The situation in Syria has reached a dangerous stalemate, with or without Kofi Annan. The Arab Spring seems to have hit a hard rock in that country where the regime, though unpopular with a part of the Syrian people, has some advantages. First: the country’s minorities and its business class are afraid of the alternative to the Bashar al-Assad regime. The alternative of a chaotic Sunni political order, with the likely domination of the Muslim Brotherhood or a variation of it after a deadly civil war, sends shivers down the collective spines of the Alawites (the ruling Shia sect), Christians, Kurds and other small communities. In other words, the Bashar regime has the core support of about 30 percent of the population and they are standing by it,. His father, Hafez al-Assad and the country’s dictator for 30 years, brutally crushed a rebellion in Hama in 1982 with an estimated 10,000 people killed, which kept the deadly peace in Syria for 30 years. Bashar succeeded his father in 2000 after his death. And the son is repeating his father’s known prescription of quelling a rebellion through brutal force but it does not seem to be working so far. Second: Bashar is not as isolated internationally as media reports seem to suggest. He has Iran behind him, and Iraq is a friendly neighbour. Hezbollah in Lebanon, with their veto on the Lebanese political system, are likely to keep that country out of any anti-Bashar regional coalition, and Russia and China are refusing to line up behind the US and Europe in the UN Security Council for any kind of military intervention to bring down the Bashar regime. They are cautious this time because the Security Council resolution on Libya, which China and Russia supported, was over-interpreted by the US and Europe to bring down the Gaddafi regime. However, in the face of mounting civilian killings, reported to be over 9,000, they have been pressuring Damascus to do something tangible to resolve the situation. The Bashar regime has announced some initiatives to liberalise the country’s polity but it is all too little too late. The Kofi Annan initiative has their support, including a Security Council resolution to send unarmed civilian monitors to ensure that both sides maintain the ceasefire enjoined on them. But whether it will last remains problematic. In other words, it is a messy situation with no prospect of any real breakthrough. The Bashar regime also has the advantage of an almost complete control of the government and the armed forces. True, there are some defections from the army but the core of the military remains loyal. And in the government, there is virtually no defection of its diplomats, intelligence community and politicians. This is in stark contrast to Libya, where the institutions became quite porous as the rebellion took hold. The Syrian rebels, on the other hand, are quite divided. Besides, they have no liberated area to operate from. They do not have anything like Benghazi, as was the case with the Libyan rebels. They are, therefore, counting on outside material help to advance their cause, which, in the present situation, is hard to come by, in any case not on the scale that Libya received. Syria, though, remains under considerable international pressure. At the same time, without effective international material support and intervention on the rebels’ behalf, they are in no position to topple the Bashar regime. It is not a totally isolated regime, as we have seen. The Israeli silence on the Syrian situation is telling. And by their silence, they seem to be favouring the Assad regime. And it is understandable from their viewpoint, because they would rather have the Bashar regime rule and control Syria rather than a radicalised and Islamic Syria at odds with them. They have had enough of the Arab Spring for their liking. In this stalemated situation, it is not surprising that the international community is banking so much on Kofi Annan’s mission. And there has been progress of sorts with a unanimous UN Security Council Resolution (including Russia and China) authorising the dispatch of unarmed civilian monitors. This puts even more pressure on the regime. The Bashar regime might continue to dig its heels in but if it is unable to decisively prevail politically and militarily, its position is likely to become untenable. Internally: it might create cracks in the military. Though there is no visible sign of any unrest in the higher military command, the possibility of a military coup cannot be entirely ruled out with the successor regime inclined to make a political deal. Second: with the regime unable to ensure stability and security, it might start to lose the support of the minorities and business community, keen to explore alternatives with the rebels. Third: the continuing violence, unrest and international sanctions are bound to seriously damage the country’s economy and hollow out the country. Therefore, it might become difficult for the Bashar regime to sustain military operations against the rebels for much longer. It has already been over a year since the unrest began, and the army is overstretched, being shifted from one place to another. One cannot, therefore, rule out a sudden collapse at some point of time. Predictions about any outcome are only guesswork. But one thing is for sure that Syria is headed for a bloodbath from sectarian conflict, with or without the Bashar regime. At this point it is pertinent to point out the irony of the Gulf kingdoms, led by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, playing an important rallying role against Syria, considering their own human rights record in their respective kingdoms — hardly an example worth emulating. Saudi Arabia, for instance, is constantly engaged in crushing the Shia population in its oil-bearing eastern province, and with its fellow potentates of other Gulf countries is helping Bahrain to do the same with its Shia population. There are two reasons for this. First: Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council are in the vanguard role to prevent Iran from playing an important/dominating role in the region. And Syria happens to be Iran’s close regional friend. Saudi Arabia and its fellow kings fear that an Iranian foothold in any Arab country will encourage Shiite disaffection and rebellion in their midst. Second: an Alawite (a Shia sect) minority rules Syria. It, therefore, has a sectarian ring to it, with Riyadh as protector of the Sunni population. What is being perpetrated in Syria by the Bashar regime is repugnant to many. But countries like Saudi Arabia and other Gulf rulers and their partners in the Arab League taking on the mantle of promoting human rights and democracy is distasteful, to put it mildly. The writer is a senior journalist and academic based in Sydney, Australia. He can be reached at sushilpseth@yahoo.com