TTP and BLA announced to join ranks against Pakistan, to work on the strategy of sabotage. In November 2022, when the TTP announced to end of its ceasefire, Pakistan witnessed an uptick of terrorist attacks. The BLA also remained active in the southwest storming the Gwadar Port Authority Complex and Turbat naval base near China-run Gwadar Port early this year. The strategy of sabotage was to undermine the Chinese interests in Pakistan – to disaffect China. Both TTP and BLA expect that by doing so they would win the support of all countries (whether situated near or far) antagonistic to China. On March 26 this year, a suicide attack in Bisham, in the Shangla district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, devoured the lives of five Chinese engineers. Consequently, the engineering work was halted not only on the Dasu dam project but also on the Diamer-Bhasha and Tarbela (5th Extension) Hydropower Project. The aforementioned three high-profile attacks on Chinese personnel and interests this year raised alarm bells in Beijing. A major challenge before Pakistan is that TTP and BLA have secured sanctuaries in Afghanistan, and also in Iran. On January 18, this year, Pakistan carried out air strikes inside Iran to target the hideouts of the BLA and other rebel groups. On March 18, Pakistan conducted air strikes inside Afghanistan to target the preserves of the TTP. Though Tehran has expressed its willingness to cooperate with Pakistan, Kabul refuses to collaborate. What has been bandied about is that China is not happy with Pakistan on the measures taken to secure the lives of Chinese engineers. During Pakistan’s PM visit to China, Chinese President Xi Jinping emphasized Pakistan’s responsibility for creating “a safe, stable and predictable business environment” that would “guarantee the safety of Chinese” personnel and projects. As if this were not enough. Liu Jianchao, Head of the International Department of the Communist Party of China, visited Islamabad and, on June 21, delivered an unequivocal message publicly to both politicians and the army, who were in attendance. The message was quadruple. First, Pakistan has to improve its internal security situation, the deterioration of which is “shaking the confidence of Chinese investors.” Second, Pakistan has to improve its business environment. That is, norms and rules governing business are not investment-friendly. Instead, they are fraught with snags. Third, Pakistan has to bring about internal political stability – without which economic stability would remain a dream. Fourth, Pakistan has to nurture a CPEC-friendly media environment, in which rumours and fake news do not spoil the toil. This is the first time China has spoken to Pakistan at a public forum, leaving little to speculate and conceal, thereby demanding that Pakistan has to overcome all four hurdles to mollify China. The next day, on June 22, Pakistan expressed its resolve to meet all the Chinese concerns. In the meeting of the Central Apex Committee on National Action Plan, the PM declared that, to fight the menace of terrorism, instead of just the army, all institutions and units of the state should work together embodying regional cooperation. The PM also announced to launch of a counter-terrorism campaign titled Operation Azm-e Istehkam (i.e. the will to create stability), as a national resolve to eradicate terrorism from the country. Necessary legislation will also be done. Critically speaking, Pakistan’s counter-terrorism departments have failed to perform. The same is true about intelligence-gathering institutions. The problem with Pakistan’s decision-makers is that they keep on waiting (and weathering) till a tipping point takes over them. The world has moved from being “reactive” to “pre-emptive” except for Pakistan, which may be good at reaction but bad at pre-emption. At this time, launching a military operation means more funds to initiate and sustain an operation and its repercussions. The country is struggling to service an enormous foreign debt, besides meeting the budgetary deficit. Inflation is soaring hitting the lower and middle classes hard. This time, it is expected that Pakistan’s military may have to go inside Afghanistan in hot pursuit to dismantle the TTP sanctuaries. This act might invite multiple challenges. Pakistan has to take a page from the US strategy. Years ago, the US remained wise in dealing with the restive tribal area of Pakistan and the volatile neighbouring Afghan suburbs with drone strikes and not by sending soldiers on the ground. Pakistan has to plan how it can achieve its targets inside Afghanistan by simultaneously saving the lives of its soldiers. The writer is an analyst on National Security and Counter-Terrorism. She tweets @TA_Ranjha and can be reached at taranjha1@gmail.com