In what can be considered a dramatic shift in a seemingly resolute and unalterable policy, the CIA has yielded to a level of compromise vis-à-vis its drone campaign in Pakistan, which has been seen by some to be stoking anti-American sentiments and is emerging as an obstacle in Pak-US relations of late. The CIA and the US State Department have been in conflict over the repercussions of this drone campaign on an already strained relationship between the two countries. Consequently, the parameters of the campaign have been re-defined to be more acceptable. The State Department will act as a check on the CIA’s gung-ho attitude and the Pakistan government will be taken on board before any drone operations are carried out. Also, the sensitivity of the timing of drone strikes is to be taken into account, such as when Pakistani officials visit the US or American officials are in Pakistan. Another concession by the CIA is on the controversial matter of ‘signature strikes’ that target unidentified suspected groups of militants as opposed to ‘personality strikes’ that target identified top militants only. The signature strikes, which form the bulk of the drone strikes, have been accepted as causing greater collateral damage, regardless of their success in weakening al Qaeda and being considered the politically safer option as opposed to boots on the ground, which is neither without risk nor possible without a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty. At the same time, influential voices in the US Congress have raised the contention whether the role of the Pakistan military is that of an ‘ally’ in the war against terrorism and have pointed out that Pakistan is determined to pursue its self-defined interests and that these interests are not in sync with those of the US. Seeing that Congress holds the purse strings, its disapproval of Pakistan’s stance has led to its decision to cut already dwindling civilian assistance pledged under the 2009 Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act to provide $ 7.5 billion of aid over a period of five years. Of late, the Obama administration has also delayed payments to Islamabad on the Coalition Support Fund account as a manifestation of its displeasure at Pakistan’s reluctance to ‘do more’ with regards to the denial to militants of their safe havens on Pakistani soil. However, Hillary Clinton has urged a continuance of civilian aid to Pakistan as “disengagement at this stage would only undermine the US’s national security interests”. Moreover, she is of the view that stability cannot be ensured without economic opportunity. With mutual mistrust piling up since the beginning of this year and the incompatibility of objectives and respective national interests now being realised and voiced by the US lawmakers, the CIA’s altered strategy of reduction and control of drone strikes and the offering of a carrot in the form of continuing aid, is a feeble attempt of the US to make the best of a bad situation. The US having acknowledged the limits on its options in ensuring post-withdrawal stability in Afghanistan and having seen Pakistan standing its ground in pursuing its notion of ‘strategic depth,’ has decided to lower its expectations and recognise, grudgingly, the importance of the relationship with Pakistan, agreed to take Pakistan’s views into consideration and thereby prevent the relationship from spiralling into the pit that has increasingly loomed under it. It appears that these differences are not going to disappear any time soon and these contradictions are likely to exacerbate over the period leading up to the withdrawal of the US. The prospects of a healthy relationship based on mutual interests are not looking good and it seems that Afghanistan is headed towards more trouble and possibly a protracted civil war, the implications of which are going to be grave, for Pakistan as well as the region.*