The present Afghan government is only in control of the main urban centres. About 70 percent of the population lives in the rural areas, many of which remain inaccessible to the government. Afghan governments without a proper moral mandate will never be able to reach the population living in remote mountains and valleys. It will be a near impossible task for the Afghan government to exert its writ through the Afghan National Security Forces. The Afghan National Army (ANA) is now estimated to be around 350,000 and by end 2014, it will have 400,000 personnel. These estimates are disputed as counting of the security forces is only on the basis of ‘trained and equipped’. There are no accurate estimates of how many personnel are actually performing duty on ground. Some estimates place the ANA available strength to be only 100,000. The discipline of the force is much below the challenges that will be faced after December 2014. Desertions, theft of weapons and even official vehicles is common. Undermined by such issues, one cannot expect the security forces to establish law and order effectively for a government working in a hostile environment, in a war-torn country. All across, it is commonly believed that there is no likelihood that the ANA can stand up to the Taliban. With the poor state of discipline and lack of fighting spirit in the ANA, the US will not be willing to give an unconditional and firm commitment to finance the ANA beyond 2014. The US must have realised that Afghanistan cannot be governed or managed only by force, as governance that ensures peace and growth is achieved only through a legitimate government, which many analysts believe is lacking in Afghanistan. The Afghan election of 2009 that placed Hamid Karzai in power lacked credibility. After the Soviet withdrawal, Mohammad Najibullah managed to stay in power for about three years, until March 1992, backed by large amounts of USSR’s financial assistance and military equipment. In the present case, the US is considering the ‘zero option’, which stands for no residual troops in Afghanistan beyond December 2014. Government institutions in Afghanistan are weak or nonexistent, especially in the rural areas as the result of constant civil strife. Here the Soviets and the Americans and allies failed to learn any lessons from the Afghan history. Entering Afghanistan in December 1979 to support a socialist government, the Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989, leaving behind a chaotic situation with an unpopular and unelected government, with the institutions of governance nonexistent or in disarray. Apparently, the present Afghan government has little or no influence or control over vast areas of the country, a situation similar to the one prevalent at the time of Soviet withdrawal. The events of 1989 and the present US retreat have a similarity worth considering. Many difficulties for a negotiated retreat for the US have surfaced; the difficulties are further compounded by the perception of the Afghan Taliban. The US should have avoided entering Afghanistan and starting a senseless war that caused much human misery, along with loss of a high moral ground. The events of 9/11 were an intelligence failure, and instead of invading Afghanistan, the US could have weighed other options, among them the creation of a better intelligence collection system. Ahmed Shah Massoud, while addressing the European Parliament in Brussels in April 2011, had warned that the insurgency in Afghanistan was likely to spill beyond the borders of Afghanistan. His caution and words were not given much consideration, and no note-worthy step was taken. This is indicative that prior to 9/11 the US administration had placed Afghanistan as a low priority area. The US could not accurately read the changes in the Afghan society and the impact those changes were likely to have globally. Prime Minister David Cameron, on a visit to Afghanistan in June 2013 to attend the Armed Forces Day ceremony, stated that 2002 was the correct time to carry negotiations with the Taliban. Moreover, General Nick Carter, Deputy Commander of NATO forces, also stated that negotiations with the Taliban should have been conducted in 2002. A great deal will now depend on the Afghan elections of 2014.The elections must be fair and free, and above all else, all major stakeholders must participate. The elections of 2009 did not have the required credibility. In March 2009, President Barack Obama declared that there has to be a reconciliation process in Afghanistan. From 2009 to 2013, no tenable plan for withdrawal of US forces has been in view, hence there is no clear picture beyond 2014. In comparison, the Soviet withdrawal strategy along with the reconciliation was well in place in 1987 onwards. The withdrawal plan worked for the Soviets till the exit of its last soldier in February 1989. The Road from Kabul to Soviet Union border is only 400 kilometres, whereas the United States is on the other end of the globe, and as is the case now, the process of the removal of military equipment to be taken back to the US is facing difficulties. The Afghan economy is another issue. The financial resources at the disposal of the Afghan government are very meager and there is a huge budgetary gap, dimensions of which will only become clear once the US and allies leave Afghanistan. Which countries will be willing to spend at least $10 billion annually for a budgetary support beyond 2014, and even perhaps well beyond 2025, is yet to be decided. As stated earlier, government institutions are in a bad shape; the writ of the state is seldom seen in spite of a huge deployment of troops by the US; the economy is weak and cannot ensure much revenue for the budget; and the discipline of the Afghan national army is far below the requirement. Such are the similarities of the Afghan engagement between the US and the erstwhile USSR. Above everything else, one striking similarity between the US and the former USSR is that both negotiated with groups within Afghanistan that they had entered to vanquish. Is our region to suffer for another very long period because of the flawed strategies and policies of earlier the former USSR and now the US and its allies? Beyond 2014, it has to be monitored how Afghanistan is going to be different from 1989, the year when the Soviets left Afghanistan. (Concluded) The writer is a former Inspector General of Police and can be reached at humayunshafi@gmail.com