Will there be a day after?

This question hangs heavy on every thinking soul’s conscience as we stand engaged with the Bad Taliban in South Waziristan, and as Hillary Clinton bucks us up for finally taking the plunge. On Waziristan, perhaps there wasn’t a choice; not because the Americans were breathing down our necks, it was simply because we had through default let ourselves be pushed into that dreaded corner from where no other alternative existed.
Just consider a probable scenario. End November 2009, the Afghan election stands completed, and either Abdullah-Abdullah, a major disaster, or Karzai, a minor disaster, is declared the winner. Given the long hiatus of Afghanistan’s leaderless recent times, a government actually gets formed early to mid-December. Around the same time and quite appropriately, based around who gets to win the run-off elections, the US policy on Afghanistan finally gets decided.
The US policy options will be pretty stark. If Abdullah, consider ceding territory east of the Hindu Kush range — populated by the Pashtuns — to the lawless tribes given that the base of support for Abdullah shall come from the non-Pashtuns — their recent history as two warring factions in Afghanistan hardly of any solace. The only recourse to the situation will be for the US to prolong her military presence in Afghanistan to bolster Abdullah and act aggressively against the Pashtuns to keep Afghan integrity intact; regional outsourcing of the same shall come by way of creating a disproportionately large armed forces for Afghanistan who could then be used to suppress the tribes, augmented by a welcome role for the Indians to take over the US role and augment and support Abdullah’s effort to avoid dismemberment.
What will that do to Pakistan? If Afghanistan was to ethnically stand divided even without a physical breakaway, a long ethnic war will ensue. The nucleus of the Taliban effort shall still be in place in the region from east of the Hindu Kush to the west of the Indus. It shall be a fairly homogenous territorial, ethnic, religious and socio-cultural composition. The ‘Guests’, Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, will find a reinvigorated relevance; they shall not only relish an expanded territorial base but a new, much more urgent and committed mission — a just war.
What may the 28 million Pashtuns of Pakistan’s NWFP have in common with this effort? Sparing the beginning, but based on a clear momentum that will, in time, engage notions of a great nationalist war composed of ferocious tribes and people who rarely forget a slight, more so when their tribal and nationalistic honour is challenged, morph into perhaps the most violent nationalist militancy of the 21st century.
Will the world acquiesce in the end by re-drawing the borders in Afghanistan? Will Afghania, inclusive of Pakistan’s Pashtuns become another state — a new state in the period when re-drawing borders is almost anathematic to global sensibilities? Will the state of Pakistan stand by idly, letting clouds of gloom with yet another possibility of secession gather on the horizon? Will such a scenario suck Pakistan into another unnecessary war, but crucial to her survival as a state? Will she end up fighting the combined opposition of India and Afghanistan on her expanded western borders to secure her own geographical boundaries, and yet implicitly on the side of the same Taliban that they would have taken on in Malakand and South Waziristan?
Almost instantly the entire meaning of the Bad and the Good Taliban stands reversed, and loses relevance. What will that trigger in Balochistan, a province already simmering in terms of nationalist sentiments? The possibilities are horrendous; what with Pakistan exposed to explosive dimensions of yet another redrawing of borders. And, will Pakistan stay as we know it today? What of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal spread all round the country? And, all because Abdullah won the Presidency and US policy had to address this changed connotation. A long haul, you might say. But entirely possible — remember.
Scenario two: the lesser disaster, Karzai, retains presidency and works through his most prominent difficulties — corruption and inefficiency, to develop a modicum of governance. He, also with some effort, re-establishes his credentials as a Pashtun and engages his fellow tribesmen to enfranchise their hopes and apprehensions. Elements from within the Taliban are brought back into mainstream politics and given responsibility to let a political system evolve, closer to what was prior to 1979 — a relatively weak centre with sufficient freedom to provinces and tribes and their heads to run a system of a modified confederacy — before the Soviets began interfering in Afghanistan to impose a communist structure, and quite different from the high moral model of democracy that the Americans have brought along.
Through such an option, Afghanistan’s state system can retain its global standing without a cataclysm impacting the entire region. Also, via such an arrangement, the US can create enough moral rationale to exit Afghanistan gracefully.
Scenario two is most likely to sustain; the US Secretary of State was explicit in suggesting that the new Afghan policy will work to consolidate the gains made till date in Afghanistan and translate those into enabling stability of the state. This is when she also expressly indicated the differentiation between the Bad and the Good Taliban, although she may have not used the exact same words. She also clearly denied any long-term presence of US forces in Afghanistan.
Pakistan can handle scenario two. Karzai is not known to be a Pako-phile but shall carry enough political sense to understand his limits, even if he is bolstered by a likely enhanced Indian presence and influence in Afghanistan. This shall still be a scenario within the recognisable geo-political dynamics of the region, well within the capacity of the component states to manage.
Rewind to today. By early to mid-December, the Pakistan Army plans to complete the major phase of its operation in Waziristan. It may then need to consolidate, lay a siege through the rough winter, and come spring activate to clear out the remnants if any. Most of the Bad Taliban currently fighting in Waziristan may get killed; some may escape into adjoining regions of North Waziristan and meet up with the Afghan Taliban there and with the Gul Bahadur and Maulvi Nazir groups — euphemistically the Good Taliban, at least from the Pakistani perspective.
Where Al Qaeda (read Osama and Al Zawahiri as the only two physical remnants of a one-time phenomenon) may be by now is anybody’s guess. It was in 2006 that orders went out from the high command of Al Qaeda to their cadres to vacate the region.
When Karzai wants to talk to the Taliban, he will have to engage with at least three main heads: Hekmatyar, Haqqani, and Mullah Omar. Come December, that may precisely be what the Americans want Karzai to do. Where will that leave Pakistan? Holding the baby and the bathtub; entirely dependent on the good offices of an intractable Mr Karzai to ensure a successful repatriation of all those who left Afghanistan after 9/11 to find refuge in Pakistan. He may deliberately sustain the conflict to keep Pakistan unstable while accepting a small cost of some law and order in his border regions.
If things don’t work out between any of these players and the world expects Pakistan to launch her third major operation to eliminate the remaining groups — they are likely to be gloriously disappointed. Enough of using the Pakistani military’s capacity to cover for others’ failings — both regionally and domestically. Pakistan is unlikely to extend favours far beyond where political sense must begin to show itself.
Therein must lay some pointers for our own government and political players. The Pakistan Army’s Waziristan operation will once again create the necessary space and deliver a defeated entity more amenable to dialogue and political assimilation. A lack of strategy to follow up on the opportunity thus created will be inexcusable.
Having paid our price in blood, lack of socio-economic progress and opportunity, a stunted economy, and a fraying societal structure, Pakistanis are within their rights to expect a new dawn. That our political masters must deliver. That is when the question haunts: will there also be a day after? We must ensure that there is, when all this mayhem and bloodshed actually comes to an end and a society may develop without prescription.

The writer is a retired air vice marshal and a former ambassador