Bangladesh has recently gone through yet another turbulent phase in its struggle towards political stability and rule of law. The recent rupture in its body politic characterises serious societal, institutional and somewhat structural division across ideological (nationalists versus secessionists), religious (moderates versus Islamists) and economic (poor versus elite) lines. This lingering phenomenon surfaced early last year and culminated in the hanging of Abdul Qadir Mollah by the end of 2013. Before one visualises a post-Mollah Bangladesh, it seems pertinent to objectively analyse actors and events that caused the present fiasco. During my visit to that country early last year, when the Shahbagh movement was at its peak, thousands of pro-Awami League youth were seen invoking agitational politics to urge the apex court to assign capital punishment to Abdul Qadir Mollah, who was charged of killing Bengali intelligentsia and raping fellow women as part of Jamaat-e-Islami’s (JI) armed wing (al Badr) during the (civil) war against the Pakistani state in 1971. Mollah, among other JI members, was arrested on July 13, 2010; he was indicted on May 28, 2012 and, on February 5 last year, the Bangladesh war crimes tribunal convicted the Mollah on six charges of murder and rape. Since the tribunal accorded him life imprisonment, the ‘atheist’ youth, as Jamaat-e-Islami termed it arbitrarily, took to the streets and demanded capital punishment for all war criminals, Qadir Mollah being one of them. The ‘liberal-secular’ youth, which incidentally was pro-Awami League politically, used the modern media aggressively but effectively. For example, at one procession in Mirpur, whereby the young leaders of this (neo)Shahbagh movement concentrated, they invoked anti-Pakistan and anti-Jamaat-e-Islami rhetoric to make a case. Interestingly, the number of women — many quite old — and children with the Bangladeshi flag imprinted on their foreheads was significantly high. This helped the speakers to instrumentalise femininity and make a broader case for ‘war rapes’. In reaction, the members of Jamaat-e-Islami, under the framework of Jamaat-shibir, resorted to political violence across the country. Since February 5, hundreds have lost their lives and the damage done to an otherwise growing economy is still to be assessed statistically. Importantly, however, the state of Bangladesh patronised the liberal-secular youth’s agenda in terms of consideration of the nature and level of punishment by the country’s Supreme Court (SC). This decision further aggravated the situation in the streets, resulting in more violence, killings and overall socio-political instability. The Jamaat, now in political alliance with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), strongly accused the Hasina government of playing politics by invoking ‘war crimes’ as a political strategy to affect the electoral results at the next general elections, scheduled to be held on January 5. Hence, sans political power, the JI-BNP duo relied on street power. Comparatively, the Shahbagh youth was stronger and more effective organisationally, politically, logistically, technologically and ideologically; their slogans were catchy and in resonance with majority Bengali nationalism. Resultantly, it did not come as a surprise when the SC sentenced Qadir Mollah to death. The JI filed a review petition, though hurriedly. It went in vain since the chief judge categorically mentioned, “There is no ground for reviews in cases related to war crimes”. Understandably, the Mollah was hanged to death three days before that nation’s ‘victory day’. Reactively, JI-led elements played havoc with society and the state. The latter, on its part, used force when deemed necessary. The effects of this event are likely to haunt Bangladeshi politics and the state in the months, if not years, to come. For instance, if the ongoing political violence intensifies, the government will find it extremely difficult to hold elections timely. If the JI-BNP decides to boycott the elections, single-party participation would make electoral success suspicious and hence illegitimate. Secondly, in another scenario, if an interim government is formed and it prolongs in view of political unrest, the military is likely to feel concerned on account of its corporate interests. On the other hand, in Pakistan, generally the Mollah’s death has been perceived in terms of ‘revenge’ against Pakistan. The Pakistani part of JI, in alliance with Imran Khan, has termed it illegal, inhuman and shameful. Pakistan’s parliament has adopted a resolution, initiated by a JI member, urging Bangladesh to show restraint with regard to further persecution. With regard to Pakistan’s relations with Bangladesh, post-Mollah, the former should apologise to the people of Bangladesh for the crimes committed in 1971. Secondly, the Bangladesh state should adopt an attitude of compassion towards the remaining culprits. Third, the two states should focus more on cultural and economic exchanges given the fact that lots of Pakistani businesses have shifted to Dhaka post-9/11. In addition, the political elite in Bangladesh must understand the fact that their infighting will further consolidate extra-parliamentary forces. Last but not least, if democracy is to get consolidated in this and other ‘defective democracies’, the political elite has to shun the politics of violence in favour of criticism, tolerance and democratisation. If this is not the case, the political future of Bangladesh will remain politically instable, socially conservative, economically isolated and religiously violent. This would, in turn, be catastrophic for the Bangladesh-Pakistan relationship. The writer is a DAAD fellow. He holds a PhD in Political Science and works as assistant professor at IQRA University, Islamabad. He tweets @ ejazbhatty