In a unique twist of events, 2011 may stand out as the beginning of the period that will see Pakistan’s internal and external dynamics converge into a single set of compulsions that should drive policy and consume strategic thinking. Not only that internal and external dynamics feed into each other and gain sustenance, these remain linked through effects that each generates even when viewed separately. The domestic policy agenda has assumed such criticality that it must be weighed along with the external policy considerations — usually both remain independent and lead to objectives in two separate domains; Pakistan’s evolved strategic context though dictates differently. The year 2011 shall see Pakistan consumed with two compulsive determinants, the ongoing war against terror and resuscitating a sinking economy. Both have internal and external dimensions. In the war on terror there remains the pending agenda of engaging the militant groups in North Waziristan and completing unfinished operations in the remaining FATA region. While operations in Bajaur and Mohmand continue unabated against the wider nexus of the Pakistani Taliban — the conglomerate under the denomination, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), who having acted as hired foot soldiers to a diminishing al Qaeda presence now seek their own relevance and hope to be outsourced a certain portion of al Qaeda’s global agenda with attendant attractions of access to resources, principally money — there shall remain that overarching need to move against an equally combustible mix in North Waziristan. These include the TTP groups that fled military operations from adjoining regions. The TTP components resident there as the Hafiz Gul Bahadur’s group, some from Punjab who have migrated to the region to find sustenance and occupation, and the dominating Haqqani group of the Afghan Taliban genre. Holding off North Waziristan under any garb will become increasingly difficult, most pretensions for not doing so having already exhausted themselves. An operation in North Waziristan though will remain hinged to certain qualifying considerations. Chief among those shall be Pakistan’s objective for a peaceful, independent, stable and friendly post-US Afghanistan with equal stake and opportunity in its development. Pakistan also seeks an unqualified assurance that Afghan soil will not be used for destabilising Pakistan’s FATA region and Balochistan. Transparency and coordination with Pakistan on the proposed US strategy and planned mix of both the military option and political negotiation as the end draws near in Afghanistan will enable Pakistan to commit wholeheartedly to achievement of shared objectives. For the moment Pakistan’s apprehension of another ‘great game’ in post-US Afghanistan, push it to hedge against an early committal in a highly unsure environment. Pakistan also fervently hopes that negotiations can pave the way for the return of the Afghan groups to the main fold without having to resort to disproportionate armed action avoiding a feared blowback in its own cities. There will remain Pakistan’s own compulsions to bring to a closure the insurgency that the state has faced since early 2009. This is an important first step to halting the extremist militant movement that has besieged Pakistani society. There remains a significant perception that Pakistan fights this war on US bidding but it remains the most paramount prerequisite to attaining internal stability and order. Step two will involve activating mechanisms in domestic counter-terrorism that should have seen initiation by now. Fire-fighting against domestic terror groups has always been a poor manifestation of national resolve and indicative of a serious lack of strategy. Both interior and the law enforcement agencies (LEAs) with the support of the intelligence outfits and legal provisions will need to get their act together in an integrated, composite action plan and put the strategy in place to rid the nation of the menace of extremism. Mitigation of the threat on the borders on either side will greatly assist Pakistan in focusing on cleansing society from the debilitating scourge. This shall also enable and link favourably into Pakistan’s other strategic necessity of recovering the economy. The second compulsive factor of the economy too has only seen short-shrift attention mostly built around inexcusable laments of an unhelpful security situation that has held the faltering economy in stagnation. Reinventing the economy includes multifaceted approaches. Barely relying on macroeconomic stabilisation will not suffice. Plugging leaks and haemorrhage because of structural distortions in tax collection and public state enterprises (PSEs) is a part. As is enabling domestic resource generation. Popular politics must take a backseat in the face of the overarching need to support the long-term health of the economy through sustaining measures. We will need to encourage domestic capital to return to the country and begin re-energising the economy even as we seek avenues of external investment. A sound industrial policy supporting manufacturing is needed. Provision of energy to areas, which will strengthen exports, is equally important. Areas of focus that will encourage exports will need to be identified and preferred. A changed view of the services sector as a money-spinner is needed, which should be tapped for developing a helpful economic sentiment. The Reformed General Sales Tax (RGST) is crucial for broadening the tax base and documenting the economy. Mega-projects should be initiated with international financial institutions’ support, while infrastructure development, particularly in the backward regions of Pakistan, will help generate economic activity zones that will help spur spin-off advantages to other facets too. Rather than limit the 10-point agenda of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) to an agreement only between the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the PML-N, the participation of all parties within parliament must be ensured to develop a national consensus on how the economy will need to be recovered as a strategic plan. Such a multi-party mix constituting of experts and party representatives with a keen approach towards economic and financial matters must remain to oversee implementation and provide necessary direction. Quite clearly the requisite support measures to recover the economy have both external and internal inputs. It also manifests directly into enabling domestic security and stability. Two other factors, one external and another internal, complete Pakistan’s strategic mosaic for the foreseeable future. Externally, as the sensitivity to nuclear proliferation becomes more acute, and as Pakistan increasingly gets viewed in the world as a greatly troubled nation isolated from the global main street, its stand on the proposed completion of the Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) is likely to come under intense pressure. Pakistan needs to be wary of moves to ostracise it from the nuclear groupings where too it may be seen as a trouble-child. Instead of hard-headedness in such matters, there is a need to evolve innovative trade-offs that will not only benefit Pakistan but should assist in restoring Pakistan’s image in the world community. There are a host of possibilities but those shall begin to get counted in only when we can climb down our assumed high horse and be more realistic with our chances. The final strategic dimension is purely domestic and relates to how Pakistani society stands exposed to serious fissures engendering possible ruptures if not attended to with urgency. Whether these are the rich-poor divide or the liberal-religious equation, these stand as serious vulnerabilities that will become difficult to heal. Add to it the regional sentiments in Balochistan and we have our work cut out. The writer is a retired air vice marshal and a former ambassador