Every other day certain speculations or rumours in media about the post-retirement role of Pakistan’s incumbent Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani are being aired. The new rumour is about his taking up the charge as the National Security Adviser to Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Although the COAS himself had stated that he was going to have a peaceful post-retirement life, yet, due to the importance of the army in Pakistan speculations are quite normal.
Now the pertinent question is: who will be the next COAS? Usually, in democratic countries, this question does not carry a great deal of weightage because the government is being run by the civilians, but it matters a great deal in a country that has experienced military rule for almost half of its 67 years of existence. The civilian leadership, generally, opts for someone on whom it can rely and who obeys authority. Presently, one of the leading names for the COAS is of Lt General Haroon Aslam, who is, currently the chief of logistics staff. He will be the senior most general when General Kyani steps down. But according to some Pakistani media analysts, he is likely to be made Chairman of Joint Chief of Staff Committee (CJCSC) and the final name could be a surprise. Although individuals do not matter a whole lot in the army because it acts as an institution yet leadership is important. It is the leader who guides the soldiers and decides the course of action.
The military became the all-powerful institution in Pakistan because within a decade of its birth in 1947 popular leaders were either dead or assassinated. This created a power vacuum, which was occupied by bureaucrats and military leadership. The military succeeded because it had means to govern the country and also had a reason: to provide security against India. This myth helped Pakistani army to cling to power in intervals since its birth in 1947. General Ayub Khan (1958-1969) was the first military dictator. He set the precedent for the succeeding generals. The first coup, later on others too, found support in the ‘doctrine of necessity’ judgement of 1955 by the Lahore High Court. In that judgement it was maintained “…that which otherwise is not lawful, necessity makes lawful.” The subsequent courts used that judgement to justify and legitimise coups by General Yahya Khan, General Ziaul Haq and General Pervez Musharraf. When in power, military does not rule alone. It includes civilians in its system to legitimise their governments. Hasan Askari Rizvi terms this as the ‘civilianisation’ of military rule. This is also being done with the expectation that during the democratic government the ‘protégé’ will serve its institutional interests. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was a protégé of General Ziaul Haq’s military regime. About his induction in politics, Dr Ayesha Siddiqa writes that the popular narrative is that General Ziaul Haq’s then Punjab governor, Lt General Jillani played a role in inducting Mian Nawaz Sharif during the early 1980s. A former senior bureaucrat, Mukhtar Masood, who served in Punjab at that time, claims that he was dispatched to talk to Sharif’s father, the late Mian Sharif, to ‘give’ one of his sons to the regime for inclusion in politics. Despite this background, Sharif has never been fully accepted by the top military brass. He was forced to step down from the post of prime minister in 1993 and 1995 due to differences with the army, and in 1999, he faced a military coup. What happened to the twice-elected prime minister, Benazir Bhutto was even worse. She was not trusted by the army brass because she was not a military protégé; she was from Sindh and not a Punjabi; and she was a woman. Due to these reasons even when she was the prime minister, she seemed to be highly dependent on the military.
The last military ruler of Pakistan was General Musharraf. He ruled for nine years (1999-2008). A series of protests and pressures led him to hold general elections, in which Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) was led to victory under the leadership of Asif Ali Zardari. He took charge after the assassination of his wife Benazir Bhutto in December 2007. His government completed its term. Afterwards, there was a democratic transfer of power through elections in 2013.This is the first time in its history that Pakistan witnessed a democratic transfer of power.
The democratic transfer of power in 2013 does not mean that the military has lost its ground in Pakistan: no, it has not. It is omnipresent and omnipotent as an institution. The civilian establishment is not powerful enough to challenge the authority of the military. Whenever it has challenged it, a military coup has taken place. The only way to lessen military’s grip over the State is by strengthening the democratic institutions through the process of democratisation.
The writer is an assistant professor (guest) at the Delhi University, New Delhi. He can be reached at [email protected]