One third of Iraq, the central region, is now controlled by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a radical outfit involved in the insurgency in Syria. It captured Mosul in early June without resistance from the Iraqi army. Then it occupied the Beiji oil field and brought Diyala, Samara, Tikrit, Fallujah, Ramadhi and other cities in the region under its control. It tried to move into oil-rich Kirkuk but failed after fierce resistance by the Kurdish army, the Peshmerga. The Iraqi army reportedly disintegrated under the onslaught and Sunni soldiers led by their commanding officers defected to ISIS. Over $ 1.2 billion in US-made arms and ammunition fell into the hands of ISIS. The Shia segment of the Iraqi army, backed by Shia militias, is now trying to resist ISIS but with mixed success. Last week, a general of the Iraqi army was killed in the fighting. Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS and one of the US army’s most wanted fugitives, has declared himself the ‘Caliph’ of the Sunni regions of Iraq and Syria. Baghdadi made the declaration in a grand mosque in Mosul last week in the presence of a big crowd. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s rise and declaration are ominous signals. He is projecting himself and ISIS as the counterpart of Hassan Nasrullah and Hezbollah of Lebanon. Hezbollah was established in the 1980s. It grew with the backing of Iran and Syria, and gradually became a stakeholder in Lebanon. It has representation in the Lebanese parliament and wields considerable influence in the politics of Lebanon. Southern Lebanon bordering Israel is virtually under its control. Hezbollah’s relentless fight against occupation compelled Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon, including the Bekaa Valley. In 2006, the capture of two Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah triggered the massive Israeli bombing of Beirut and other parts of Lebanon. Though Israeli airstrikes caused colossal damage, it could not dislodge Hezbollah nor succeed in freeing the abducted soldiers. After the expulsion of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) from Beirut, Syria deployed a few army brigades in Lebanon in the mid-1980s but, over the years, the Lebanese began to resent the Syrian army presence on their soil. The assassination of former Prime Minister (PM) Rafiq Hariri in 2004 sparked violent demonstrations all over Beirut and his acolytes accused Syria of orchestrating the assassination plot. Syrian troops were withdrawn from Lebanon the following year. The Druze, Maronites, Sunni Muslims have distinct stakes and there is a power sharing arrangement amongst different stakeholders. The power sharing agreements are observed more in the breach than in compliance, pushing the country to the precipice from time to time. Lebanon also has large numbers of Palestinians. Israel masterminded a killing spree in September 1982 for over 36 hours at Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. Between 700 and 3,500 Palestinians were murdered. The seizure of almost one third of Iraq’s territory by ISIS has triggered renewed sectarian violence in and around Baghdad. About 1,000 people, including two prominent Sunni imams, have been killed and about a million people have been displaced. They are camped in the middle of deserts where temperatures range from 50 to 55 degrees Celsius. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has vowed to expel ISIS and seeks military assistance from the US, Russia and Iran. President Obama has ruled out sending troops to Iraq but has dispatched 150 marines to assist the evacuation of US citizens in Baghdad, if needed, and to train the Iraqi army. US surveillance over Iraqi air space has reportedly intensified and early this week Mosul came under severe airstrikes. While the US army has denied involvement in the airstrikes, Iran admitted losing a pilot in Iraq. Russia, in compliance with al-Maliki’s request, immediately provided six used fighter jets to the Iraqi army and more are on their way. It is unclear whether Iranian ground troops have arrived in Iraq. In the meantime, Saudi Arabia has deployed 300,000 troops along its border with Iraq. Iraq’s northern Kurdish region has been quasi-independent since the Gulf War in 1992. The four million Kurds have their own government and maintain their own military. The collapse of the Iraqi army in the face of the ISIS attack allowed the Kurds to expand their territory by about 40 percent, including oil-rich Kirkuk. They now control over one third of Iraq’s oil production. The Kurds have scheduled a referendum on the self-determination of Kurdistan and have no intention of reverting to a status dependent on Baghdad for revenue, refraining from directly exporting oil and postponing a claim on Kirkuk. Kurdish officials recently told The Washington Post that ISIS cannot be dismantled by the Iraqi army and Peshmarga cannot do it either. It would take collective action by a regional coalition to neutralise ISIS but the coalition simply does not exist. Iran wants a reliable partner in Baghdad. It will not hesitate to send troops to protect the holy sites in Najaf, Karbala and Samara, but does not have the will to deploy thousands of ground troops to fight an insurgency in Iraq. Saudi Arabia, the ‘champion’ of Sunni Islam, prefers an integrated Iraq but disapproves the marginalisation of Sunnis. It will not endorse an ISIS presence in the Arab peninsula. Iraq could be saved from disintegration by an inclusive government with the exclusion of al-Maliki as prime minister, but this has become hard to achieve. The sale of fighter jets by Russia and political support from Iran has made al-Maliki intransigent. He dismissed John Kerry’s call for a government under a different leadership. The Sunni population has been marginalised and will not withdraw support for ISIS. Likewise, the Kurds in the north have lost confidence in al-Maliki. Kurdish members of his cabinet including the foreign minister have resigned in protest at his accusation that the Kurds were in collusion with ISIS in order to destabilise the government. They are now determined to proceed with a referendum on self-determination. The US does not have any easy choices. Iraq’s government is vulnerable to an ISIS onslaught but providing arms and ammunition to a sectarian government would anger Sunnis in the Middle East. One option would be to forge a regional coalition with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Turkey and the Gulf States to liquidate the funding source of ISIS, encourage Iraq’s Sunni leadership in national reconciliation and persuade al-Maliki to abdicate in favour of a secular leader. Iran must be brought into the diplomatic discourse to encourage Tehran to abandon al-Maliki in favour of a more acceptable candidate to lead the Baghdad government. The al-Maliki government cannot fight an insurgency with a fragmented army. Failure to install a broad-based government in Baghdad with the confidence of major sects and stakeholders will only promote the insurgency. The southern region has a religious affinity with Iran. The Kurdish region in the north enjoys relative peace and prosperity, and friendly relations with Turkey. The central region is volatile and ISIS’s presence has further exacerbated the situation. The stakeholders and their external allies are more prepared than before to support a proxy war in Iraq. This will lead to disintegration and ultimately the ‘Lebanonisation’ of Iraq, which is not desirable for the people of Iraq or the region. The author is a former official of the United Nations