Each time Pakistan is hit by a major terrorist attack or the state launches an offensive on terrorist hideouts, the opinion pages and talk shows are flooded with diverging views by political and security analysts on the best way to curb terrorism. Over the years, the ongoing terrorist activity on Pakistani soil has kept this debate alive, allowing two distinct schools of thought to emerge.
There are those analysts who often resonate the importance of eradicating the “root causes of terrorism”, most commonly listed as poverty, lack of education, social injustices or the reactionary vendetta against drone attacks. These ‘reformists’ argue that educational and economic empowerment is the best remedy against radicalisation and terrorist recruitment. They believe that poverty, coupled with ignorance, allows the miscreants to exploit the naivety of the locals, creating a breeding ground for radicalisation where the masses begin to view the terrorists as their ‘saviours’. The case of the current ‘ameer’ (head) of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP,) Maulana Fazlullah, substantiates the arguments of the reformists. Fazlullah in Swat had initially talked about restoring rule of law and addressing social injustices to garner support for his alternative model of governance by the gun. His model was greatly endorsed by the local population, which felt betrayed by the existing order.
This hypothesis of socioeconomic deprivation and terrorism is strongly rejected by the second group that undermines the importance of these factors. The proponents of this school of thought argue that most terrorists are neither socially deprived nor uneducated. Contrary to perception, a whole lot of these terrorists hail from middle class or even affluent elite backgrounds. Faisal Shahzad, the alleged Times Square bomber, was educated in reputed educational institutes in Pakistan, he was fortunate enough to be escorted by chauffer driven cars and was able to afford collage education in the US. Similarly, Omar Sheikh, the mastermind behind the murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl was a graduate of the London School of Economics. Hence, while the theory of socio-economic deprivation may be applicable to the ‘foot soldiers’ who choose to adorn themselves with the suicide vest, it does not correlate to a whole breed of prosperous terrorist strategists. Accordingly, the proponents of this ideology define the fight against terrorism with elaborate emphasis on the role of the state and non-state actors, jihadist ideology, counter-intelligence mechanisms and coercive military operations.
The proponents of both schools of thought present some valid arguments yet they overlook some key shortcomings. Let us put it this way: when the reformists debate the root causes of terrorism, they are not actually concerned about counter-terrorism approaches. The reformists are engrossed in fighting the conditions that lead to terrorism; they have little interest in apprehending the terrorist. Their interest remains in curing the ‘cause’ rather than eliminating the terrorist networks that are actively playing havoc with the lives of the Pakistani people. On the other hand, analysts who solely focus on counter-terrorism through military offensives forget that, while such operations temporarily succeed in cleansing the target areas of militancy, they do little in addressing their socio-economic deprivations. These operations are short-term solutions because, unless the causes are eradicated, the inhabitants will remain entangled in the web of radicalisation.
In turn, it is important to stress here that these perceived root causes themselves are extremely complex, multifaceted and often intertwined. Due to the complex nature of this conflict, there is no unique universal remedy or a simplified formula to end terrorism. What is imperative is a long-term and multipronged holistic strategy that envisions strengthening the institutional governance of development, democracy and security to achieve effective results. Such a strategy must also take on board the two schools of thought and strike a balance.
Accordingly, for any counterterrorism strategy to be effective it is imperative that all possible measures to protect the homeland and shielding civilians with maximum vigilance, better intelligence gathering, a greater degree of interagency coordination and, ultimately, when deemed unavoidable, the use of force. Terrorist networks such as al Qaeda or the Taliban cannot be stopped by anything short of the strongest possible security measures. However, when we debate the root causes of terrorism, then we have to look beyond counterterrorism approaches and perhaps introspect on the socio-economic conditions such as poverty, illiteracy and religious indoctrination — factors that lead to an environment that serves as a breeding ground for terrorist recruitment.
By incorporating aspects from both anti-terrorism and anti-radicalisation approaches, counterterrorism efforts are thus more likely to bear fruit. Such a strategy on the one hand will focus on eliminating existing terrorist networks and, on the other hand, neutralising the causes that provide an enabling environment for terrorist elements to resurface in the future.
The writer is a development practitioner, working with a non-profit organisation on issues pertaining to governance and socio-economic reforms. He can be reached at [email protected]