The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), comprising 11 articles, has three components or pillars: Non-proliferation, Disarmament and the right of the non-nuclear states to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. In the domain of nuclear non-proliferation, the Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) have undertaken not to transfer to any recipient nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not to assist a non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or acquire such weapons. The non-nuclear states have pledged not to receive nuclear weapons and other explosive devices from any source or accept assistance for the manufacture of such weapons or devices. In regards to disarmament, the signatories to the treaty have affirmed the desire to ease international tensions and strengthen international trust so as to create, someday, the conditions for a halt to the production of nuclear weapons and a treaty in general for a complete disarmament that liquidates, in particular, nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles from national arsenals. The third pillar of NPT recognises the right of the non-nuclear states to the acquisition of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes under the incisive glare of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), provided they can prove verifiably that they are not engaged in developing nuclear weapons. Ostensibly, all these objectives of the NPT are beyond any reproach. But the reality is that during the 42 years of its existence, the NPT has failed to stop nuclear proliferation or in evolving a credible mechanism for disarmament. According to the former IAEA chief, Mohamed ElBaradei, there are 35 to 40 states that possess the knowledge to develop nuclear weapons, in addition to 13 others who have installed facilities for enrichment of weapons grade uranium. Israel beyond doubt is an undeclared nuclear power. North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Libya have been pursuing nuclear weapons programmes though South Africa and Libya have abandoned them under international pressure. India and Pakistan, the two countries who have not signed the NPT, have also become nuclear weapon states with justifications of their own. The failure of the NPT to prevent nuclear proliferation and achieve its objective of disarmament is mainly attributable to the breach of the treaty provisions by the NWS and some intrinsic inadequacies in the treaty itself. The NSW under the treaty committed not to provide nuclear technology or weapons to any other state or use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state. However, in violation of this commitment, the US that has been crying hoarse from every convenient rooftop to urge the non-signatory states to join the NPT, has provided nearly 180 B61 nuclear bombs to Belgium, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands and Turkey for use. The US also targeted its nuclear warheads at North Korea, a non-NWS from 1959 until 1991. Former Secretary of Defence UK, Geoff Hoon explicitly invoked the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons in response to a non-conventional attack by ‘rogue states’. In January 2006, President Jacques Chirac of France indicated that an incident of state-sponsored terrorism in France could trigger a small-scale nuclear retaliation aimed at destroying the rogue state’s power centres. The failure of the NSW to bring about a major reduction in their nuclear arsenal, to halt the production of nuclear weapons, the inability to hammer out a treaty on general and complete disarmament and their reluctance to agree on complete disarmament within a prescribed timeframe has also contributed to lack of progress in this regard. This has angered many non-nuclear states and also provided justifications to many of them to develop nuclear programmes of their own. The dilemma with the third pillar of the NPT is that a commercially popular light water reactor nuclear power station uses enriched uranium fuel, which has either to be enriched by those countries themselves or purchased from the international market. The countries concerned can easily switch to a nuclear weapons programme if they so desire, leading to the spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. That perhaps explains why in 2004 the US declared the prevention of further spread of uranium enrichment and plutonium as a major pillar of its non-proliferation policy and why it has been pressurising a number of countries, including Pakistan, to sign the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). Nevertheless, the issue still remains unresolved and even the process to negotiate has not taken off. The sticking point is that while the US, UK and Japan favour a treaty that limits future production of fissile materials, other states including Pakistan believe that the treaty should also address fissile materials already produced and stockpiled. Pakistan holds the view, and rightly so, that a fissile material treaty which does not address existing stockpiles will “freeze existing asymmetries” that threaten its security and therefore is unacceptable. This, undoubtedly, is a manifestation of its concern regarding regional rival India who possesses much larger stockpiles of fissile material. It maintained the same principled position in the first committee meeting of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in 2009 and 2010, because of which a deadlock persists. Islamabad’s position is likely to prolong a 14-year-old stalemate in the CD; the UN operates on a consensus basis, and the US, Japan, Australia and several other countries have announced that they would support moving negotiations for a fissile material treaty to another forum if the deadlock in the CD continued. The apprehensions expressed by Pakistan have proved true. The US has violated the NPT by entering into an agreement with India — a non-signatory state of the NPT — for the transfer of civilian nuclear technology to prop it up as a counterbalance to China, and to exploit its lucrative market. The UK and France have also followed suit. India has agreed to accept IAEA supervision for only 14 nuclear reactors out of 22. Pakistan views it as a discriminatory act and in view of its Indo-centric security paradigm, has a considered opinion that India will utilise this to enhance its nuclear capability and that might lead to a nuclear arms race in the region. In view of the foregoing facts, no person in his right mind can believe that the NPT will achieve its objectives in the foreseeable future unless the NWS abandon their discriminatory and self-serving policies and learn to abide by their international commitment. Until then the idea of a nuclear-free world will remain an elusive dream. The writer is a retired diplomat, a freelance columnist and a member of the visiting faculty of Riphah Institute of Media Sciences, Riphah International University, Islamabad. He can be reached at ashpak10@gmail.com