Since the May 11 elections and their outcome, there is a general feeling that Pakistani civil society and its politics are perhaps in a melting pot. And there is an air of expectation, coupled, of course, with a wave of cynicism that tends to neutralise it. Most of us have many expectations from the new Nawaz Sharif. We believe that he has probably learnt a great deal after his prolonged adversity. He is an older and a much reformed leader, who will be doing quite a lot for the better, both in the area of foreign relations and the internal problems we confront, such as corruption and its sharpest manifestation in the energy sector, and the blackouts. And in all other related areas. There are quite a few of us who have expectations from him for the better that there will be an improved law and order situation, a much better governance coupled with diminishing power shutdowns, etc. However, there are some perhaps better connected to the nitty-gritty of our politics at the top level who are cynical, and think that Mr Sharif will have to take his cue from Saudi Arabia, and from the army. It is interesting that this very well informed and exclusive circle does not connect Mr Sharif’s future course of action with the US as much as they do with the army and the Saudis. They seem to think, and the core of their reasoning is that Mr Sharif is a realist, that practical politics is what will come first in his decision making. And on that note he is not going to take risks by going at cross-purposes with the Pakistan Army, particularly because of the Pervez Musharraf episode in our history. Now I am not clear about the reasoning for the above. I would like to seek further wisdom on this point from those who are better informed than me. We have had the first military coup of the late Field Marshal Ayub Khan, the second one of General Yahya Khan, the third of General Ziaul Haq, and the last one of General Pervez Musharraf. We have experience of the mechanics of Pakistani military coups from their well-recorded history. But before drawing conclusions about these coups, let me mention the first civilian coup that set the military ball rolling. I refer to the coup in 1954 by Governor General Ghulam Muhammed, whom the Quaid-e-Azam appointed the first finance minister. Surely when he dissolved the Constituent Assembly and nullified the then ongoing process of constitution making, that coup, if looked at more closely, might persuade us to consider if the subsequent military coups were not derivatives of that first civilian one. Two points emerged from the record of the first coup. Firstly, the civilian coup was challenged by Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan, the then Speaker of the Constituent Assembly, before the Sindh Chief Court. The full court unanimous judgment held that the coup was illegal and null and void. The coup maker’s only recourse was to file an appeal before the then Federal Court, which overturned the judgment of the Sindh Chief Court and legally validated the coup against the Constituent Assembly set up by the Quaid-e-Azam. It is relevant to recall that the foundation stone of the Federal Court’s judgment in appeal was the maxim of Jurisprudence, which is stated as ‘Salus populi Suprema lex’. Perhaps these facts and events point to two prevailing realities. One, that the coup maker had neither sufficient political roots nor stamina to bypass the judicial process or to challenge a verdict of the judiciary. Secondly, civil society at that time was not sufficiently interested to take an active position in a matter relating to the fundamental legal dispensation in society. It did not matter whether the court opposed or supported the coup. Presumably, civil society was too preoccupied with urgent matters relating to the individuals composing it. Thus the field was left open for those who could take an initiative and get a court verdict. It appears that the verdict of the law courts was the best that could fill the political vacuum. This was the first occasion when the political reality in Pakistan manifested itself for all concerned to see and draw conclusions. I submit that the experience of the first civilian coup was decisive in enabling the first military coup four years later in 1958. A consortium of a bureaucrat, Iskander Mirza, and a general, Ayub Khan, felt comfortable in launching the second coup. Less than three weeks later the general felt sufficiently confident about our political realities to stage a coup within a coup, and dispense altogether with our civil society and its bureaucracy, without much justification or explanation. And this went on quite cheerfully for a decade, until the ‘development decade’ made a peaceful transition to the third coup of General Yahya Khan, which after its achievements in East Pakistan found it necessary to have a civilian interim government with the blessings and invitation of the army. Until the army came to the conclusion that the civilian democracy had had its ‘development decade’, and did a simple military takeover with a broomstick and installed General Ziaul Haq. Then after another ten years or so, with a short round of civilian political flavour, General Pervez Musharraf takes over while he was still flying in a plane. After another near decade of political musical chairs, the next round went to the civilian government. External circumstances such as the SEATO and CENTO pacts in 1954-55, the oil boom of the early 1960s in the Gulf, and then the Afghan climax of the Cold War in the 1980s were decisive in the economic opportunity growth in the country. But I doubt if any serious minded people within or without Pakistan will accuse any government since 1947 of good and proper governance. Returning to the issue in hand, I cannot understand what reason Mr Sharif can have today for being afraid of the Pakistan Army. Firstly, it is our own army and not a foreign or hostile army. Secondly, it is as much Pakistani as you and I are. It has the good and weak traits that most of us have. It is as brave as we are and no more. And we know when and where we are brave and when we are not. For instance, our army has never done or contemplated a coup like the one that Mustafa Kamal Pasha did in Turkey. They have always staged a coup riding on the back of a judiciary and never on their own two feet. General Musharraf perhaps tried to exceed these historical and institutionalised limitations of Pakistan and is now facing a death penalty on a charge of treason under Article six of the Constitution. The army has shown no signs of rescuing Musharraf from the clutches of the Supreme Court by staging a coup under their own steam, even though the army is perfectly aware of what a depressing effect it will have on the morale of its generals if on a quid pro quo basis General Musharraf is hanged as a civilian prime minister was hanged by them. So if Mr Sharif is still harbouring some fears of the army by doing under the constitution what he can and should do, then it can only be a case of him trying to compete with the army in excessive psychological caution. Then I think one would have to agree with Mark Antony that the fault dear Brutus lies not in our stars but in ourselves. (To be continued) The writer is an advocate and director of Sanjannagar Institute of Philosophy and Arts. He can be reached at rkazim13@gmail.com